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The nexus between military service and political activism is explored in this thesis. The lives of 153 
politically-exposed Second World War veterans are examined. Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of 
‘Capital’ and ‘Habitus’ are used to examine the ways in which the war shaped the political views of 
the servicemen as well as the ways in which the ex-servicemen could leverage their war service to 
further their post-war political careers. 
An examination of the fault lines of class and culture, in pre-war, White South Africa, provided crucial 
insight into the initial habitus and motivation of the volunteer soldier. War-time military service drew 
together volunteers from every part of South Africa and from each strata of the White community. 
This provided a common platform to develop shared notions of a common ‘South Africanism’. This 
shared comradery facilitated their later mobilisation against the National Party (NP) after 1948. 
The ex-servicemen, having fought German and Italian forces on several warfronts, had been 
exposed to the dangers of totalitarianism. As a result, some returned with an embedded intolerance 
of authoritarianism and, after the war, the Springbok Legion (SL) acted as a clarion call against rising 
racial intolerance in South Africa. The more affluent ex-servicemen, often in line with family tradition, 
joined the established United Party (UP). However, the widely unexpected defeat of the UP in 1948 
by the NP triggered the ex-servicemen’s entry into politics.  
After the NP’s victory in 1948, a cohort of increasingly-politicised ex-servicemen used the NP’s 
wartime dalliance with fascism to mobilise ex-servicemen en masse as the Torch Commando (the 
Torch). The Torch Commando brought together ex-servicemen, active in parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary politics, as a front against the NP in the 1953 elections. However, the UP’s defeat in 
the 1953 elections soon exposed the fault lines, particularly in terms of the ex-servicemen in 
parliamentary politics. The subsequent implosion of the Torch Commando led to the emergence of 
the Union Federal Party (UFP), and Liberal Party (LPSA) after the 1953 elections, which marked the 
end of the ex-serviceman identity as a coherent political identity and revealed an array of diverse 
political views amongst voting Second World War veterans. Tensions between the conservative and 
more progressive and liberal ex-servicemen in the UP led to the formation of the Progressive Party 
(PP) in 1959. 
Finally, increased government repression led to the detention of the more radical ex-servicemen in 
1956 and 1960. Their subsequent involvement in the formation of armed formations in the form of 
the African Resistance Movement and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) provides continuity between the 





Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die verband tussen militêre diens en politieke aktivisme. Die lewens 
van 153 politiek-blootgestelde veterane uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog word ondersoek. Die gebruik 
van Pierre Bourdieu se konsepte ‘Kapital’ en ‘Habitus’ bied ‘n manier aan om te onderskei tussen 
hoe die oorlog die politieke sieninge van die dienspligtige gevorm het en hoe die veterane hul 
oorlogdeelname gebruik het om hul politieke loopbane na die oorlog te bevorder. 
Die ondersoek van onderskeie lyne van klas en kultuur in die blanke Suid-Afrika voor die oorlog, 
bied insig in die aanvanklike habitat en motivering van die vrywilliger. Oorlogdeelname het 
vrywilligers van alle dele van Suid-Afrika en vlakke van die blanke samelewing bymekaar gebring. 
Dit het hulle ‘n gemeenskaplike gebied gegee om hulle tot ‘n gedeelde ‘Suid-Afrikanisme’ te bind. 
Hierdie kameraadskap het hul mobilisering teen die Nasionale Party (NP) na 1948 vergemaklik. 
Die voormalige soldate, wat teen die Duitsers en Italianers op verskeie fronte geveg het, was aan 
die gevare van totalitarisme blootgestel en ‘n onverdraagsaamheid van outoritarisme in die na-
oorlogse Suid-Afrika het ontwikkel. Na die oorlog het die Springbok-legioen (SL) as ‘n oproep teen 
die toenemende rasse-onverdraagsaamheid in Suid-Afrika opgetree. Die meer gegoede veterane, 
dikwels in ooreenstemming met die familietradisie, het by die gevestigde Verenigde Party (UP) 
aangesluit. Die breë onverwagte nederlaag van die UP in 1948 deur die NP het die ou-soldate se 
massa toegang tot die politiek veroorsaak. 
Na die NP-oorwinning in 1948, het ‘n groepering van verpolitiseerde ou-soldate die NP se 
oorlogstyd-toenadering met fascisme gebruik, om die ou-soldate in die Fakkelkommando te 
mobiliseer. Die Fakkelkommando het ou-soldate in die parlementêre politiek en die buite-
parlementêre politiek teen die NP in die 1953-verkiesing saamgevoeg. Die UP se nederlaag in die 
1953-verkiesing het egter vinnig die onderskeie lyne onder die ou-soldate in die parlementêre politiek 
blootgelê. Die inploffing van die Fakkelkommando het tot die ontstaan van die Unie Federale Party 
en die Liberale Party na die 1953-verkiesing gelei. Die einde van die voormalige militêre identiteit, 
as ‘n samehangende politieke identiteit, het die verskeidenheid politieke sienings binne die ou-
soldaat identiteit aan die lig gebring. Die spanning tussen die konserwatiewe en progressiewe oud-
dienspligtiges in die UP het gelei tot die stigting van die Progressiewe Party in 1959. 
Laastens het die verhoogde regeringsonderdrukking van die radikale ou-soldate tot hul aanhouding 
in 1956 en 1960 gelei. Die daaropvolgende betrokkenheid van hierdie oud-dienspligtiges by die 
vorming van gewapende formasies, in die vorm van die African Resistance Movement (ARM) en 
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1. BACKGROUND  
War, like other times of human disaster, strips away at the veneer of society and exposes societal 
fault lines. Suppressed inequalities are brought into stark relief and demand resolution.1 On a global 
scale, the Second World War was no different. The physical defeat of the authoritarian regimes in 
Berlin and Rome weakened European world domination, exposed the dangers of unfettered 
nationalism and anti-Semitism, and allowed for the strengthening of liberalism. The post-war creation 
of the United Nations seemed to usher in a more inclusive world order.2 World wide, returning 
soldiers further strengthened the tide of political reform by calling for broad social reforms and more 
representative governance.3 However, South African ex-servicemen seemed immune to the war’s 
liberalising effects. The ex-servicemen seemed to have remained aloof when the electorate set 
South Africa on a different political trajectory at the first post-war election in 1948.4 Part of the ex-
serviceman’s failure to stem the tide of exclusive Afrikaner nationalism lies in the contested nature 
of South Africa’s involvement in the war.  
From the very beginning, South Africa’s involvement in the war had divided public opinion.5 The very 
decision to fight had spilt the cabinet and left the country divided. The parliamentary debate and vote 
to enter the war had brought Prime Minister Barry Hertzog’s resignation. The Purified National Party 
(PNP), which represented a large sector of the Afrikaans-speaking community who still nursed 
historical grievances against the British Empire vocalised opposition to South Africa’s entering the 
war. In contrast, the English-speaking community, loyal to the idea of the British Empire, had already 
accepted the inevitability of fighting for Britain. There was no consultation with the Black 
communities.6 
The conflicting attitudes in the White community shaped South Africa’s contribution to the war. The 
new Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, restricted the recruitment of White soldiers to volunteers only. 7 The 
soldiers had to volunteer to fight in Africa, and then again to fight in Europe.8 This volunteer army 
 
1  J Fennell, Fighting the People’s War. The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World 
War [ebook, pages 1744] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1126. 
2  DW Krüger, The making of a nation: A history of the Union of South Africa 1910-1961 (Johannesburg: 
MacMillian, 1978), 225, 229. 
3  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 1129. 
4  Fennell, 1193. 
5  Fennell, 139. 
6  M Shain, A Perfect Storm. Antisemitism in South Africa 1930-1948 (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball, 2015), 
233–34; Krüger, The Making of a Nation, 196–98; A Grundlingh, ‘The King’s Afrikaners? Enlistment and 
Ethnic Identity in the Union of South Africa’s Defence Force during the Second World War 1939-45’, 
Journal of African History, 40 (1999), 353. 
7  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 166. 
8  Fennell, 694; Krüger, The Making of a Nation, 202; ND Orpen, Victory in Italy (South African Forces 
World War II) (Volume V) (Cape Town: Purnell and Sons, 1975), 4. 
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appealed to the loyal and to the financially desperate.9 White South African soldiers fought alongside 
Black. Coloured, and Indian soldiers, from both South Africa and other countries, against Italian 
Imperialism in Africa, despite the racist beliefs harboured at home.10 Fighting in Italy, alongside 
communist partisan fighters, exposed the soldiers to further class-based, societal inequalities.11 
Soldiers, freed from the racial constraints of South African society, had their outdated racial beliefs 
confronted, which forced them to reframe their beliefs within a new and rapidly changing world.12 If 
the war experience did not change their world views, it surely tested them severely. 
To returning soldiers, it was apparent that the war was not changing attitudes in South Africa, but 
was instead hardening them.13 The war had allowed the leader of the recast National Party (NP), 
Daniel (DF) Malan, to consolidate political control of the rurally-based Afrikaans-speaking 
community.14 In contrast, the ruling United Party (UP) had become stale and divided.15 Distracted by 
conducting the war, the UP became increasingly dependent on capitalist funding and the goodwill of 
volunteers to run the party.16  
Expectations for post-war South Africa reflected these fault lines in South African politics. Liberals, 
buoyed by the global shift away from authoritarian governance in a liberal direction, saw a similar 
liberal trend evolving in South Africa. They cited the wartime reforms of Jan Hofmeyr, as well as Jan 
Smuts’s realisation that ‘segregation has fallen on evil times’, as evidence of this. The hope that the 
war experience had reconciled the White community and the emergence of a leftist movement 
among the soldiers further emboldened liberals to believe that the war had acted as an accelerant 
for a new ‘holistic’ South Africa.17 Leftist radicals also made positive advances during the war. The 
multi-racial Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) received a semblance of respectability by the 
 
9  Grundlingh, ‘The King’s Afrikaners?’, 360–61. 
10  Krüger, The Making of a Nation, 208; L Lovell, For the Love of Justice (South Africa: Jewish Publications, 
2009), 109. 
11  A Kirkaldy, ‘Very Ordinary Communists: The Life of Ivan and Lesley Schermbrucker’, South African 
Historical Journal, 69, no 3 (2017), 429; L Carneson, Red in the Rainbow: The life and times of Fred 
and Sarah Carneson (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2010), 91; T Lodge, ‘Secret Party: South African 
Communists between 1950 and 1960’, South African Historical Journal, 67, no. 4 (2015), 441; L 
Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting: Memoir of a Time in South African Politics (Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, 1999), 100. 
12  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 1185–86. 
13  Shain, A Perfect Storm, 264; Lovell, For the Love of Justice, 120. 
14  Shain, A Perfect Storm, 274. 
15  Krüger, The Making of a Nation, 228; F Oosthuizen, ‘The Demobilisation of the White Union Defence 
Force Soldiers During and After the Second World War’ (Master’s Dissertation, Rand Afrikaans 
University, 1993), 132-133; University of the Witwatersrand-Historical Papers Research Archive 
(hereafter Wits Historical Papers), A2242 Hackland, ‘Interview with Vause Raw by B Hackland’, 3. 
16  WB White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 1948-1953’ (PhD Thesis, University of Natal, 
1989), 8–12. 
17  JN Lazerson, Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid (Bellville: Mayinuye Books, 
1994), 54; J Hyslop, ‘“Segregation Has Fallen on Evil Days”: Smuts’ South Africa, Global War, and 
Transnational Politics, 1939-1946’, Journal of Global History, 7, no. 3 (2012), 439; S Dubow, ‘Uncovering 
the Historic Strands of Egalitarian Liberalism in South Africa’, Theoria, 61, no. 140 (2014), 14; D Everatt, 
The Origins of Non-Racialism: White opposition to apartheid in the 1950s (Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, 2009), 38–39, 133. 
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Allied states’ association with Russia and even garnered increased electoral support from White 
South Africans.18 Coupled with the Marxist ideology, they believed that they marched with history. 
The physical defeat of Nazism and Fascism in the war surely was the death knell for organisations 
with Nazi-like associations. 
However, the war and the defeat of Adolf Hitler had not exorcised authoritarian ideologies from South 
African soil but had rather grafted some of their ideas onto the stem of Afrikaner nationalism.19 The 
declaration of war that had unified the English-speaking community behind Smuts had left the 
Afrikaner community divided.20 Capitalising on the disarray within the Afrikaner community, DF 
Malan provided the NP with steady leadership and direction, and he positioned himself as the 
Volksleier (Political/Cultural Leader).21 Assisted by François (FC) Erasmus, the NP Party organiser, 
he used the war period to consolidate the Nationalist hold over Afrikaners in the rural areas.22 In the 
urban areas, Afrikaans and Black workers filled the vacuum brought by the exodus of English-
speaking mineworkers, who had left to enlist with the departing regiments. The NP exploited the 
influx of Afrikaners to the Rand to gain a foothold in the White mineworkers’ unions.23 Parallel to 
these efforts, the emergence of the often-violent Ossewabrandwag (OB) (Ox-wagon Sentinel) and 
other ‘shirtist’ movements (styled on the Nazi movement) met any home front liberal or anti-Afrikaner-
Nationalist tendencies with intimidation and force.24 After the war, DF Malan confidently depended 
on the support of a significant portion of the Afrikaans community, which outnumbered the English 
and Jewish communities.  
Returning ex-servicemen entered the political arena from two perspectives. Those with previous 
formal political experience simply returned to their positions in the UP. They either treated the war 
as a hiatus from politics or an affirmation of their family affiliation with the UP. In extreme cases, they 
even assumed their fathers’ seats in Parliament and the party.25 These politicians returned from the 
war buoyed by overt military accolades and the loyalty bequeathed from combat comradery.26 Others 
experienced the war from the ranks and, politicised by participation in the Springbok Legion (SL), 
 
18  Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, 11. 
19  Shain, A Perfect Storm, 37; PJ Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right 
on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Facist Era (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 
Johannesburg, 1991), 14. 
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were determined to build on wartime activism.27 The SL, formed during the war inter alia to protect 
soldiers’ interests during demobilisation, was retooled as a vehicle for more comprehensive social 
justice. The SL was virulently anti-fascist and after the war refused to forget or forgive the 
Nationalists’ flirtation with Nazism.28  
Wartime animosity that had developed between soldiers and the rising Afrikaner Nationalist 
movements, who had often imitated the ideals of Nazism, persisted after the war. During the war, 
the tension between servicemen and the Afrikaner nationalists often split out onto the streets, with 
returning Afrikaans soldiers most targeted for abuse.29 The animosity continued after the war. The 
SL disrupted Nationalist rallies in Johannesburg in 1945 and 1946.30 During by-elections, ex-
servicemen were called upon to protect UP and Labour Party (LP) candidates from Nationalist 
interference.31 The UP, although willing to call on the ex-servicemen for electioneering, was wary 
that their absorption into the UP would disrupt the status quo within the party. Instead, the UP 
leadership incorrectly believed the latent wartime association of the ex-servicemen with the UP 
would be sufficient to pull them through the 1948 general election.32 
South African historians tend to identify the NP victory in the 1948 elections as a turning point in 
South African history, diverting the country away from the global trend of liberalism, and towards a 
racist dystopia.33 Although a litany of poor decisions by Smuts led to the 1948 defeat,34 a lingering 
belief remains that the ex-servicemen had deserted Smuts in his ‘finest hour’.35 Historians are divided 
on the role and significance of the ex-serviceman’s vote in the 1948 elections. Rodney Davenport 
describes the “restlessness of ex-soldiers” and “irritations of war-time controls over food 
distributions”, as possible “pin-pricks” that pushed the electorate towards the NP.36 Ex-servicemen, 
stripped of military status, “joined the ranks of the politically disaffected”.37 Jonathan Fennell is more 
adamant, arguing that “the conditions for institutionalised apartheid in South Africa had been 
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substantially shaped by the experience in the war”.38 The war had revealed the latent racism of the 
White South African soldiers, who would now seek ‘extreme solutions to the colour problem’. For 
Fennell, it ‘seems reasonable’ that the anti-Black, anti-capitalist agenda of the NP had attracted the 
ex-serviceman vote in 1948.39 However, François Oosthuizen and Neil Roos believe that the 
Nationalists’ flirtation with Nazism hindered its ability to access an ex-servicemen support base.40  
The 1948 elections exposed Smuts’s Achilles heel. Despite all his international accolades, he acted 
poorly as a domestic politician. Notwithstanding various warnings of a looming defeat at the polls,41 
he failed to use his power of incumbency to weigh the elections in his favour at the demarcation 
commissions. Furthermore, he ‘grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory’ by snubbing Nicolaas 
(Klasie) Havenga, the leader of the Afrikaner Party and a Hertzog disciple. DF Malan thereby 
secured the wafer-thin parliamentary majority he needed to consolidate his hold on power. Despite 
only winning the minority of the popular vote, the NP, with the Afrikaner Party support, gained the 
majority of seats in Parliament.42  
If the ex-servicemen had voted for the NP in 1948, their support was fleeting, and no ex-serviceman 
bloc within the NP emerged. Instead, once the implications of the Nationalists’ electoral victory 
became apparent, ex-servicemen worked to counter the NP. The NP’s opponents did not wait long 
to lobby ex-serviceman for support.43 After 1948, ex-servicemen, as political actors in their own right, 
entered the South African political landscape in opposition to the Nationalists.  
The emergence of a politicised veteran community provided an outlet for unresolved wartime issues. 
The veterans portrayed the NP’s denial of the franchise to people of colour, and other oppressive 
legislation, as an attack on the constitution, something they had fought to uphold. When juxtaposed 
against similar Nazi machinations in pre-war Europe, the NP appeared to be a post-war extension 
of European fascism.44 Constitutionalism and anti-fascism fuelled the ex-servicemen entry into the 
political arena.  
In 1951, ex-servicemen in the SL and the UP collaborated to consolidate the veteran community’s 
concerns into one movement. This was the Torch Commando, also simply known as the Torch. As 
a mass movement, the Torch appealed to wartime camaraderie and the soldiers’ sense of duty in 
order to further constitutionalism in South Africa. The Torch thereby bound itself to act constitutionally 
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but without the discipline and organisation of a political party. Thus, to leverage its popular support, 
the Torch would have to cooperate with established political parties. 45  
Despite playing an active role in the creation of the Torch, neither the SL nor the UP was able to 
stamp their authority on the movement. Legionaries who had played a pivotal role in organising the 
Torch’s inaugural march to Parliament, known as the Steel Commando, were soon jettisoned to 
prevent accusations of communism from tainting the movement.46 These legionnaires, cut adrift from 
formal white politics, soon positioned themselves as the white component of the Congress 
Movement. After their involvement in the framing of the Freedom Charter, the NP government 
initiated the Treason Trial and a barrage of banning orders to neutralise their influence.47 
The UP attempted to ensure Torch compliance by inserting pliable people into the organisation, 
providing funding for the Torch and aggressively lobbying its leadership.48 Key Torch leaders, who 
eschewed such influences, continued to pursue independent agendas.49 Although the Torch, the UP 
and the LP agreed to fight the 1953 elections in a United Democratic Front (UDF or the Front), 
tensions soon arose around the direction the front should take.50 Instead of being controlled by the 
UP, the Torch, founded on idealistic views, would become a catalyst to worsen internal divisions 
within the UP.  
The UP still smarting from electoral defeat in 1948 was dealt with a series of reverses in quick 
succession. The death of Hofmeyr, Smuts’s heir apparent and Smuts himself, shortly afterwards, left 
the party depleted of leadership.51 A muted leadership contest left Kosie (JGN) Strauss reluctantly 
leading a party divided between liberals and conservatives.52 Conservatives, such as maverick 
politician Arthur Barlow and his son-in-law, ex-serviceman Frank Waring, pushed for the party to 
move closer to the Nationalists.53 In turn, the liberal faction, emboldened by the left-leaning Torch, 
began to agitate for reform from within the UP. However, ex-servicemen in the Torch soon realised 
that UP divisions were irreconcilable.54  
Despite being in partnership with the UP, where the UP would provide political direction and the 
Torch mass support, the leadership of the Torch persisted in charting an independent political 
course.55 Fresh from agreeing to a common front with the UP in 1952, the secretary of the Torch, 
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Louis Kane-Berman announced the possibility of the Torch holding mass protests if the NP acted 
unconstitutionally in the matter of the Coloured Franchise.56 His veiled threat of ‘something in 
reserve’, further fed the government’s paranoia of a Torch-led coup de état.57 Arguments between 
the Natalian Torch and UP over possible federalism also surfaced.58 Overtures to merge the UP and 
the Torch made later that year, contributed to worsening relations, as it included an attempt to unseat 
Kane-Berman from the Torch.59 Progressively more repressive measures from the NP elicited 
principled responses from the Torch leadership that pushed it further and further away from the UP’s 
political pragmatic positions. Sensitive to contain developments on the radical left, the liberally-
minded Torch leadership found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the diverging political agendas.60  
Furthermore, the NP was quick to exploit the internal inconsistencies within the ‘broad church’ 
approach of the Torch. Immediately the NP used the time-tested conspiratorial accusations of the 
Torch being both ‘communist’, and ‘capitalist’. Behind the propaganda barrage, there remained a 
fear in the NP that, as ex-servicemen, the Torch would attempt to unseat the government violently.61 
The NP remained wary of the Torch until its disbanding after the 1953 elections.  
Despite presenting a unified front to the electorate, as the 1953 elections drew closer, it became 
clear that the Torch was not able to sustain itself as a mass movement. At odds with the UP and 
unwilling to becoming a political party itself, the Torch chose to disband.62 The disbanding of the 
Torch ended the politicisation of the veteran identity in South African politics. However, the collapse 
of the Torch did not mark the withdrawal of ex-servicemen from politics. Instead, with veteran identity 
removed from the table, ex-servicemen pursued their political activism within the framework of 
political parties. Those that had been alienated by the UP’s vacillations and machinations founded 
two political parties, the Union Federal Party (UFP) and the non-racial Liberal Party (LPSA).63 
The UP was happy to be rid of some of its more liberal tendencies and reorganised under the 
leadership of Sir De Villiers Graaff.64 As a former prisoner of war (POW), he soon drew loyal ex-
servicemen around himself.65 Many of them had either served with him or in senior positions in the 
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Union Defence Force (UDF). The war veterans caucus was strengthened by soldiers who left the 
UDF in protest against Erasmus’ reforms as Minister of Defence.66 Furthermore, Graaff moved to 
make the UP more acceptable to the ‘backveld’ or rural constituencies. He recruited conservative 
candidates to stand in these constituencies in the 1958 elections. However, his attempts to win over 
the nationalist support base failed and further alienated the remaining liberals and progressive 
members of the party, many of them ex-servicemen. Matters came to a head at the 1959 UP 
conference in Bloemfontein, where 12 members of Parliament and others left the party to establish 
the Progressive Party (PP).67 Significantly, the Progressives secured the support of Harry 
Oppenheimer, which would mean the eventual end to an essential source for UP funding.68 
By 1960 it was evident that veteran status and its inherent social capital had lost its currency. The 
veteran community no longer had sufficient cohesiveness to act as a pressure group. Ex-
servicemen, dispersed across the political spectrum, and no longer bound by a collective identity, 
now relied on wartime loyalties within established political formations. However, the NP 
government’s enthusiastic response to events in Sharpeville concentrated on a significant number 
of ex-servicemen, who had been politicised by the war, in prison together. Their incarceration 
reignited previous martial ideals, planting the seeds for future armed resistance.69  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
According to Roos, of the University of the Free State, historians have given little attention to the 
relationship between military service in the Second World War and post-war political activism in 
South Africa.70 However, the involvement of ex-servicemen in post-war politics re-emerges in the 
literature when the focus is placed on the formative years of the anti-apartheid struggle, when ex-
servicemen played an instrumental role in both MK71 and the African Resistance Movement (ARM).72 
However, their immediate post-war political participation is overwhelmed by the louder discourses of 
the radical, liberal and nationalist historiographies.73  
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Historians, including Karen Horn, Surya Chetty, Albert Grundlingh and Roos, have identified the 
paucity of South African history writing on the Second World War.74 The advent of apartheid shortly 
after the war, discouraged historical inquiry partially because “it [stood] as a counterfactual moment 
to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism”.75 Several writers, including John Lambert, Ian van der Waag 
and David Katz, observe that the historiography of South Africa’s involvement in the war languished 
in the doldrums during NP rule.76 Roos and Roger Boulter continued this reasoning by noting that 
the disinterest extended to the influence of wartime experiences on post-war politics.77 Roos further 
suggests that post-war government oppression made key proponents reluctant to both keep records 
of their activities or openly share their views. This reluctance is evident in the lack of consolidated 
primary source material on the Torch and SL.78 
Nicholas Waddy, an American historian, provides another compelling explanation for the broken 
continuity between the war to post-war history in South African history writing. The seeming 
obsession of South African historians with apartheid has framed the 1948 elections as a “watershed” 
in South African history. Waddy believes that interest in pre-1948 history rarely extends beyond 
framing it as an era of preparation for apartheid. This tendency has also led to standard 
interpretations of South African History as a particular type of race conflict, blinding historians to 
other just as “real” historical threads, such as intra-white tensions. According to Waddy, it means 
“the essential continuities between the pre- and post-1948 periods are frequently overlooked”.79  
Van der Waag and Deon Visser point out that much of the post-1948 military history writing, done 
by Afrikaner nationalist historians,  
focussed on the political history of the glorious march of Afrikaner nationalism toward the creation 
of ‘South African’ structures and eventually the advent of the republic in 1961 … [and that] … [i]t 
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was sufficient for nationalist scholars to note simply that 1948 allowed a triumphant nationalist 
party to reshape the UDF into a supposedly more “South African” force…80  
Van der Waag points out that in South Africa there has been tendency to cast war and military history 
in a supporting role to the dominant discourse of Afrikaner nationalism or the anti-apartheid struggle, 
which is even present in Anglo-Boer War historiography.81 
The dominant Republican, nationalist narrative, where the declaration of the Republic in 1961 
formalised the South African identity, has de-emphasised the turbulent period between the war and 
Republic. The domination of the competing narratives of race conflict and of the ‘March of Afrikaner 
Nationalism’ silenced the ex-servicemen’s political activism in this period. The disconnect in South 
African history writing provides some explanation for the literature gap dealing with this facet of South 
African history. As a result, the role of war veterans in post-war society has remained hidden, thereby 
leaving an important strand in South African history underappreciated. In an attempt to expose the 
nexus between wartime experience and post-war politics, the next section reviews both Second 
World War material and post-war material.  
2.1 Official and semi-official histories  
The National Party government influenced the writing of the official and semi-official histories. The 
historians of the Union War History section produced a number of narratives during and after the 
war. Three volumes appeared under the editorship of John Agar-Hamilton. However, the Union War 
History section was closed prematurely in 1962 – they worked on narratives disagreeable to the 
government of the day – leaving Colonel Neil Orpen, a soldier rather than an historian, to dominate 
the history writing after 1962. Orpen collaborated with poet and ex-soldier, James Ambrose Brown, 
and a retired general, Henry (Kalfie) Martin, to produce an eight-volume series, between 1962 and 
1982, covering the South African forces participation in the war, dealing with the preparation for war, 
land campaigns and air campaigns. The series was published by Purnell of Cape Town. Orpen 
carefully bowdlerised many controversies or embarrassing incidents so as to not offend the NP 
government. Between 1990 and 1994, Ashanti published the last semi-official history in a 12-book 
series called South Africans at War, which included books dealing with South Africa’s participation 
in the Second World War. The series marked a final effort by the NP to influence the Second World 
War narrative. Funded by the SADF, the project had been aimed to alleviate some of the international 
isolation ahead of the changes the Fredrick (FW) de Klerk government was ushering in. But they fail 
to impress. These histories focus on the war and because of the political context, rarely extend their 
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analysis beyond the end of the conflict, thus providing scant insight into the nexus between war 
experience and post-war political activism.82 
2.2 Regimental histories 
Regimental histories, another significant contribution to the South African wartime narrative, provide 
some continuity between war and peace as they tend to cover the entire life span of the regiment.83 
Older Regiments, such as the SA Irish, the Transvaal Scottish and the Cape Town Highlanders, 
have several volumes. These histories, written by the soldiers themselves, can provide valuable 
insights into the transition of volunteer soldiers back into active citizen life. 
In the post-war period the English-medium regiments, feeling threatened by the reforms of Erasmus, 
commissioned the writing of a wave of regimental histories.84 Their primary focus was to record for 
posterity the regiments’ and soldiers’ achievements and sacrifice. Unsurprisingly, a ‘drum and 
trumpet’ style dominated. The regimental perspective from the tactical level dominated descriptions 
of wartime campaigning and the post-war period was an assemblage of the small minutiae of 
regimental matters, such as promotions, training camps and transfers.85  
During the 1950s, South African regimental historians avoided discussing the post-war political 
environment, especially the non-military implications of the political decisions made by Erasmus. 
When narrating the political climate, the focus tended to be on the organisational impact of the 
restructuring of the UDF.86 The efforts of the Minister of Defence, Erasmus, and of his protégé, 
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Colonel Rudolph Hiemstra, to reorganise and control the military archives possibly deterred many 
narrators from being overly critical.  
Later histories such as Tartan on the Veld87 and The Kaffrarian Rifles, 1876-198688 broke from this 
trend and made direct reference to the political tension between the regiments and Erasmus. Mark 
Coghlan, writer of recent histories of Royal Natal Carbineers and Umvoti Mounted Rifles, unfettered 
by the fears of the 1950s, was even more critical of the minister. He documented the struggle of 
Natal’s regiments to protect their English-medium identity in Brother vs Brother: The Colonial Citizen 
Soldier in Natal during the Anglo-Boer War and the Implication for Later ACF Regiments in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. Coghlan links the Active Citizen Force (ACF) units to post-1948 protest movements 
such as the Torch, the Horticulturalists, and Freedom Radio.89 
Despite the various motivations for writing regimental history, and the political constraints upon the 
authors, this genre of history writing provides continuity between the wartime and post-war periods. 
Despite their ‘drum and trumpet’ style and the attempts to avoid political debate, their authors reveal 
some of the tensions between the NP Government and the regiments of the ACF. Later authors, 
including Coghlan, James Mitchell and Francis Coleman, explore these issues in more depth. 
Coghlan links Erasmus’ reforms to the alienation of the ACF members and subsequent political 
action by ex-servicemen.  
2.3 General works 
There are several general histories on the post-war changes the Union of South Africa underwent 
before the declaration of the Republic. However, the majority of these sources only briefly touch on 
the Union’s war participation, the war years and the influence of the post-war politicised veteran 
movements. Floris (Floors) van Jaarsveld in Van Riebeeck tot PW Botha refers to the Torch as a 
part of a United Front with the UP and LP.90 Daniël Kruger links the creation of the Torch to the 
‘communist-inspired’ SL. He however dismisses its impact stating that “notwithstanding the support 
it received from opposition newspapers, it had little success”.91 Davenport, who was an ex-
serviceman and a member of the Liberal Party (LPSA), chronicles the Torch’s lively rise and fall 
concisely and traces its influence beyond its fall in 1953 in South Africa: A Modern History. He 
shrewdly observes that “[i]t’s divided spirit lived on in the UP and the emergence of two new political 
parties, both formed in May 1953; the Union Federal Party…and the Liberal Party…”92  
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Later general histories are even less detailed regarding the role ex-servicemen and veteran 
organisations played in post-war politics. Herman Giliomee, in his The Afrikaners Biography of a 
People, refers to the Torch only in terms of the Coloured franchise and downplays the political 
implications of Erasmus’ military reforms.93 David Welsh, in The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, does not 
mention either the SL or the Torch.94 It seems general histories overlook the ex-serviceman role in 
post-war politics. For this study, general histories, therefore, only contextualise the broad political 
landscape of the Union of South Africa.  
2.4 Academic journals, dissertations and theses 
The scant reference to the role played by ex-servicemen in post-war politics in general histories, 
official military histories and regimental histories suggests a focus area for study. However, a review 
of a variety of more specialist literature is required to consider works covering the war and the post-
war periods to trace the continuity between war service and post-war political activism.  
In recent decades, historians and political scientists – inter alia Lambert, Albert Grundlingh, Louis 
Grundlingh, Roos, Horn, Kevin Greenbank, Bill Nasson, Visser, Van der Waag, Timothy Stapleton 
and Annette Seegers – have built a collection of South African Second World War literature.95 
Lambert and Albert Grundlingh investigate the motivations for White men to join the war effort. Their 
work reveals interesting intersections between class, intra-white ethnic identity and their reasons for 
enlisting from September 1939.96 Albert Grundlingh argues that many poor Afrikaners often joined 
to escape impoverishment.97 He does concede that the more affluent Afrikaners may have been 
motivated by higher ideals.98 Lambert found that the English-speaking community, possibly being 
more prosperous than the average Afrikaner, joined because of the righteousness of the cause and 
a strong affiliation to Britain.99 Both Oosthuizen and Greenbank concur that, among whites, pre-war 
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social class or wealth influenced the soldiers’ war experience.100 Such differences in pre-war 
expectations may have shaped their war experiences and influenced post-war activism. 
Adopting a ‘war and society’ approach, Nasson’s Jacana pocketbook explores the influence of the 
war on society in a concise and accessible manner.101 Works by Fankie Monama102 and Chetty103 
investigate the propaganda efforts by the military to garner support on the home front, while other 
histories, such as that produced by Horn,104 are more topical and concentrate on the experiences of 
South African prisoners of war (POWs). Stapleton, Van der Waag, and Seegers, while adopting very 
different approaches, fill a long-existing void in terms of overarching histories of the South African 
armed forces. The nature of these studies precludes coverage of any individual war experiences.105 
The lived experience so often lacking in general military history is the focus of the new social history 
approach that emerged in the late 1970s. The approach focuses on the dynamic of power from the 
perspective of the ‘ordinary person’ or ‘history from below’.106 Some valuable additions to the South 
African historical narrative have been made by adding marginalised groups that were previously left 
off the stage of history. Louis Grundlingh’s work on Black ex-servicemen107 and Chetty’s and Nancy 
Clark’s investigations of the war from the Black and feminine perspectives,108 chronicle the loosening 
grip of white masculine dominance caused by the war. The post-war re-emergence of white male 
dominance resulted in bitter disappointment for women and Blacks who were marginalised during 
demobilisation and eventually excluded from the military environment.  
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James Bourhill,109 Greenbank110 and Gustav Bentz111 have recast the war experience from the 
ordinary white soldiers’ perspective. Roos goes further by using the framework of radical theory to 
make a unique and vital contribution. He interrogates the role and experiences of ‘ordinary’ White 
soldiers during and after the war through the lens of ‘whiteness’. He uses the radical (SL) ex-
servicemen’s post-war political engagements to map out the fault lines of class, ethnicity and race 
in South African society.112 The critique of his work by Alex Mouton and Lambert raises questions 
about the influence of the war on the broader spectrum of ex-servicemen who pursued careers as 
opposition politicians. Both Mouton and Lambert point out that Roos focused on ordinary soldiers 
and suggest that further enquiry is needed if his findings are to be generalised beyond the category 
of the ‘ordinary’ soldier or the working class.113 
The observations of Lambert, Albert Grundlingh and Greenbank regarding the intersection between 
politics, class and ethnicity provides substance to Mouton and Lambert’s critique of Roos. Lambert 
identifies the intersection between white-racial identity and class, and argues that the British South 
African identity was “male and middle class”.114 Fennell, using quantitative techniques, confirms that 
the English-speaking recruit came from the more prosperous strata of society than his Afrikaans-
speaking comrade.115 However, Lambert laments that being trapped in the ‘middle’, the middle-class 
White English speaking community has become the “unknown people” of South African history.116 
Within the South African context, Jonathan Hyslop’s exposition of Perla Siedle Gibson117 provides a 
glimpse into the history from the middle. Further cases, are to be found in the genre of 
autobiographies, biographies and memoirs.118 Similarly, Mouton explores history from the 
perspective of those on the edge of power in Iron in the Soul: The Leaders of the Official 
Parliamentary Opposition in South Africa, 1910–1993. He provides a biographic overview of the 
opposition leaders in South Africa, of which Graaff, Colin Eglin and Radclyffe Cadman had served 
in the war.119 According to Mouton the war had enhanced Graaff’s stature which ensured some ex-
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servicemen’s loyalty to him. In contrast Eglin’s war experience had awoken a principled hatred for 
fascism and discriminatory government in him.120 
South African military historians prefer to focus on military matters, often ending the narrative at the 
end of the war, leaving the tracing of the continuity of threads into the post-war periods to others.121 
For instance, Greenbank observed that it was “the upper echelons of society who were educated in 
Britain and seemed likely to pursue careers in government or as leaders of industry”.122 Oosthuizen 
observed that “common war-time experience by no means resulted in common political 
philosophy”.123 Similarly, Lambert concludes that despite the English-speaking community’s total 
involvement in the war effort on both the home front and abroad, there remained a dangerous 
detachment from politics and insensitivity to any demands for political reform from their returning 
servicemen.124 Horn also finds a consistent lack of effort by the ex-servicemen to become involved 
in politics.125 Greenbank, however, felt that the war might have had a more considerable influence 
distilling a feeling of political disposition among younger recruits.126 Fennell goes further in claiming 
that, instead of liberalising soldiers’ political perspectives, the war had “hardened White servicemen’s 
racial prejudices and encouraged many to seek extreme solutions to the colour problem”.127 He 
believes that it would be ‘reasonable’ to argue that wartime experience may even have caused ex-
servicemen to have supported the NP in the 1948 elections.128  
Focused study on the political history, especially that of white opposition to apartheid, seems to 
refute Fennell’s assertions and provide a more nuanced view of the political world in which ex-
servicemen had to reintegrate. Such works enable an unbroken thread to be traced from war 
experience, through the veteran organisations, to political activism. Randolf Vigne, in Liberals 
Against Apartheid, and Lambert, in ‘Their Finest Hour: English-speaking South Africans in World 
War II’, point out that the SL provided a voice for both communists and liberals.129 Joshua Lazerson 
in Against the Tide, and Barry White in The Role of the Springbok Legion in the Communist Party of 
South Africa’s Common Front Strategy, 1941-1950 focus more intently on the post-war role of the 
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communist ex-servicemen in the SL.130 Notwithstanding the value of these sources, they oversimplify 
the influence of war service on political activism by treating it as membership of a veterans’ 
association rather than systematically illustrating the various effects of war participation upon 
broader social interaction and community life. 
Similarly, other political histories, especially those focused on the 1950s, do not investigate the nexus 
between war service and political views, but rather focus on the influence of ex-servicemen 
organisations in post-war South Africa. Opposition political discourse, when placed under academic 
scrutiny, reveals the influence which the veteran organisations (the SL131 and the Torch) exerted on 
political events of the 1950s. Michael Fridjhon’s paper ‘The Torch Commando & The Politics of White 
Opposition’ has become the reference point for subsequent discussions on the Torch.132 White 
explores the symbiotic relationship between the Torch, the UP and the ‘Natal Stand’. Thus, studies 
that focus on the opposition politics of the 1950s tend to disregard the wartime experiences that 
shaped the ex-servicemen’s political activism.133  
Interestingly, Brian Reid in ‘The Federal Party, 1953-1962’ reveals that the Natal Torch leadership 
was instrumental in the formation of the UFP.134 Whereas Anne Moffat, in ‘From ‘Conscience Politics’ 
to the Battlefields of Political Activism’, places ex-servicemen, such as Kenneth Hill, Hans Meidner, 
Terence Beard, Peter Brown, Leopold (Leo) Kuper, Leopold (Leo) Marquard and Joseph (Jock) 
Isacowitz at the heart of the LPSA.135 Similarly, David Everatt references the activism of ex-
servicemen and highlights the tensions between the radical and liberal ex-servicemen in the 
Torch,136 while Boulter speculates that the frustration of UDF officers with Erasmus translated into 
support for the Torch and UP when the officers eventually were pressured into resigning or retiring.137 
Albeit valuable, these sources do not provide a satisfactory bridge between war experiences and the 
post-war period.  
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2.5 International literature 
A survey of international literature provides some theoretical direction in addressing the link between 
the Second World War and the post-war political activism of the ex-servicemen. Roos, Ernst 
Malherbe, and van Jaarsveld have all drawn parallels between the race relations of South Africa and 
the Southern states of the USA.138 White US ex-servicemen developed a ‘sense of responsibility to 
build a better world’ and saw political activism as a continuation of their initial military service 
obligation.139 The post-war political experience of Iraq War veterans seems to replicate these 
findings.140 These findings suggest a sense of continuity in ex-serviceman behaviour and could 
provide insight into South African veteran activism. 
The focus on social history as “history from below” treats ex-servicemen as a potentially marginalised 
group.141 A limited number of studies dispute this trend, although studies of Second World War ex-
servicemen in parliamentary affairs are scarce.142 Social scientists show a similar disinterest in the 
middle-class as a group.143 However, there has been some thought-provoking work done regarding 
the First World War.144 These studies provide useful insights into analytic methodologies.  
The privileged position of White South Africa ex-servicemen in South African society makes a 
comparison of their situation with veterans from other countries problematic. Angel Alcade and Xose 
Seixas warn against making generalisations from global Second World War veteran historiography, 
which casts veterans as marginalised groups.145 Studies on Canadian-Indian,146 Afro-American,147 
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Indian-American148 and African149 ex-servicemen emphasise veteran marginalisation. These studies 
suggest that ex-servicemen developed a ‘sense of entitlement’ or special privilege as a result of their 
service. But poor demobilisation policies and societal reintegration aggravate the feeling of 
entitlement, making the veteran vulnerable to mobilisation by political elites.150 While White South 
African ex-servicemen may not be reflective of such groups, their war experience may have set them 
apart from society. Roos observes, “veterans were different to other White men in South Africa. They 
stood out as a social category, and the bonds of comradeship they developed on active service were, 
for most, lifelong”.151 South African White ex-servicemen did develop both a ‘sense of entitlement’ 
and a sense of solidarity in the post-world order.152 
There is a clear, and definite, gap in the literature appertaining to the post-war roles played by 
demobilised White South African servicemen in the political arena. Global literature confirms that the 
nexus between military service and veteran political activism, is a valid area of enquiry. 
3. AIM AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The aims of this study are to to gain a better understanding of the roles played by White ex-
servicemen in political opposition to the National Party in South Africa, from 1948 to 1961. The study 
focuses on White ex-servicemen that were politically active after the war through to 1961.  
The timeframe for the study covers the period from the outbreak of war in September 1939 through 
to the proclamation of the Republic in May 1961. The reason for this was to enable an examination 
of the formative influences of the ex-servicemen’s war experience on their post-war political careers. 
Gibbs refers to this period as the ‘twilight years’ of the Union.153 The period marks a transition in 
South African history, with the systematic dismantling of the grand experiment of ‘White South 
Africanism’ and its replacement with a rigid ideology of Afrikaner nationalism and racial apartheid. 
MacMillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ speech, the outbreak of violence in Sharpeville in 1960 and the 
declaration of the Republic in 1961 mark the end of this period.154  
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The study has the following three research objectives:  
• To examine the extent to which participation in the Second World War influenced ex-
servicemen and their later political careers.  
• To examine the influences exerted by ex-servicemen, as a collective (i.e. veteran political 
movements) on opposition politics. Inter alia, to evaluate the usefulness of veteran status as a 
coherent category. 
• To examine the interactions, on a transactional level, of leading ex-servicemen in the South 
African political arena in the years between 1948 and 1961, with specific reference to networks 
of influence and obligation derived from a collective war experience. To assess the role of 
these veterans within the wider South African political discourse. 
4. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Writing this thesis revealed several interesting areas for further enquiry which were not pursued 
either due to the limitation of space or because they fell outside the stated scope. These included, 
but are not limited to the following. 
• A reoccurring theme in South African history writing is the use of constructed identities to 
support the narrative. Both nationalist and radical historians use constructed identities to 
deliver a crisp description of the struggle of coherent and homogenous groups for dominance 
in South Africa. However, an alternative to the divisiveness of using identity, be it class, 
ethnicity or race, lies in the ideas of South Africanism. The study uncovered efforts within the 
elite white population to construct a shared ‘South Africanism’. Smuts attempts to merge the 
provincial elites into one South African identity is not only an area for further enquiry but also 
speaks to Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts on the transformation of capital between both fields and 
types.  
• In the same vein, the grouping of all whites which did not form part of Afrikanerdom into one 
pseudo-typology (i.e. English-speaking) obscured the individual histories of these 
communities and convoluted many threads of history into an indecipherable identity loosely 
known as the English-speaking South African. Today a more ambiguous ‘White’ identity in 
dialectic conflict with a generic ‘Black’ identity threatens to further obscure understanding of 
these communities’ nuances and minutiae. 
• The discussion of the differences between the African and Italian Campaigns highlighted the 
varying psychological impact of war on soldiers fighting in different campaigns. The deep 
impression or lack thereof which two such different Campaigns had on the fighting soldier is 
a field for further research. 
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• The scope of the study covered the Union of South Africa from 1939 until 1960. However, 
after the declaration of Republic additional ex-servicemen surfaced in politics, thus opening 
the possibility to extend the study to include the ex-servicemen in politics during the Republic 
of South Africa as well. 
• The symbiotic relationship between business and politics lurked ever-present throughout the 
discussion. This is evident when considering the number of ex-servicemen that had found 
employment in Anglo-American, which under the leadership of Oppenheimer supported a 
progressive business agenda in South Africa. There needs to be further investigation into the 
nexus between business, politics and the formation of a shared South African identity. 
• The sample group of this thesis were neither ordinary soldiers nor predominantly Generals, 
thereby positioning the study somewhere between history from below and the broad brushes 
of general history. The study thus provides a view from the middle and suggests that not only 
is the view from the middle possible, but it also can provide invaluable insights into the 
pragmatical synthesis of the ideological conflicts. 
• The dual-use of prosopography and biography leveraged quantitive and qualitative methods 
to re-evaluate previously accepted views, thereby giving more substance to the foundations 
of historical debate. This technique is a powerful addition to the historian’s toolbox. 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The historical method was used. It is versatile and adaptable. As Jonathon Moses and Torbjorn 
Knutsen explain: 
The core of the method is to probe evidence in order to determine its solidity. The most refreshing 
quality of the historical method is that the historian presents his case in everyday language. The 
historical method is remarkably varied allowing the utilisation of a wide range of approaches and 
perspectives to determine the veracity of claims.155 
Everatt observes that a good historian is not “restricted by methodology or ideology to one data 
source or the other. He finds useful, often vital data, everywhere, attracted to whatever seems to be 
glinting in the gloom”.156 This universal, eclectic method accommodates collective and individual 
perspectives. In this spirit, this study used various data resources. The study, in the first instance, 
relied on the personal experiences of the ex-servicemen. In this regard, ten memoirs, 
 
155  JW Moses and TL Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Science 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007), 117. 
156  D Everatt, ‘The historian who can help us all make sense of the mess the world’s in’, The Conversation 
(27 June 2019). Available: https://theconversation.com/the-historian-who-can-help-us-all-make-sense-
of-the-mess-the-worlds-in-118469 [Accessed: 3 July 2019]. 
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autobiographies, and personal accounts (Malherbe,157 Graaff,158 Yossel (Joe) Slovo,159 Eglin,160 
Gideon Jacobs,161 Helen Joseph,162 Len Lee-Warden,163 David Brokensha,164 James Chutter165 and 
Kane-Berman166) were examined and placed alongside an additional ten biographies 
(Oppenheimer,167 Adolphus (Sailor) Malan,168 Brown,169 Lionel (Rusty) Bernstein,170 Ivan 
Schermbrucker,171 Leopold (Leo) Lovell,172 Jacobus (Kosie) Marais,173 Isacowitz,174 Walter Hain175 
and Fred Carneson.176). Most are published works: a few only are held in manuscript form in libraries 
and repositories (Lee-Warden,177 and Kane-Berman178). Furthermore, 13 transcribed interviews 
support these life histories (Brian Hackland’s interviews with Eglin, Jan Steytler, Harry Schwarz, 
Vause Raw and Graaff.179 Everatt’s interviews with Piet Beyleveld and Carneson.180 Terri Barnes 
interviews with Hilder and Bernstein.181 Norman Bromberger’s interview with Brown.182 Pinnocks’ 
interview with Brain Bunting.183 Julie Fredrikse’s interviews with Carneson, Slovo, and Wolfie 
Kodesh184). These personal accounts give authenticity and depth to the narrative and were treated 
circumspectly and triangulated with a range of other source material. 
 
157  EG Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1981). 
158  Mouton, ‘No Prime Minister Could Want a Better Leader of the Opposition’, 48–69; Graaff, Div Looks 
Back. 
159  Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography. 
160  Mouton, ‘One of the Architects of Our Democracy’; Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power. 
161  G Jacobs, Beckoning Horizons (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1985). 
162  H Joseph, Side by Side. The autobiography of Helen Joseph (London: Zed Books, 1986). Available: 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-iii-my-very-ordinary-life) [Accessed: 15 September 2020]. 
163  Wits Historical Papers, A2521 aa, David Everatt Papers, ‘Memoirs Len Lee-Warden’. 
164  D Brokensha, Brokies Way (2007), Available: www.brokiesway.co.za/book.html. [Accessed: 15 
September 2020]. 
165  JB Chutter, Captivity Captive (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954) 
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1980); Nasson, ‘A Flying Springbok of Wartime British Skies’; O Walker, Sailor Malan: A Biography 
(London: Cassel & Son, 1953). 
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(Hereafter OHP), ‘Interview with Dr Peter Brown conducted by Prof Norman Bromberger in 
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In the second instance, recourse was made to archives, depositories and special collection libraries 
to compile biographic profiles of 153 politically exposed ex-servicemen (see Appendix: List of Ex-
Servicemen considered in the Prosoprographic Study). The most important of these were: 
• National Library of South Africa. The National Library maintains a complete set of Who is Who 
in Southern Africa as well as of Government Gazettes.  
• The Sanlam Library, University of South Africa. This repository provided a range of records 
and documents on United Party politicians’ and candidates’ records. The candidate curriculum 
vitae provided biographic details for the development of the dataset. The records of the Torch 
provided insight into leadership and functioning of the organisation, while the records kept on 
other political formations provided the information required to populate the prosopographic 
dataset. 
• The William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand. The Historical Records Archive 
includes the records of the Springbok Legion. The Fighting Talk magazine and the minutes of 
the Legion provided the identity of ex-servicemen involved in extra-parliamentary politics, while 
the minutes covered the Legion’s post-war engagement with formal political parties. This 
repository also holds the unpublished memoirs of Kane-Berman and Lee-Warden, as well as 
the interviews conducted by Hackland and Everatt, and the records of the Anglican Church. 
The school magazines of the Diocesan College (Bishop’s) provided lists and biographic details 
of old scholars that fought in the war. 
• Department of Defence Archives. The Personnel Archive provided the service cards of 
selected ex-servicemen. Further investigation provided details regarding parliamentary 
questions and lists that were important to this study. The library at this archive also maintains 
a collection of Who is Who in South Africa, a full set of the regimental histories, a goodly 
number of the personal accounts (memoirs and autobiographies) and a range of military-
related theses and dissertations.  
• School Museums. School museums provided access to school magazines and the physical 
artefacts held at Jeppe High School for Boys and Pretoria Boys’ High School. 
This study rests on two complementary techniques, namely biographic recollection (the life histories) 
and prosopography (multiple career line analysis). These techniques are complementary and, when 
used in unison, can reveal critical insights. Koenraad Verboven, Myriam Carlier and Jan Dumolyn 
argue that there is also a stable link between them: ‘biography attempts to study the entire personality 
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of an individual, prosopography only focuses on the external similarities and differences of 
individuals within the group.’185 
The deep desire of many of the opposition, both radical and constitutional politicians, to share their 
story has resulted in waves of published and unpublished works. Such biographies are a mine of 
information on the personal networks and a useful means to compile a multiple-career-line database. 
Graaff, in his memoirs, fastidiously referred to personalities, “Among my pupils were Harold van 
Hoogstraten, who later became a Member of Parliament, and Monty Crooks [sic.] …Later in life he 
became one of the most talkative members of the South African Senate.”186 Such detailed 
recollections provide useful source material for the contextualisation of the subjects and assists in 
the mapping of the less obvious relationships and networks. These sources also render biographic 
data for the statistical analysis.  
Biographies as sources are, of course, tainted by the writer’s perspective of his own time and carry 
the biographer’s own subjective voice, personality and motivations. Furthermore, writers often gloss 
over aspects relevant to this study. For example, Slovo, in his autobiography, spent little time 
investigating his decision to enlist in the UDF after 1939. Similarly, Franks in his biography of Sailor 
Malan openly avoided the question of Malan’s post-war activities. He states: ‘There is no intention 
in this book to go deeply into the politics of South Africa…those who wish to know more of this whole 
scene are referred to the final chapter in Olivier Walker’s earlier biography….’ Such hiatuses may 
be addressed through triangulation with other biographies and with the primary source material. The 
biographic sketches in Lazerson187 and Tom Karis,188 provide some guidance in such an endeavour.  
Van der Waag also warns against generalisations from limited sources; ‘All generalisations’, he 
argues, ‘are suspect, and the narrower the statistical base, the greater the grounds for doubt.’189 The 
use of the quantitative, prosopographic technique can strengthen generalisations made from 
interviews, memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies. Both Richard Carr (in ‘Conservative Veteran 
MPs and the “Lost Generation” Narrative after the First World War’190) and Van der Waag (in ‘Smuts’s 
generals’191) merged a prosopography approach with other qualitative techniques. Prosopography, 
Verboven, Carlier and Dumolyn agree, provides the means to study  
 
185  K Verboven, M Carlier, and J Dumolyn, A Short Manual to the Art of Prosopography Prosopography 
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187  Lazerson, Against the Tide, 81–114. 
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Africa 1882-1964. Volume 4: Political Profiles 1882-1964 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977). 
189  Van der Waag, ‘Smuts’s Generals’, 60. 
190  Carr, ‘Conservative Veteran M.P.s and the ‘lost Generation’ Narrative after the First World War’. 
191  Van der Waag, ‘Smuts’s Generals’. 
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a group of individuals by means of their external or material characteristics, in order to determine 
linkages and commonalities. It allows for the study of phenomena that transcends individual 
lives.192  
Prosopography, therefore, provides for a more extensive statistical base than traditional qualitative 
studies and thereby provides an opportunity for broader insights. But it is also a useful way to 
construct knowledge, where organised data is scarce.193 In a sense, compiling a prosopographic 
dataset is akin to conducting a questionnaire survey where the subjects have all passed away. This 
surveying of the documentary footprint left by the subjects’ life gives the researcher insights into the 
subject. The discovery of standardised forms which recorded the subjects’ details, simplified the 
process significantly, especially when the majority of the subjects completed the same forms. For 
this reason, war records (such as attestation forms) and political party curriculum vitae were most 
useful.  
Bourdieu’s ideas on social theory provided a theoretical foundation for this study. One of the pillars 
of Bourdieu’s social theory project was to transcend the objective-subjective bridge in Western 
philosophy. This provided a good point of departure for my study.194 Much of his work was 
prosopographic by nature, with its focus on identifying and analysing the nature of collective identities 
and cultural reflexes.195 His ideas are useful because he developed them to support empirical 
research, dismissing the idea of ‘theory for its own sake’ as ‘gobbledygook’.196 Thus Bourdieu’s 
thinking and theorising are ideal for supporting the prosopographic-biographic approach used in this 
study.  
The two main ideas of Bourdieu are those of ‘Habitus’ (Disposition) and ‘Capital’. Although intractably 
linked, habitus and capital are different. Habitus is the internalisation of past experiences to frame 
future action, in effect forming character.197 Capital, in contrast, is the transmutation of accumulated 
advantages (lived and inherited) into tangible and intangible forms of currency (or capital) with which 
to invest and trade.198 This study considered both concepts essential to explain the influence of war 
experience on political activity. 
6. IMPACT OF COVID 19  
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic impacted on the writing of this thesis. The author, as a senior 
officer in the Armed Forces, became involved in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
intervention from the onset in March 2020. The demands of providing intelligence support to 
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Operation NOTLELA, the SANDF operation in support of the nation, not only disrupted the author’s 
focus on the study but also denied the author study leave to consolidate the thesis. The government 
decision to lock down the country denied access to book shops, libraries and archives for most of 
2020, thus preventing the inclusion of photographs and other visual material. Only the tenacious 
efforts of Ms Zelda Green of the Defence College Library made some books available. In some 
cases, the author resorted to the second-best option of using online editions of books (often without 
page numbers) to fill the gaps that surfaced in the initial research. The author cited the secondary 
source when lockdown denied access to additional archival material. Luckily, the exclusion of the 
few politically exposed ex-servicemen that had escaped initial identification effort did not alter the 
prosopographic findings. Finally, the constant underlying psychological pressure that COVID-19 
pandemic placed on the South African society disrupted the author’s family and work life as the 
author adapted to the new normal. 
7. TERMINOLOGY  
The language of the period, when judged against modern standards, is often racist and insensitive. 
In order to make the language usage less inciteful, an element of bowdlerisation has occurred. 
Throughout the study, the author uses ‘White’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Black’ according to the apartheid race 
classification, to stay true to the nomenclature of the historical context of the period. Much of this 
survives into the New South Africa. However, there were instances – for example in place names – 
where such terminology cannot be avoided: for example, Hottentots-Holland and Kafferskraal. The 
reader is asked to bear with this approach.  
The author uses ‘Afrikaner Nationalist’ to denote supporters and members of the NP, instead of 
merely ‘Afrikaner’ or ‘Afrikaans-speaking’ since not all Afrikaners were members or supporters of the 
National Party. Reference to the National Party will imply the Purified National Party of DF Malan 
and its subsequent renaming. 
Similarly, ‘English-speaking’ refers to only South Africans originating from Europe who adopted 
English as their first language. Due to the era’s practices, the study distinguishes the Jewish 
community as a coherent grouping separate from the English-speaking community.  
The sample group for the study comprised almost exclusively White men because of the exclusion 
of women from active combat service. Very few women were allowed to deploy outside the Union of 
South Africa. The study includes three women, Ms Doreen Dunning, Joseph and Jacqueline de 
Villiers, because of their unique contribution in the war and post-war politics. All were members of 
the Woman’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). The racially segregated society and political system also 
meant that the dominant political grouping was White male.  
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8. CHAPTER LAYOUT  
Chapter One: The War and its Politics. The first chapter introduces the thesis and illustrates the 
broad strategic landscape of the Union between 1939 and 1961 to provide context to the motivations 
and activities of the ex-servicemen.  
Chapter Two: Biography of the Politicians that Fought. This chapter maps the broad demographic 
characteristics of the subjects. In the chapter, the focus is on issues such as religion, age distribution, 
schooling, academic education and occupation of the ex-servicemen as possible politicising factors. 
The idea of habitus assisted in organising ex-servicemen into discrete classes. 
Chapter Three: Military Service of Political Active Ex-Servicemen. This chapter dwells on the military 
experience of the ex-servicemen during the Second World War. The focus is on exploring how the 
structural nature of the Union Defence Force, the primary military campaigns, POW experience and 
the two attempts to politicise the ex-servicemen, namely the SL and the Army Education Scheme 
(AES) influenced the soldier. 
Chapter Four: Veteran Organisations in Politics: 1948-1953. The period from 1946 until 1953 is 
covered, where ex-servicemen involvement in politics had occurred within veteran organisations, 
which overlapped with political parties. The opposition political parties, (UP and LP) provided a 
unified front against the Nationalist Party. The front used the ex-servicemen’s collective wartime 
experience to mobilise them politically. 
Chapter Five: Ex-servicemen in Politics 1953-1961. After the collapse of the Veteran Status as a 
political identity by 1953, ex-servicemen found that invoking collective wartime experience was no 
longer useful to draw popular political support. Instead, ex-servicemen relied on wartime 
camaraderie to build consensus within established political parties. Personal loyalties formed during 
the war played a more significant role than the collective veteran identity. 
Chapter Six: Conclusions. The chapter deals with the relationship between military service and 
political activism. These conclusions are significant for understanding the future engagement of the 





CHAPTER ONE:  
THE WAR AND ITS POLITICS  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
South African history, from the declaration of war in 1939 through to the coming of the Republic in 
1961, was turbulent. Despite playing a part in defeating Nazism and being part of the formation of 
the United Nations, South Africa stood accused of acting on the darker impulses of antisemitism and 
racism by her riding roughshod over the very human rights she had written into the United Nations 
(UN) preamble. Every aspect of South African society and politics was in some way entangled with 
the global tapestry. South Africans were quick to appropriate ideas, concepts, and alliances from the 
global context, thereby imposing half-assimilated solutions onto the South African situation. The 
English-speakers, who dominated white-collar occupations were generally economically better off 
than the Afrikaners.199 Many English-speakers held a sentimental attachment to the idea of the 
earlier British Empire despite fundamental changes that had happened since 1910. The Balfour 
Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931 acknowledged the independence of the 
Dominions within the British Commonwealth. Thus, many English-speakers saw the Commonwealth 
as an extension of the British Empire by arguing that the crown was indivisible.200 
In contrast, the Afrikaners argued among themselves over whether South Africa could be truly 
sovereign within the multinational Commonwealth and whether other white groupings could be truly 
South African. The emerging Afrikaner intelligentsia had borrowed from continental theology and 
philosophy adopting Kuper-ism and various forms of National Socialism to argue for the discarding 
of historic loyalties in favour of narrower national survival. The 1938 Centenary celebrations of the 
Great Trek served further to strengthen Afrikaner nationalism and cultural exclusivity. The 
reawakening of the Afrikaners’ historical grievance after Union along with a perceived British 
weakness translated into growing Afrikaner support for Germany and the authoritarianism embedded 
in Nazism. In 1942, John (BJ) Vorster, an Ossewabrandwag (OB) General, and later State President, 
succinctly stated, “In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa 
Christian Nationalism”.201 The Afrikaner Nationalists’ association with fascism before and during the 
war would not be forgotten by left-wing radicals and liberals who would thereafter work to embed the 
association in the public mind.202 The Afrikaner nationalists’ assimilation of some fascist ideas 
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provided a template to blame the Jewish community for the Afrikaners’ socio-economic 
marginalisation.203 In 1931 DF Malan, a Dutch Reformed Church theologian, Minister of the Interior 
and editor of Die Burger, commented that “…it is very easy to rouse a feeling of hate towards the 
Jews in this country”.204 The radical right and Malan were quick to group Jews, Communists and 
liberals (by implication the English-speaking South Africans) as the enemy of the Afrikaner Volk 
(Afrikaner Nation).205  
The South African Jewish Board of Jewish Deputies was wary of growing antisemitism in Europe. 
Therefore they cautiously monitored rising antisemitism in South Africa.206 In 1934, Morris Alexander, 
a lawyer, Jewish community leader and Member of Parliament (MP), had already warned of an 
impending war against the South African Jewish community.207 These entanglements meant that by 
1939 South Africa was probably divided more along philosophical/ideological lines than strict Anglo-
Afrikaner ethnic lines.  
The war only worsened the tensions within the White community.208 Soldiers that returned from 
fighting the war were struck by how little the war had changed South African society.209 Instead of 
South African society being liberalised by the war as the liberals had hoped, it seemed that political 
opinion had drifted to the right.210 The subsequent defeat of the United Party (UP) by a Fascist tainted 
National Party (NP) in 1948, confronted the ex-servicemen with the reality that their victory against 
fascism in Europe had not weakened the appeal of authoritarianism of identity politics at home.  
This chapter provides a broad panorama of the political-military landscape that shaped the 
servicemen politically and contributed to their later involvement in politics. This chapter exposes the 
fractured nature of the White community that made South Africa a fertile ground for foreign ideas, 
such as fascism, to grow. Foreign ideas grafted onto historical grievances and nourished wartime 
animosities grew to bitter fruit which the ex-servicemen had digested on their return from the fight 
against the root evil of Fascism in North Africa and Europe. The defeat of the UP, and General Jan 
Smuts, their Commander-in-Chief, in the 1948 elections by the fascist-tainted NP added to the 
returning ex-servicemen’s anguish. For the ex-servicemen that had defeated fascism in the war, the 
NP victory at the polls negated their sacrifice.211 This chapter traces their opposition to the NP’s 
grand reorganisation of South African society, which included the erasure of their legacy and shows 
how the ex-servicemen’s activism soon drew them into a maze of opposition initiatives, which 
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entangled the ex-servicemen’s identity with the broader opposition to all the NP represented. 
Furthermore, the mix of political views that co-existed in the broader ex-serviceman identity led to 
the blurring of the lines between liberalism, radicalism, non-racialism and parliamentary opposition. 
This chapter positions the ex-servicemen’s contribution to Union politics from 1945 until 1960 and 
explores how military service in the war provided a thread of continuity in the White community’s 
struggle against the formulation of Apartheid in South Africa. 
1.2 DIVIDED NATION  
The Union of South Africa before the war was a divided nation. This division also extended to the 
White population. Afrikaner nationalists have argued that these divisions ran almost exclusively 
along language or cultural lines pitting English-speakers against Afrikaans-speakers.212 The 
dialectical argument was not unexpected, as Afrikaans was declared an official language in 1925 
which was in itself a highly politicised event. In that same year, Christian Louis Leipoldt observed 
that language had become deeply enmeshed with the Afrikaner nationalist political struggle and 
discourse.213 However, closer inspection suggests that by the late 1930s the central discourse 
revolved around the notions of Afrikaner Nationalism and a ‘South Africanism’,214 with the Afrikaner 
being the only group divided by these positions.215 The description of the 1938 election by Deneys 
Reitz, a Cabinet minister in Barry Hertzog’s Cabinet and later during the war, Smuts’s deputy Prime 
Minister, best captures the prevalent mood; “Rival orators thundered at each other; charge and 
counter charge were levelled and, again, the ill will and the friction was between the Dutch, while the 
English-speaking voters stood aloof but supported the less intolerant side.”216 
The Afrikaner nationalists nursed a grievance against the British, and by association, against 
English-speaking South Africans.217 The Afrikaner memory reached back to evoke the Slagtersnek 
Rebellion in 1815 and the atrocities of the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, particularly in the 
concentration camps.218 The Afrikaner rebellion in 1914 and South Africa’s entry into the Second 
World War in 1939 acted to intensify tensions among White South Africans further. Afrikaner 
nationalists refused to acknowledge any other group, as truly South African, thereby making them 
almost incapable of accepting White English-speakers as South Africans.219 Any other interloper 
group that could tip the demographic scale against the growing Afrikaner nation was perceived as a 
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threat and reviled.220 The Volk became the voice of South Africa, discarding the opinions of the 
English-speakers and Jews as un-South African. Likewise, the Volk excluded Afrikaans-speaking 
supporters of the more inclusive ideology of ‘South Africanism’. They were either lumped together 
with the ‘English’ or airbrushed from the narrative.221 
Since Union in 1910, the heterogeneous English-speaking community222 had routinely galvanised 
against Afrikaner Nationalism. Sporadic protests had been lodged by the English-speaking 
community during Fusion government from 1934-1939, as Hertzog systematically eroded South 
Africa’s links with Britain.223 Despite such attempts by Hertzog and his supporters to weaken South 
Africa’s links with Britain, English speakers maintained their ties to Britain. Their close link with 
volunteer regiments rooted in British tradition that predated Union, symbolised their connection to 
the empire.224 The English-speaking school cadet system which linked the schools to the local 
regiments further bound the English-speaking community to this regimental tradition.225 In times of 
national crisis, the English-speakers willingly mobilised in large numbers to support the state by 
joining these volunteer regiments. These regiments served in both the Second Anglo-Boer War and 
the First World War.226 The Union Defence Forces’ (UDF’s) involvement in the First World War on 
the side of Britain and her allies further strengthened the English-speaking community’s link with the 
state.227 During the 1922 Rand Strike, UDF units were called on by Smuts to break up the strikers.228 
In the early 1920s, due to budget constraints, the Active Citizen Force (ACF) units were left to 
continue on their own volition, which aided to increase community involvement in the running of the 
volunteer regiments.229 Thus the English-speaking community saw no contradiction in having loyalty 
to both Britain and the Union of South Africa. 
The English community’s political support gravitated towards Smuts in the inter-war years.230 He 
had, since the Act of Union in 1910, championed their inclusion in the common ‘South Africanism’, 
writing to John Merriman in 1910 that “[o]n our policy of racial peace we carried many English 
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constituencies with us, and I think we should continue that policy night and day”.231 Smuts maintained 
parity of Afrikaner-English wherever he exerted power. A study of the general staff from 1912 to 
1948 also reflects this commitment.232 Smuts became a stringent supporter of the British 
Commonwealth and actively participated in the British war effort during the First World War.233 
Smuts’s decision to go to war went a long way to consolidate English-speakers’ support behind him 
with John Lambert claiming that “[t]he commitment of Smuts and the new ministry to the British cause 
came as an immense relief to English-speaking South Africans, consolidated their imperial 
consciousness and underscored their sense of apartness from Nationalist Afrikaners.”234 
After the war, Smuts’s involvement in the establishment of the League of Nations not only elevated 
South Africa’s status on the world stage but also strengthened the perception of the Union’s 
connection with Britain and its former European allies.235  
Adolf Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, invoked a new sense of urgency in Smuts. 
He became more committed to involvement in the coming war as the months passed.236 The 
supporters of the old South African Party were willing to stand by Smuts. However, when Smuts 
attempted to sound Hertzog for his views on South Africa’s position on an imminent European war, 
he was brushed off. Hertzog firmly believed that as Hitler did not intend to go to war, such discussions 
served no useful purpose.237 As tensions rose in Europe, Smuts and Reitz accepted an invitation 
from Ernst Oppenheimer, the heir and then Chairman of Anglo-American and MP, to tour the Kivu 
area of the Congo during July 1939.238 By the time Smuts had returned from Central Africa, in August 
1939, Hertzog had withdrawn to his farm in the Free State and was not accessible to provide direction 
on South Africa’s position regarding the impending war. It seemed to Reitz that Hertzog was delaying 
the inevitable, and was intent on avoiding having to make any decision on the matter of war 
participation. (He had previously promised to summon Parliament before deciding to declare war).239 
Hertzog’s avoidance, however, was cut short by a peculiarity in the South African constitution which 
required Parliament to sit to extend the life of the senate. He reluctantly summoned Parliament at 
the very time war broke out in Europe on 1 September 1939 with the German invasion of Poland.240 
Events caught even Smuts off guard. In a letter to Thomas Lamont, a few days later on 6 September 
1939, he confided “A few days ago, I left Pretoria thinking that I might be out of government soon 
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and planning for the future when I should be free of public duties. Suddenly the whole situation 
changed.”241 
Hertzog was confident that the majority of Afrikaners, which in his mind represented the volkswil 
(Afrikaner national will or national interest) of all South Africans, would choose to remain neutral, 
keeping South Africa a spectator to the world in crisis. Hertzog believed that the Balfour Declaration 
of 1926, and the Statute of Westminster of 1931 gave South Africa the legal right to decide to remain 
neutral in the war.242 He was also convinced that a 1938 cabinet position on South Africa’s neutrality, 
in the case of a war in Europe, would also apply in the case of a war between Germany and the 
British Commonwealth.243 Smuts, who was deeply engaged in global affairs, argued that South Africa 
was so entangled in the economy and defences of the British Commonwealth that it had no choice 
but to follow Britain into the war.244 Smuts had in the previous months already called Hitler “nothing 
but a dire menace to peace”.245 Smuts was also more in touch with his colleagues in Cabinet and 
knew that with the backing of the English-speaking MPs, he would only need the support of a minority 
of the Afrikaans MPs to carry the vote in Parliament.246 For Smuts’s camp, with even this slimmest 
of support, it was almost a foregone conclusion that South Africa would enter the war on the side of 
Britain. Hertzog blundered and blustered his way through a cabinet meeting on Sunday, 3 September 
1939, eventually losing the cabinet vote by eight to seven. His defeat in Cabinet paved the way for 
a parliamentary debate on the issue the next day.247  
On Monday, 4 September 1939, Hertzog attempted again to argue his case for neutrality, this time 
in Parliament. He hoped that he could harangue the gathering over to his viewpoint. He equated 
South African neutrality with independence and that joining Britain in the war would mean Parliament 
cared more for Britain than for South Africa. In his opinion, it was this misplaced loyalty that was 
destroying South African unity.248 He predicted that South Africa’s entry into the war would set Anglo-
Afrikaner relations back 50 years.249 However, again, he failed to appreciate the arithmetic of his 
position adequately. Nationalists, such as Eben Dönges, Helm van Zyl, Johann Conradie, and 
Oswald Pirow were confident that Hertzog would win the vote.250 In contrast, the calculations done 
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by members in the UP camp such as Reitz, Louis Esselen, and Colin Steyn, pointed to a Smuts 
victory.251 Reitz analysed the arithmetic of the Smuts camp as follows; 
On the one hand, the 29 Nationalists, all violently anti-British, would vote for anything anti-British 
and they would support a neutrality motion. With his own tail of 38, and with the 29 Nationalist 
recalcitrants, he commanded 67 votes against our 66, but we knew that the 7 Dominionites, the 
4 Labour Members, and the 3 Native Representatives were with us, giving us a majority of 
thirteen.252 
After a long debate on 4 September 1939, the votes returned 67 in favour of Hertzog’s motion and 
80 in favour of Smuts’s amendment. Hertzog was defeated.253 He requested the Governor General, 
Sir Patrick Duncan, to dissolve Parliament. Duncan believing that Smuts could form a viable 
government, and wishing to avoid an outbreak of public violence, immediately called on Smuts to 
form a new cabinet.254 By 6 September 1939, Smuts had formed a new government and included 
the Labour and Dominion parties which had supported his motion to declare war on Germany.255 
Smuts again allocated an equal number of cabinet posts to Afrikaans and English-speakers, 
reflecting his commitment to unify the White population.256  
A few months later Smuts found himself again alongside his old friend Winston Churchill, who 
became Prime Minister of Britain on 10 May 1940, in the fight against Germany.257 His ongoing 
presence in the rarefied circles of Allied command and global affairs had led him to maintain 
friendships with many prominent statesmen. For DF Malan’s NP, who had always derided Smuts’ 
reconciliatory position, such cosmopolitanism symbolised the antithesis of Afrikaner Nationalism. For 
the Afrikaner nationalist, Smuts’s and the English-speakers’ direct participation in the war indicated 
loyalty to Britain and disloyalty to South Africa.258 Events had cast Smuts and the UP as pro-British, 
at odds with the Afrikaner interests.259  
The ideological middle ground that Hertzog represented was swallowed up into the re-unified NP 
when Hertzog and his 38 supporters joined DF Malan on 9 September 1940.260 Smuts was confident 
that this alliance would not survive, dismissing it with the question “Have you ever heard in history 
 
251  Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 320; Reitz, Adrift on the Open Veld, 517. 
252  Reitz, Adrift on the Open Veld, 517. 
253  Steyn, Seven Votes, 38-46; Bourhill, ‘Red Tabs’, 36. The language split was 54 English and 26 Afrikaans 
votes for Smuts and 1 English and 66 Afrikaans votes for Hertzog. 
254  Steyn, Seven Votes, 51; Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 297. According to Graaff, Louis 
Esselen had some influence on Duncan, as Esselen had found a precedent from Canada where the 
Governor could appoint a new Prime Minister without calling new elections, see Graaff, Div Looks Back, 
62. 
255  Reitz, Adrift on the Open Veld, 519. 
256  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 173. 
257  Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 356. 
258  Lambert, ‘‘Their Finest Hour?’, 75. 
259  Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 335; Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 
178. 
260  Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, 335; Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 441; Steyn, Seven Votes, 54. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
8 
of Afrikanders [sic.] combining into a bloc?”261 His private opinion of DF Malan and the NP was even 
more caustic when he shared a jibe with Ernst Oppenheimer on a Central African holiday in 1939. 
Reitz, as a fellow guest of the Oppenheimer’s, recalls 
He [Smuts] summed up his opinion of the National Party by telling us that during the last elections 
an inmate of the Pretoria asylum had rung up their leader Dr Malan and said ‘Doctor, doctor, I just 
want to let you know all we lunatics over here are Nationalists.262 
It was not long before the more radical nationalists, enamoured by the fascism so prevalent at the 
time, grew weary of Hertzog’s views, especially his coolness towards the idea of a Republic, and his 
willingness to accommodate English-speakers in future nationalistic plans.263 They soon found a way 
to jettison him and his ideology into the political wilderness. His death in November 1942, marked 
the final collapse of the ‘middle ground’ position in White politics.264 Afrikanerdom and by implication, 
White South Africa, was divided between the national exclusivity of DF Malan and the internationalist 
holism of Smuts.  
By then, the South African liberals established themselves as a small but influential group within 
Smuts’s sphere of influence.265 For them, Smuts’s stand against rising fascism was correct. They 
had hoped that participation in the war would allow for the construction of a more equitable post-war 
world order, and place South Africa in a strong position within a free and powerful commonwealth.266 
For instance, Harry Oppenheimer believed that the war provided “the possibility of realising the ideal 
of a new, truly united, happier and juster [sic.] South African society and nation”.267 
1.3 THE WAR YEARS 1939-1945 
1.3.1 The gathering storm 
German and Italian preparations for war were not unknown to the UDF. The Union Minister of 
Defence between 1933 and 1939, Pirow, had visited Germany in 1936 and 1938, in an attempt to 
smooth relations between Britain and Germany, and was impressed by the German military 
machine.268 In 1937, the UDF sent Colonel George Brink, the Director of Army Training, on a staff 
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visit to the continent. Brink returned convinced that Germany and Italy were on a war footing.269 The 
militarisation of German society enthralled Brink. He wrote to his wife: “Can you wonder that the 
German nation is a military nation?”270 The Italians, however, failed to impress him. Brink noticed 
details, and he noted how the Italian infantry bunched and advanced in defile. The Italian army, Brink 
felt, lacked combat knowledge and discipline under pressure.271  
Despite foreknowledge of German and Italian war preparations, the UDF was thoroughly unprepared 
for the outbreak of war in September 1939.272 It had a Permanent Force establishment of 352 officers 
and 5 033 men; however, it was 2 032 under-strength. Few of the appointed 313 officers, had 
received staff training. The ACF was in no better situation with an active strength of 918 officers and 
12 572 men, which was 1 015 under the establishment strength of 14 361 officers and men.273 The 
commando system, which was rurally based and overwhelmingly Afrikaans, could call on 122 000 
men, of which only 18 000 were reasonably equipped.274 The equipment available to the UDF was 
equally outdated or obsolete. There were 71 artillery pieces in service, with barely enough 
ammunition for a day’s shooting. Armoured vehicles amounted to two obsolete medium tanks, two 
obsolete armoured cars and two locally built experimental armoured cars. The South African Air 
Force (SAAF), the darling of Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), fared 
marginally better with four modern Hurricane fighters, one Blenheim fighter, six Fury fighters, one 
Fairey bomber, eighteen Junker 86s, and 53 Hartbeest biplane bombers.275 Years of neglect meant 
that South Africa had to rebuild the UDF almost from the ground up.276 
The lack of material preparations carried over into the lack of realism within the UDF’s planning 
scenarios on the strategic level. Previous planning prepared by the British, South African, and 
Rhodesian governments, was dusted off and modified. Four plans existed if Portugal became hostile. 
These were Plan W for the occupation of Southern Angola by the UDF, Plan X which required 
Rhodesian forces to occupy Northern Angola, Plan Y for the capture of Beira by the Rhodesians and 
Plan Z for the occupation of Southern Mozambique by South Africa.277 Van Ryneveld had worked 
on the concept of Plan Z in 1935.278 The plan’s outlandish assumptions suggest that it was a 
hypothetical planning concept. For instance, an unidentified enemy would land an expeditionary 
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force at Lourenco Marques and invade South Africa from there. Van Ryneveld had cast the SAAF in 
the lead role in the battle, attributing almost omnipotent powers to the aeroplanes which would 
destroy the invading force’s artillery before it could deploy.279 Brink had elaborated on Plan Z to 
include the capture of Lourenco Marques.280 There was speculation that the legacy of this plan 
resulted in the 1st Transvaal Scottish being deployed towards Komatipoort when Italy entered the 
war on 10 June 1940 in response to intelligence provided by Major Pretorius on the activities of 2 
000 German nationals in Mozambique.281 
By 22 September 1939, Van Ryneveld had developed a proposal that South Africa should have a 
Home Defence Force of one division and a Mobile Field Force of two divisions. The Mobile Field 
Force would be fully motorised, making it the first motorised Brigade Group in the British 
Commonwealth. This broad plan would later evolve into a force of three divisions.282  
1.3.2 Mobilisation 
The ACF units were authorised to accept volunteers for training on 22 September 1939.283 The 
emotional ties of the empire, military service and regimental honour were influential in the English-
speaking units.284 Participation in the war reaffirmed the English-speaking communities’ commitment 
to Smuts and their connection with Britain,285 and even before Smuts had declared war, many 
regiments were already attesting volunteers.286 Within the ACF and SAAF, there were grumblings of 
independent plans for mobilisation if the Union had remained neutral.287 
The enthusiasm to join-up meant that, in many cases, youths under the age of 21 (who needed their 
parent’s written consent to join) and skilled artisans key to the war production (the so-called ‘key-
men’) had to be turned away or ‘combed-out’. The Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Rifles had to turn away 
300 youths.288 The Cape Town Highlanders experienced similar problems.289 The 2 Transvaal 
Scottish had to release over a hundred key-men back to their trades after mobilisation,290 while, even 
worse, the 3 Transvaal Scottish, recruiting from the industrial East Rand, had to return almost half 
of their effective strength to industry.291 The Pretoria Highlanders also lost about 300 men within 
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three weeks of mobilisation, as units were required to returned key-men back to the railways, Mint 
and Iscor.292  
Smuts, anticipating Italy’s imminent entry into the war,293 positioned South Africa to play a more 
substantial combat role. Towards the end of 1939, expecting Benito Mussolini’s ambitions in East 
Africa, Smuts offered a brigade and several SAAF squadrons to strengthen defences in Kenya. 
Except for four SAAF Squadrons, Smuts’s initial offer was declined by the British.294 Undeterred, 
Smuts continued to prepare forces for the ‘North’, and on 16 February 1940 instituted the Africa 
Service Oath which enabled the employment of soldiers outside the borders of South Africa and 
anywhere within Africa.295  
A red tab (rooi lussies) worn on the shoulder straps, identified the men who had taken the Africa 
Service Oath or Red Oath, thereby politicising the war effort.296 The Afrikaner nationalist movements 
used every opportunity to undermine the war effort,297 arguing that for true Afrikaners “service in the 
armed forces of the Union of South Africa was incompatible with his duty to the Afrikaner People”.298 
On the first day of implementation of the oath, approximately 350 men refused.299 Permanent Force 
members, who did not take the oath, potentially denied themselves the chance for the rapid 
promotion that often occurred during the war. However, despite the Nationalists’ assertions, post-
war investigations were hard-pressed to find substantive evidence of hardship suffered by those not 
taking the Africa Service Oath.300  
Afrikaner nationalists, in response to war preparations, pursued extra-parliamentary action in various 
movements of which the most prominent was the OB. The OB, originally a cultural movement 
emanating from the Great Trek centenary of 1938,301 raked up enmity stretching back to the British 
occupation of the Cape in 1806, Slagtersnek in 1815 and the more recent Second Anglo-Boer War 
to mobilise supporters. As Justice Minister between 1933 and 1939, Smuts had discretely monitored 
the movement.302 Smuts rightly believed that the OB was “probably only a secret military organisation 
masquerading as a ‘culture’ movement”.303 However, the bruising personal consequences of the 
1914 Afrikaner Rebellion and the 1922 Rand Strikes, probably made him wary of over-reacting 
against the movement.304 During the war as Prime Minister, Smuts deftly hampered the OB’s ability 
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to be more than a nuisance, despite cries by his supporters to do more.305 He selectively interned 
the more subversive OB members, such as Hendrik van der Berg and Vorster (both men who would 
rise to prominent positions after the war), banned soldiers and civil servants from joining the OB and 
the Broederbond and kept the leader of the OB, Dr Johannes van Rensburg, on a close leash.306 
To push the point home, towards the end of 1940, Smuts sent a mechanised column called the Steel 
Commando throughout South Africa to demonstrate the country’s newly developed military power. 
The demonstration was both a warning to the disaffected and a means to recruit the rural 
Afrikaners.307 Smuts writing to Margaret Gillett expressed his satisfaction in the outcome: 
I have sent a column of motorised troops through the Union, partly to show people what we have 
been doing in war production, partly to show the flag as they say – and let the disaffected see 
that they have no chance in mechanical war, and that rebellion is out of the question.308 
Despite the efforts by the more radicalised Afrikaner nationalists to hinder the war effort, many 
Afrikaans-speakers and even Afrikaner nationalists joined the war effort. Ernst Malherbe, the Director 
of Military Intelligence during the war, refers to a survey that “showed that the percentage of 
Afrikaners in the army was almost exactly the same as in South Africa’s White population at the 
time”.309 To explain this situation, Albert Grundlingh suggests the power of manna and adventure 
was more substantial than ideology for many of the Afrikaners who had joined. The ‘poor-White’ 
population, many of whom were Afrikaans-speaking, were attracted by the higher wages foreign 
deployments offered.310  
Soldiers, especially Afrikaans speakers, who took the oath were labelled as traitors of the Volk and 
jeered as Hanskakies (traitors).311 Volunteer soldiers, however, saw wearing the tabs as a public 
reaffirmation of their faith in Smuts, the righteousness of his war policy, and of the war’s eventual 
outcome.312 Tension often boiled over to violence, with street fights breaking out between soldiers 
and nationalists.313 The brutality of the OB Stormjaers (storm troopers) should not be 
underestimated, especially towards their own. During the 1942 “Stormjaer’s Treason Trial”, the 
charred body of a police informant, Louis Nel, was found in a bush in Nylstroom, and a key witness 
“Dice” Lotter was assaulted and then shot in cold blood in his home.314 Such incidents only reinforced 
the argument for a Home Defence Force, and the implementation of more stringent internal stability 
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measures such as internments. However, Smuts refused to provide the Afrikaner radical right with 
martyrs and treated them with such leniency that the number of internments during the war never 
exceeded 600 at any given time.315 
The mobilisation of the regiments of the 1 South African Division (1 SA Div) further accentuated the 
distinction between Afrikaner nationalist and Smuts loyalist – not only did they wear the rooi lussie, 
but many of the mobilised ACF infantry battalions had some kind of association with Britain.316 The 
only distinctly ‘Afrikaans’ ACF regiment mobilised in the 1 SA Div was the Regiment Botha, named 
after the Union of South Africa’s first Prime Minister, Louis Botha, and was associated with Smuts, 
who was their Colonel-in-Chief.317 What the Afrikaner nationalists had missed was that despite the 
regular appropriation of the Caledonian/Gaelic martial traditions, these regiments were not too 
perturbed about the language or culture of their recruits. As Flight-Sergeant J Sachs, a Jewish 
volunteer, reflected:  
The Transvaal Scottish, The Dukes, the Cape Town Highlanders, the RDLI, the Irish, the RLI, and 
all the other regiments being brought up to strength in numbers and up to maximum fitness in 
training. And the usual jokes were going around about the Cohens and the Kellys and the 
Scotsmen and the Jews. What is more, Jewish affinity for the Irish and Scots regiments was 
reflected in the roll call each morning, when Goldberg and O’Brien, Weinstein and Macdonald, 
Hirsch and van Rensburg, were often in close and cordial juxtaposition.318  
Military planners, commanders and ordinary soldiers worked to politicise the soldiers. They hoped 
that the shared military experience would bring cohesion to an otherwise diverse force.  
In 1940, liberal academics, which included Professor Reinhold Alfred Hornlé, Professor (Jac) 
Rousseau, Malherbe and Leo Marquard, initiated activities that would result in the establishment of 
the Army Education Scheme (AES). Both Marquard and Malherbe at the time served in the military 
training and intelligence structures, which placed them in an ideal position to develop the initiative in 
the military.319 They argued that soldiers required education regarding the importance of winning the 
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war. Malherbe felt that “soldiers should know not only know what they were fighting against, but also 
what they were fighting for…”320 The scheme trained hand-picked personnel and deployed them with 
the combat forces.321 Exploiting the opportunity provided by military discipline, to shape the opinion 
of these soldiers away from political extremism,322 the training had a distinct liberal-leaning.323 The 
objective was to ensure commitment to the war while simultaneously exploiting the ideals of fighting 
Nazism and Fascism to engender values required for a more equitable society.324 After the war, 
Malherbe proudly reported that his survey had detected a tendency, in the change of attitude towards 
the South African Blacks, among White soldiers from “one of blind intolerance to one of 
understanding and tolerance”.325  
Soon after mobilisation had commenced, ordinary soldiers, wary of broken government promises 
from the First World War, and distrustful of officialdom, began organising numerous debating 
societies and interest groups. One of these debating societies was formed in early 1941 by men of 
the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion of the South African Tank Corps at the Kafferskraal training camp 
near Klerksdorp. By mid-1941, two similar soldiers’ groups were formed. One was the Soldiers’ 
Interests Committee formed by members of the 1 South African Brigade (1 SA Bde) in Addis Ababa. 
The other was the Union of Soldiers, which was also created in Egypt by soldiers of the same 
Brigade. Over the following months, representatives of these three groups established contact with 
one another and met on occasion to discuss various issues and concerns that related to servicemen. 
The outcome of these discussions was the merger of the three organisations to form the Springbok 
Legion (SL) of Soldiers in Johannesburg in December 1941 as the premier soldiers’ organisation.326  
The SL, politicised from its inception, sought to look after the interests of all South African Soldiers 
(both White and Black, male and female).327 The Legion was initially placed under the leadership of 
Warrant Officer Jock Isacowitz, a former leftist student activist at the University of Witwatersrand 
(Wits). He became quite influential during the Legion’s early years as later chapters will show.328 The 
objectives of the AES and SL enticed many communists who had joined the UDF, especially after 
Germany had invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941.329 By 1944, barely three years since the 
Legion’s formation, its membership peaked at between 50 000 and 60 000 members. Considering 
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that this figure was almost a quarter of all White South African volunteers as well as more than the 
number of men who actually served at the time, the deduction can be made that the Legion was 
successful during its early years in attracting support from a diverse group of soldiers with different 
political views.330  
It was not only the ordinary soldiers in the 1 SA Bde who were contemplating the post-war political 
environment but the higher-ranking commanders as well. During the Abyssinian campaign, the 
brigade commander, Brigadier Daniel (Dan) Pienaar, soon took his officers into his confidence 
around the campfire. As kindred spirits, they spent much of their free time debating and arguing over 
politics. Concerned about the inevitable frustrations to be borne out of demobilisation, Pienaar 
envisioned a Soldier’s Party to smooth the transition to peace. Wishful plans were developed, which 
included a ‘shadow cabinet’ and an assessment of possible funders from the officers and men of the 
Brigade, many of them wealthy. However, these plans died with the originators, as the war claimed 
Pienaar, then everyone else involved, sparing only Eric (Scrubs) Hartshorn, who remained to 
reminisce over an idea stillborn.331 
1.3.3 Military campaigns 
South Africa’s participation in landward operations is grouped into two distinct periods: the African 
campaigns (1940-1943) and the Italian campaign (1944-1945). The 1943 elections separated them. 
The Madagascar campaign in 1942, the air war, and the naval campaigns were ancillary to these. 
Furthermore, South African involvement in the war was significantly broader than just the UDF 
participation, as many South Africans had either joined or were seconded to the British Armed Forces 
as well. 
Italy entered the war in support of Germany, in June 1940, which provided Smuts with an argument 
to push South African soldiers into the fight. Commonwealth forces, mobilised from as far afield as 
Kenya, Uganda, Somaliland, Gold Coast (Ghana), Zanzibar, Tanganyika (Tanzania), Nigeria, 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South Africa and India could now be 
concentrated in defence of Kenya, and for the later invasion of Abyssinia.332 SAAF squadrons were 
already in Mombasa, and the 1 SA Bde embarked almost immediately to join the concentrating 
forces from throughout Africa. The rest of the 1 South African Division (1 SA Div) joined them shortly 
afterwards. In August 1940, Italy quickly overran British and French positions in Djibouti and 
Somaliland, making the British commander, Major General Douglas Dickinson, unenthusiastic about 
offensive operations. Dickinson further antagonised Brink and Pienaar by attempting to dilute the 
South African brigades into the 11 and 12 African Divisions. Such an arrangement would have 
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undermined Smuts politically in South Africa where the Afrikaner nationalists were arguing for more 
segregation of races.333 Smuts, not shy of a fight, forcefully addressed the issue in October 1940. In 
a conference with Dickinson, Smuts berated him: “You are no General for me. I did not send my 
young men to die of fever in East Africa. I sent them to drive the enemy out of Africa”.334 On 29 
October 1940, Smuts returned to Nairobi from a meeting with Anthony Eden, the British Secretary 
for War, who had brought with him Dickinson’s successor, Lieutenant General Alan Cunningham.335  
The East African force of the 11 and 12 African Divisions and 1 SA Div, started the offensive with a 
successful raid on El Wak on 16 December 1940. They soon swept through Somaliland into 
Abyssinia, reaching Addis Ababa by 6 April 1940. The advance had covered over 2 000 km in 53 
days.336 The rapid collapse of the Italian forces posed a new challenge to the East African Force, 
which now had to protect their erstwhile White enemy (and civilians) from the marauding Abyssinians 
wanting to affect revenge.337 After the capture of Addis Ababa, and Dessie, the 1 SA Bde cleared 
the road through Amba Alagi from the South. Prince Amedeo, the 3rd Duke of Aosta, had taken 
defensive positions in the mountainous redoubt, in an attempt to prevent the linking up of Allied 
forces between Addis Ababa and Eritrea.338 The 1 SA Bde began the assault on Amba Alagi on 11 
May 1941,339 and by 18 May 1941, the Duke of Aosta ceremoniously surrendered.340 The forces in 
East Africa, which comprised mainly African soldiers, had provided the Allies with their first major 
land victory of the war.341  
After the fall of Amba Alagi, Defence Headquarters in Pretoria decided to withdraw the 1 SA Div from 
East Africa.342 By 4 May 1941, Major General Brink had established the 1 SA Divisional headquarters 
at Amaruya in Egypt, with the responsibility for preparing a defensive line to block enemy approaches 
towards the Suez Canal.343 With the 1 SA Bde arriving at Mersah Matruh, on the 24 June 1941, the 
1 SA Div was whole again.344 At the same time, the 2 South African Division (2 SA Div), under 
command of Major General Isaac de Villiers was concentrating forces at Mareopolis near Alexandria 
and was made responsible for preparing positions around El Alamein.345 The two South African 
Divisions now formed part of the 8 British Army.346 By this stage in the war, the South African 
 
333  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 41–42; Birkby, Uncle George, 99. 
334  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 45; Birkby, Uncle George, 100. 
335  C Birkby, Springbok Victory (Johannesburg: Libertas Publications, 1941), 69. 
336  Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 140; Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, 251. 
337  Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, 252–53. 
338  Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 140. 
339  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 73. 
340  Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, 312. 
341  Stapleton, A Military History of South Africa, 140. 
342  Orpen, East African and Abyssinian Campaigns, 314. 
343  ND Orpen, War in the Desert South African Forces World War II (Volume III) (Cape Town: Purnell & 
Sons, 1971), 7. 
344  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 78; Orpen, War in the Desert, 18. 
345  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 78; Orpen, War in the Desert, 18, 40. 
346  Orpen, War in the Desert, 34. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
17 
divisions struggled endlessly to secure sufficient reinforcements and vehicles needed to reach 
combat status.  
By November 1941 the 1 SA div, understaffed, undertrained and underequipped was reluctantly 
drawn into Operation CRUSADER.347 Despite a heroic stand in defence of Sidi Rezegh, where the 
5 South African Brigade (5 SA Bde) extracted a heavy toll on the advancing Germans, effectively 
“cutting the heart out” of the German 15 Panzer Division, the Brigade was overrun and annihilated 
on 23 November 1941.348 The 1 SA Bde’s cautious behaviour saved it and the 1 SA Div from total 
destruction. At the same time, the 2 SA Div, as part of XIII Corps, played a dominant role in the 
capture of Bardia, Sollum and Halfaya.349 Colonel Hendrik Klopper was instrumental in the planning 
of the attack on Bardia which bagged 8 000 prisoners of war, which included General Helmut Schmitt, 
the first German general to be captured by Allied forces.350  
The disaster of Sidi Rezegh was soon overshadowed by an even greater calamity eight months later 
in June 1942. The 2 SA Div, under the command of the now Major General Klopper, was cut off and 
isolated in Tobruk by Rommel’s much-anticipated counteroffensive. The newly-promoted Klopper, 
surrendered when the Germans breached the fortress’s perimeter, leading almost 35 000 Allied 
forces, including the 2 SA Div of 10 722 South Africans, into captivity.351 The 8 British Army was able 
to halt Rommel’s advance into Egypt at El Alamein in July and August 1942. It took Lieutenant 
General Bernard Montgomery of the 8 British Army until 12 November 1942 to recapture Tobruk and 
another month to clear Libya of German Forces. The 1 SA Div, having served well in the 8 British 
Army, was returned to the Union of South Africa at the beginning of 1943.352 
Smuts, digesting the ‘lessons’ of the North African campaign, was eager to recommit South African 
forces to the fight. On 1 February 1943, Major General Evered Poole took command of the newly 
formed 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div).353 The formation of the division allowed 
Smuts to secure modern tanks from the British,354 allowing South Africa to field a division despite 
personnel shortages, as an Armour Division had a smaller personnel establishment table. To deploy 
the division outside Africa, to Italy, the soldiers swore a new oath, the General Service Oath, to serve 
outside Africa known as the ‘Blue Oath’. Staffing the new division occurred in almost typical South 
African fashion.355 With total disregard to esprit de corps, the formation of the new division required 
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the breaking-up of the returning 1 SA Div.356 Many ACF units, which could not raise sufficient 
soldiers, were linked together into composite units.357  
The victory in North Africa, after the calamitous start at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk, set the pro-German 
opposition in South Africa into disarray.358 Smuts, seizing the opportunity, called for an election on 
17 July 1943. In order to seal his victory, he pushed through legislation allowing soldiers on ‘foreign 
service’ to vote, despite vigorous opposition from the NP, and especially from FC Erasmus, the NP’s 
Defence spokesman.359 In the end, the ‘soldiers vote’ only decided in 12 constituencies of which ten 
favoured the UP, one LP and one Dominion Party.360 The UP returned to Parliament with an enlarged 
majority of 110. Almost unnoticed, the NP had increased its representation by one seat to 43, and 
the smaller Afrikaner nationalist parties (Nuwe Orde and Afrikaner Party) failed to capture any seats. 
Afrikaner support for the UP had also shrunk from 40 per cent to around 32 per cent during this 
election.361 The NP’s performance signalled the start of the consolidation of Afrikaner nationalism 
into a disciplined bloc behind DF Malan.362 Erasmus was instrumental in this reorganisation and 
repositioning of the NP, work that would bear fruit after the war.  
In April 1943, the 6 SA Armd Div established itself in Egypt at Khatatba, some 100 km from Cairo, 
to prepare for the Italian campaign. After a year of exhaustive training, the division transferred to the 
Altamura-Matera-Gravina area in Italy.363 It soon became apparent that the Italian theatre was totally 
unlike the flat, hot, dry, and sparsely populated deserts of North Africa. Italy was mountainous, wet 
in spring, icy cold in winter and densely populated. Furthermore, the enemy was well entrenched 
and willing to fight.364 
In May 1944, the division moved forward to assist the British and US forces in their assault against 
the Gustav Line, at Monte Cassino. After that, the South Africans met light resistance as the Allies 
swept into Rome on 6 June 1944. It took eight weeks of hard fighting for the South Africans to liberate 
Florence on 4 August 1944. There they took a six-week rest to refit and overhaul their equipment. 
On 22 August 1944, they were placed under the command of the 5 US Army and the task to push 
the Germans back on the Gothic Line to Pistoia fell on the 6 SA Armd Div . By February 1945, they 
had pushed the Germans back as far as the Apennines when they were relieved and moved to Lucca 
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for reorganisation. The eventual collapse of the German front, in April 1945, allowed the 6 SA Armd 
Div to be employed in its armour role, as the Allies pursued the retreating Germans across the Italian 
plains towards Venice. As the 6 SA Armd Div entered Milan on 2 May 1945, German forces in Italy 
announced their surrender. The remainder of the campaign contrasted significantly with previous 
events as South African soldiers faced the agonisingly slow repatriation and demobilisation 
process.365  
The Italian campaign made a different impression on the ordinary soldier compared to their 
experiences in Africa. The most pertinent difference was the density of the population, their proximity 
to and their interaction with the South African soldier. In North Africa, the battlefield was unpopulated, 
and during training, the South Africans were billeted far outside Cairo. South African authorities were 
thereby able to exercise a fair degree of control over the soldiers’ contact with the local population. 
Soldiers were allowed limited visits to the sights and experiences of Egypt, usually only after 
extensive ‘hygiene’ education.366  
In contrast, fighting in Italy often took place among the population. The proximity to the Italian 
population exposed South Africans to the suffering of the Italian peasantry. The class struggle 
rhetoric found credence among the radicalised soldiers. In many cases, the soldiers with communist 
sympathies, especially those who had joined after Hitler had declared war on the Soviet Union, made 
contact with local communist political parties. During the campaign, soldiers befriended Italian girls, 
and with the relaxation of regulations at the end of the war, this behaviour became more prevalent. 
Relations between soldiers and the Italian population resulted in over 572 wives, 30 children and 31 
fiancées being repatriated to South Africa from Italy after the war.367 The South African soldiers who 
returned from Italy were, in many cases, deeply moved by the human cost war exacted on civilians. 
1.3.4 End of war 
At the end of the war, South Africa had deployed 342 692 volunteers in uniformed service. Of the 
132 194 White male soldiers, the majority served in the Army. Of those that had served elsewhere, 
44 569 had served in the SAAF and 9 455 in the South African Naval Force (SANF), which, in August 
1942, amalgamated the earlier Seaward Defence Force (SDF) and the Royal Navy Volunteer 
Reserve (South Africa) (RNVR(SA)). Of the men as mentioned above, 6 215 had lost their lives, and 
more than 14 583 had been prisoners of war. At least one in ten servicemen had become a casualty 
in the war.368 
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Along with the losses, South African soldiers served with distinction. The ‘medal count’ for the 
soldiers included three Victoria Crosses (VC), 14 Companions of the Order of the Bath (CB), 41 
Commanders of the Order of the British Empire (CBE), 108 Distinguished Service Orders (DSO), 
147 Officers of the Order of the British Empire (OBE), 363 Members of the Order of the British Empire 
(MBE), 37 Distinguished Service Crosses (DSC), 335 Military Crosses (MC), 429 Distinguished 
Flying Crosses (DFC), one Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM), 535 Military Medals (MM), and 
over 3 800 mentions in dispatches (MID).369 These figures exclude awards to South Africans that 
served outside of the UDF and foreign medals and decorations.  
After the war, the rapidly expanded wartime UDF faced demobilisation and reform. The Army 
reactivated the ACF, which now comprised 23 Infantry Regiments, new Anti-Aircraft Regiments, and 
reinvigorated Field Artillery regiments. In most cases, units with long histories were retained, with 
few being re-designated as artillery. The availability of war equipment ensured that these units were 
well-armed, and even allowed for the formation of a Permanent Force armour capability. The ACF 
was fortunate to be able to mitigate the declining post-war enthusiasm for military service, with a 
core of battle-hardened and experienced officers and NCOs.370  
The SAAF had emerged from the war substantially strengthened and better organised. Combat 
requirements had replaced obsolete aircraft with modern aircraft. The Joint Air Training Scheme had 
trained over 12 221 pilots and aircrew for the SAAF, and the close co-operation with the British Royal 
Air Force (RAF) had resulted in the SAAF developing a distinct culture and expertise that separated 
it from the SA Army. The SAAF had become a capable fighting force with over 28 Squadrons.371 
The SANF as the Cinderella force also experienced expansion. From a force that had barely existed 
before the war, it now boasted three frigates, two Boom defence vessels and eleven Harbour motor 
launches. The SANF retained a Permanent Force complement of 866 from a wartime strength of 
over 8090 officers and men.372 
Brink headed the difficult job of demobilisation supported by a staff of some 6 000 men and women. 
The process of repatriation and demobilisation was long and complicated and did not transpire 
without complaints and problems. The scale of the project was astounding with the financial cost 
amounting to 41 000 000 pounds. Approximately 245 668 soldiers passed through the dispersal 
depots, with 155 330 placed into positions of employment.373  
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1.4 POSTWAR YEARS 
1.4.1 Post war expectations 
There was hope that participation in the war would allow for the construction of a more equitable 
post-war world order.374 Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts’s deputy and a prominent liberal in the UP, initiated 
liberal wartime reforms.375 During the war, Smuts, distracted by the international war effort, gave 
these liberal elements substantial latitude to implement their policies.376 Smuts further voiced support 
for the liberals when he acknowledged, in a speech at the SA Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) 
on 21 January 1942, known as the ‘Segregation has fallen on Evil Days’ speech, that Black 
urbanisation was irreversible and that a policy urban racial segregation would become impossible to 
implement in the future.377 Thus, liberals perceived that Smuts’s government would continue to 
pursue liberal reforms after the war. 
Internationally, the war had popularised liberal values, such as individualism, the rule of law, and 
self-determination. These values, propagated by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter of 
14 August 1941, had started to filter into the broader South African political stream. Smuts’s 
involvement in the drafting of the UN Charter further increased domestic expectations for a more 
equitable society within South Africa.378 Smuts himself acknowledged this on his return from the UN 
in 1946: 
The fully publicised discussion at UNO [Smuts wrote this on his return] are having a great effect 
in all directions. We even hear about them from our domestic and farm Natives [sic.] who really 
have nothing to complain of, but are deeply stirred by all this talk of equality and non-
discrimination…. …but it is even more difficult now in the view of these Native claims which have 
just the opposite effect on European mentality. Both extremes are gathering strength.379 
In 1947, Smuts continued to tussle with the challenge of balancing African and Indian rights and 
white dominance: In a letter to Margaret Gillett on 6 February he confided: 
Mrs Ballinger said the other day in parliament that in social and economic advances we have a 
strong case, but the Native want rights and not improvements. There we bump up against the 
claim for equality which is most difficult to satisfy except in very small doses which will not satisfy 
the leaders. I have so far done my best to follow the other line (of improvements) as less open to 
white prejudice and opposition. I must try again.380  
Liberals were confident that South Africa was on an irreversible path of urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Growing urbanisation, it was hoped, would then generate further liberal political 
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reforms. They were thus confident that gradual liberalism would inform post-war governmental 
policy.381  
After the war, the SL continued to pursue an agenda of non-racial social justice.382 The Legion’s 
position appealed to the politically leftist ex-servicemen who progressively took over the leadership 
of the Legion.383 The ease with which the chairman could co-opt new members onto the committee 
facilitated the gradual loading of the National Executive Committee (NEC) with communist 
sympathisers.384 However, the Legion’s NEC was still careful not to favour the Communist Party of 
South Africa (CPSA) and when approached by the CPSA in 1945 to discuss a pamphlet, proposed 
instead to “…invite representatives of the United Party, Labour Party, Dominion Party, and 
Communist Party, to address the NEC, on their policy with particular regard to their Fascist 
struggle.”385  
As ex-servicemen returned to the workplace, the soldiers lost the incentive to support the SL. 
Furthermore, the SL’s vocal leftist leanings may have also caused less radical or politically inclined 
ex-servicemen to withdraw from the SL.386 In 1947, despite declining support, the SL still had enough 
influence for the Labour Party (LP) to approach it to provide candidates in the 1948 elections. The 
SL also believed that it could still influence the nomination of more progressive candidates in the LP 
and UP and assisted by providing election volunteers to both parties.387 On 14 December 1947, in a 
SL NEC meeting, the Chairman of the SL, Isacowitz, anticipating Smuts’s death, predicted the future 
tensions that the UP would experience.  
Sooner or later General Smuts will retire, thereby precipitating a re-alignment of forces in the 
House. Reactionary United Party members may very well ally themselves with the Nationalists: 
liberal United Party members would stand firm by the United Party, possibly under the leadership 
of a man like Mr. Hofmeyr. To that end we should press for the nominations of candidates, who 
would be likely to align themselves with the ‘liberal’ group. Until such a re-orientation takes place, 
the presence in the House of a strong progressive group will influence legislation in a direction 
acceptable to the Springbok Legion.388 
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Furthermore, the SL encouraged its legionaries to “join and work in the political party of their 
choice”.389 Such political work for the UP and LP would hopefully induce inactive legionaries to take 
on the work of the SL in the future.390  
The devastating electoral defeat for the UP in 1948 marked a dramatic change in the political 
landscape of South Africa. Colin Eglin, an ex-serviceman, who had joined the UP after the 1948 
elections, expressed the prevailing sentiment of those in support of Smuts in the war:  
I had been a 19-year-old soldier in the war, and to me the NP was almost an extension of Hitler’s 
party … It may not have been, but they were backing Germany. Most of my associates were ex-
servicemen and the election of the NP touched a chord among those who had been fighting 
Fascism and Nazism - there was a profound sense of shock, of unreality.391 
Barry White argues that “most ex-servicemen were emotionally bound together by the shared 
experience of military victory and, soon after demobilisation, by the experience of a tacit political 
defeat”.392 The UP election defeat disrupted the ex-servicemen’s sense of belonging within the 
political sphere.393 The Anglo-Afrikaner social hierarchy which they fought to preserve was 
overturned by a political grouping that openly pursued narrow Afrikaner nationalism, and had 
associated with the fascism during the war. One ex-serviceman felt that “When the Nats came to 
power it seemed as though they were taking away the freedom we actually fought for.”394 
An almost apocalyptic sentiment developed among the ex-servicemen that the Nationalists were 
dragging the country backwards in time: 
It was a disaster, you know, I’m saying now what I thought all along. The day they had that 1948 
election and the South African Party lost to the Nationalists, we stood in the office, at the office 
and we had one Afrikaans-speaking chap and he was, he was doubtful, but the rest of us, and 
there was one major, who’d been a major in the Cape Town Highlanders, his words that day were, 
‘This has put the country back 40 years’.395 
These feelings ran deep, especially since the war was legitimised globally and locally as not only a 
war against Germany, Italy or Japan but also a war against fascism.396 The NP’s wartime flirtation 
with fascism placed it in conflict with such sentiment. At a less articulated level, the purpose of the 
war in the minds of many was being re-conceptualised in broader, more positivist terms, to that of a 
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war for freedom, democracy and human rights.397 The political discourse in the Black communities 
also reflected this broadening interpretation: 
If a new beginning is to be made, if the foundation of the peaceful world is to be secure, then the 
scourge of Hitlerite tyranny must be uprooted not only in Europe but also in South Africa and 
every corner of the globe.398 
Despite the apparent shock at the NP’s victory, Smuts had received forewarning.399 He, however, 
had demurred against changing the loading of rural electoral constituencies that was so 
disadvantageous to the UP, as he held the belief that the rural constituencies would not fail him.400 
Even after the election, he had opposed the formation of a coalition government with the Afrikaner 
Party of Klasie Havenga who was a loyal Hertzogite despite pleas from Malherbe and others to 
consider it.401 Furthermore, career politicians in the UP, many who had served in the war, initially 
saw the NP victory as a minor setback. However, after the death of both Hofmeyr, Smuts’s heir 
apparent in the UP, in 1948 and Smuts in 1950, the UP realised that the NP had no intention of 
relinquishing power again. 
1.4.2 Opposition to NP government 
Once the UP had realised that the NP had no intention to relinquish power, and began implementing 
their policy of Apartheid, the White opposition faced the challenge of removing the NP from 
government. The following section unpacks how the ex-servicemen rallied against the NP 
government, and how the ex-serviceman identity became instrumental in the construction of a unified 
front against the NP.  
For the radicals of the SL, the UP loss was dire. They had, within the SL, worked for a UP victory in 
1948, aware of the dangers inherent in the NP victory. Legislation introduced by the NP, such as the 
Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which banned the CPSA and limited activists in both the 
White and Black opposition outraged the radicals.402 Apart from the radical legionnaires, many ex-
servicemen mobilised against the NP, more out of anger over the NPs rehabilitation of pro-Nazi 
sympathisers such as Robey Leibbrandt in 1948, than out of dislike for the NP policies.403 
For the English-speakers, especially in Natal, the talk of reconciliation by DF Malan, did not soften 
the excesses of the military reforms by Erasmus, the newly appointed Defence minister since 
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1948.404 Furthermore, the exclusion of English-speakers from the Cabinet, the inclusion of various 
pro-Nazi factions into NP ranks and the rehabilitation of Nazi sympathisers further exacerbated 
concerns held by English-speakers.405 The layering of English-speaking interests, South Africanism, 
a sense of waning South African influence in the Commonwealth, and strong Afrikaner antagonism 
towards all things British, meant that the English community was almost uniformly opposed to the 
NP. For them, being so openly excluded from political power was distasteful and was “almost as 
harsh as the NP’s rigid exclusion of Africans from the privileges of citizenship”.406  
The NP also did not intend to accommodate the left-wing radicals, liberals or the English-speakers. 
On a political-philosophical level, the Nationalist leaders had embraced and adapted the theological 
ideas of Abraham Kuyper, which provided divine justification for Apartheid or separate development 
on a grand scale.407 The divine ordination of their political project did not merely provide a counter 
to the perspectives of the liberal and socialist left but instead attempted to refute them outright. Tracy 
Kuyperus observes, “It would be a direct contradiction of the revealed will of God to plead for a 
commonality between Whites, Coloureds and Blacks”.408 Based on such views, the NP’s 
implementation of separatist policies was justified as God-ordained and racial integration a sin.409 
Even when the NP engaged with other political formations, the nationalists were unable even to 
consider alternative positions. The leader of the NP, DF Malan, made this clear when claiming victory 
stating “…today South Africa belongs to us once more. South Africa is our own for the first time since 
Union, and may God grant it will always remain our own.”410 Erasmus later similarly echoed this 
sentiment when referring to the Second Anglo Boer War saying “… we lost the second war of 
independence but step by step we have won the peace.”411  
The NP victory came from the party’s ability to fuse the Afrikaner into one coherent national identity. 
The interests of Afrikaner rural and urban capital, Afrikaner Intelligentsia, and Afrikaner worker 
interests, were brought together in an election campaign based on not only the vague promise of 
Apartheid but also a position of Anti-Imperialism, and Anti-Capitalism.412 Arguing the need to counter 
increased wartime Black urbanisation and the softening of the colour bar, the NP sold Apartheid as 
necessary for the survival of the whole White community.413 Nevertheless, in the 1950s inter-racial 
tensions had not completely eclipsed the internal divisions among the Afrikaner and English-
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speaking Whites.414 The NP exploited anti-British sentiment to divide the White race along linguistic-
cultural lines, thereby securing the support of the Afrikaner Volk.415 The Volkseenheid (national unity) 
was required to guarantee the survival of the White race,416 and to place the Afrikaner on social and 
economic parity with the Anglophone community. With most of its support coming from the White 
Afrikaans working class, the outcome of the 1948 election was not only a cultural victory but also a 
class victory, for the Afrikaner Nationalist. Within the White community, the 1948 election marked 
the start of a cultural and social revolution within the White community which left the more affluent 
‘South Africanist’ support base devoid of political power.417  
The frustration and anger within the South African opposition circles converged when the NP began 
undermining the constitution in 1951, in order to remove the Coloureds from the voter’s role. Dönges, 
the Minister of Justice, on 10 June 1948 fired the first salvo in the NPs war to reduce non-white rights 
when he moved to repeal Part II of the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act. The act 
had made provision for Indian parliamentary representation.418 The issue divided the UP who were 
unable to stop the motion. Smuts conceded that ‘[native] Coloureds and Indians have been under 
constant attack and we in the opposition have not been able to ward off the blows struck against 
those who cannot defend themselves.’419  
The ease of the NP’s initial success fortified them for the greater task of changing the constitution. 
The Act of Union of 1910 had two entrenched clauses, the qualified franchise of the Cape (section 
35), and equality in the treatment of the two official languages (section 137). To amend the clauses 
required a two-thirds majority in a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament.420 Violation of one 
entrenched right could indicate a willingness to violate the other. Thus the constitution irrevocably 
linked the interests of the English-speaking community with that of the Coloured community.421 Thus, 
the NP’s pursuit of its dual policies, Apartheid and Republicanism, was to provide ex-servicemen 
with the spur to mobilise politically.  
The UP, the left-wing radicals and English-speaking society had come upon a common cause. The 
key to unlocking this populist potential lay with the ex-servicemen. In October 1949, the SL had 
already identified the Coloured franchise as a rallying issue and called for a meeting of influential 
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people in Johannesburg.422 Around this time, the SL held discussions with Harry Oppenheimer, and 
Smuts, and the Coloured franchise issue probably formed part of the discussions.423 The thuggish 
nature of NP political campaigning, especially in the Newlands by-election in around 1950, triggered 
many ex-servicemen to picket to ‘protect’ UP candidates.424 In the same vein, radical ex-servicemen 
had since the war also picketed to protect CPSA speakers in Johannesburg.425 By 1950, ex-
Servicemen had already started protesting against the NP policies in Natal, Johannesburg and 
Kimberley.426 In April 1951, representatives of the UP and the SL agreed to mobilise ex-servicemen 
discontent to force the government into an early election. They agreed to the formation of the War 
Veterans Action Committee (WVAC), later known as the Torch Commando (the Torch).427 The SL 
had hoped that the initiative would lead to significant opposition to Apartheid. 
In contrast, the UP was hoping that the Torch would provide the UP with campaign workers and a 
dependable voters’ bloc.428 The famous Battle of Britain Ace Wing Commander Adolphus (Sailor) 
Malan, headed up the executive committee, with the popular Major Louis Kane-Berman, son of Edith 
Kane-Berman, Chief Commandant of the Red Cross, and Major Ralph Parrott. Kane-Berman was 
involved in the National War Memorial Fund, and Parrott was awarded a Military Cross for his part 
in the Battle of Tobruk.429 Sailor Malan expressed the opinion of many ex-servicemen during Torch 
parades: 
Who has the greater claim to talk about saving white civilisation? the [sic.] moles who now pay lip 
service to it or the men who fought for it?430 
We ex-servicemen and women and other citizens assembled here protest in the strongest 
possible terms against the action of the present Government in proposing to violate the spirit of 
the Constitution.431 
On 31 May 1951, swelled by the support of ex-servicemen, the Torch converged on Parliament to 
demand early elections. Oppenheimer, and Sir De Villiers Graaff, both ex-servicemen and now rising 
MPs in the UP, quickly amended these demands, by persuading the Torch that the UP would not be 
prepared to fight an early election. The Torch, disarmed of its most dramatic demands, was left to 
warn the NP of its latent potential. During the march on Parliament, a more radical element fomented 
street fighting in the hope of sparking a violent revolt. When this failed, the Torch, under UP pressure, 
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purged the SL members from its committees.432 The SL came to an end when it amalgamated with 
the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD) in 1953.433  
The Torch, reluctant to become a political party, opted to support the UP and LP in the 1953 election 
as part of a United Democratic Front (the Front). However, the populist nature of their mission soon 
planted the seeds for the Torch’s ultimate demise. The Natalian ex-servicemen, led by former POWs, 
Edward (Gillie) Ford and Reverend James Chutter, feared that removing the Coloured franchise was 
only a stepping stone to the declaration of an Afrikaner Republic.434 The Natalians’ concern about 
Afrikaner Nationalist resurgent Republicanism led to the infamous Natal Stand, which simply stated, 
was a threat of succession from the Union by Natal if the NP did not respect the 1910 Constitution. 
The Torch Executive supported this logic if only to dislocate the NP.435  
The NP’s continued assault on the Coloured Franchise and the UP’s inability to stem the tide of 
repressive legislation, such as the Criminal Law Amendment Bill of 1953 known as ‘The Swart Bill’ 
after its originator Minister of Justice, Charles (CR) Swart, put the Torch at crossed purposes with 
the UP. In February 1953, Kane-Berman further alienated the Torch from the UP and business 
interests when he announced that the Torch was planning to oppose these bills by independent civil 
action.436 Growing discontent with the UP within the Torch, coupled with the loss of funding, forced 
the Torch into crisis.437 
The 1953 election loss provided the impetus for the liberals and the federalists to break from the 
UP.438 UP-Torch co-operation ended when the rump of the Torch executive co-sponsored the 
formation of the Union Federal Party (UFP) in 1953.439 In a bid to prevent the UFP encroaching, the 
Liberal Party (LPSA) declared itself around the same time.440 By 1956, Graaff had taken control of 
the UP from Kosie Strauss and had cocooned himself with loyal ex-servicemen such as Vause Raw, 
John Bowring and Julius (Bill) Horak. The UP’s continued vacillation on African representation 
eventually led to further splits in the UP in 1959 and 1975.441 
By 1960, extra-parliamentary parties began considering violent alternatives in reaction to the 
increasing suppressive actions of the Nationalist state. The imprisonment of prominent liberal and 
radical activists during the 1956 treason trial and later in 1960 after the Sharpeville Massacre, 
provided an opportunity for them to open discussions regarding armed resistance. During their 
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confinement in 1960, David (Monty) Berman, a former communist, and John Lang, a liberal, found 
common ground. Lang’s failure to resuscitate the Torch in 1955,442 opened the way for Berman and 
himself to become co-conspirators in the establishment of the National Committee for Liberation/ 
African Resistance Movement (NCL/ARM) in 1960. The NCL/ARM began violent resistance in 
1961.443 Left-wing radical ex-servicemen within the SACOD became involved in the African National 
Congress’ (ANC) armed struggle at the same time. Among them were Joe Slovo, Rusty Bernstein 
and many others also detained with Berman and Lang.444 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
Ex-servicemen accounted for a large segment of the leadership cadre of opposition politics in the 
1950s. Prominent ex-servicemen appealed to the memory of wartime camaraderie when mobilising 
ex-servicemen at the political stumps. However, the divergent expectations within the ex-serviceman 
leadership cadre resulted in competing attempts to exploit the mass of the Torch for narrower political 
objectives. However, the focus on the Torch and SL should not detract attention from ex-servicemen 
in other political formations in the 1950s. The demise of the Torch did not mean an end to social 
capital derived from wartime service, as many ex-servicemen remained active in various opposition 
parties and movements. 
It is impossible to ignore the role of the ex-servicemen in the leadership cadre of white opposition 
politics from 1948 until 1961. Many of these ex-servicemen came from different backgrounds and 
political ideologies to work against the NP. Often, they mobilised their collective war experience and 
sense of obligation to appeal to others. Their actions have established the belief that their war 
experience had a politicising effect on them. The veracity of this belief requires a closer study of ex-
servicemen within the leadership cadre of white opposition politics. The link between wartime 
experience and political activism requires clarity around who they were, where they came from, 
where they served and what motivated them to pursue political careers. The next chapter 
investigates who these men were. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, White South African men volunteered for war service for 
various reasons, some because they believed in the war effort, some out of a sense of obligation, 
some for the adventure and others for financial gain. The shared war experience gave returning 
soldiers a sense of common identity. Major Geoffrey Tylden, a prominent South African military 
antiquarian, pursued the idea of South African soldiers as a uniform group or class,  
In the course of the last war the South African soldier, irrespective of the language he spoke, 
evolved as a type. …The men are inclined to think themselves as good as their officers, … most 
of them were apt to think themselves better than those in command. They are impatient of being 
asked to suffer heavy loss, though they will stand up to it well enough if the occasion demands.445 
The socialisation and comradery within the context of wartime necessity may have resulted in such 
class formation. Military organisations and structures disrupted the peace-time structures of power, 
thereby allowing soldiers to access and develop new social networks, and question the accepted 
assumptions and practices of the day, regarding class and race. After the war, this constructed 
identity and commonality positioned soldiers to mobilise a more comprehensive social and 
conceptual framework in the pursuit of their future political careers.  
As returning ex-servicemen entered into politics, the soldier typology expanded to accommodate the 
perception that their wartime experience had played a central part in moulding their political activism. 
The ex-serviceman identity, especially the influence of wartime experiences, became entangled with 
a liberal dispensation and a desire to effect change.446 Randolph Vigne, a Liberal Party (LPSA) and 
NCL/ARM member, argued: 
The Second World War did serve to raise the consciousness of a minority of white South Africans 
at the plight of blacks. Many among the English-speaking section, especially those serving in the 
South African forces, and some of their Afrikaner comrades, were won over to the democratic 
ideals to which they were exposed by the strongly anti-Nazi discourse of the day.447 
However, a uniform transformation of political disposition, especially for a group with diverse 
backgrounds, requires further scrutiny. Arguments highlighting a symbiotic relationship between war 
experience and political activism require a broader conceptualisation to include factors such as the 
soldiers’ personality and previous social environment. 
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French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to social capital theory provides a theoretical 
structure in which to discuss how the war had influenced the development of the political attitude 
and actions of the ex-servicemen that had fought in the war. Bourdieu developed three theoretical 
concepts, namely habitus, capital, and fields, of which habitus and capital were useful for this study. 
Bourdieu defined Habitus as the internalisation of experience to provide a disposition for future 
action. Habitus, in simplistic terms, is what a person believes to be ‘common sense” and 
“reasonable”.448 Peter Jackson explains the concept as follows: 
The Habitus is constituted by conscious and unconscious learned experience on the one hand 
and by cumulative impact of practices on the other. It is first and foremost a ‘system of durable 
dispositions’ that have been internalised by the actor over time. This is both unconscious, through 
lived experience, and conscious or semi-conscious, through formal learning. Attitudes and 
inclinations are inculcated by the rhythms and habits of everyday life that are characteristic of the 
social and economic position occupied by the agent as well as by more formalised types of 
education and training. The effect of the Habitus is to provide the actor with an ingrained set of 
orientations that influence not only in the intellect but also in the physical relationship of the social 
actor to the external world.449 
The habitus, as a position of attitude, interprets new experiences against a cumulative past 
experience. The primacy of early experience acquires a dominant role in the ongoing formation of 
habitus.450 New habits are informed by foundational habitus, which in turn is shaped by new 
experiences and the environment. Habitus is the individual’s ingrained history and is not consciously 
brought to mind but rather spontaneously used in decision making.451 People with shared or similar 
life experiences often have similar habitus and thus make similar decisions and act the same. 
The presence of shared experience and cultural conditioning in society allows for the identification 
of discreet and coherent classes or groups. Such generalisation allows for the quantification of 
similarities and lends to prosopography. However, Bourdieu does warn that such groupings or 
classes are not exact or explicit categories but rather dependent on similarities:  
Though it is impossible for all (or even two members) of the same class to have had the same 
experiences, in the same order, it is certain that each member of the same class is more likely 
than any member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most frequent for 
members of that class.452 
The argument allows for the grouping of individuals with similar foundational experiences, such as 
schooling, culture, religion, military experience, and education, into coherent classes irrespective of 
the order of the experiences.  
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In the same way, the possession of similar capital suggests the formation of discrete classes. Magne 
Flemmen et al. argue that “social class divisions are understood in terms of the differential 
endowment of economic and cultural capital”.453 Gal Levy and Orna Simon-Levy found that habitus 
formation is consistent within class categorisation, especially when transforming social capital from 
the military fields to other fields. When determining how soldiers valued their military experience, 
Levy and Simon-Levy found that middle-class soldiers tended to “turn their military jobs into an 
advantage for their prospective middle-class careers”. In contrast, soldiers from the working class 
“fail to render their military service useful in terms of life careers”.454 The habitus and social capital 
of men before they enlisted for war service played an integral part in how they experienced war and 
provided a justification for military service afterwards. 
Where habitus is a subconscious disposition towards the environment, capital is the currency 
employed to accumulate additional capital.455 According to Bourdieu, capital includes all resources 
that are available to and used by individuals to pursue their objectives.456 Capital can include any 
kind of competence or possession that is in short supply, unequally distributed and which is valued 
in some ‘market’ or social field, so that it may come to constitute an advantage for its holder.457  
Bourdieu categorises capital into three forms: economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital. 
Economic capital, being materialistic, encompasses financial resources, assets, and income. 
Cultural capital is the ability to define and legitimise standards and values and is reliant on education, 
knowledge and symbolism.458 Within the military, physical artefacts of cultural capital include titles, 
positions, rank and decorations. Social capital is “the actual and potential resources that can be 
mobilised through membership in social networks of actors and organisations”.459 Furthermore, 
capital is malleable and convertible from one form of capital to another and from one field of use to 
another. The cost of conversion is dependent on its nature and the context in which the conversion 
takes place.460  
Given the aim of this thesis, Bourdieu’s broad theoretical framework was useful in firstly exploring 
the influence of war service on the development of ex-servicemen’s political beliefs while on active 
duty. Secondly, how the war influenced the accrual of socio-political capital that was used after the 
war in opposition politics. However, in order to understand the influence of war service on these 
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men, one first needs to consider their pre-war habitus formation within this theoretical framework. 
Thus, this chapter aims to provide a broad background to the White men who volunteered for military 
service. To this end, the chapter takes a biographic and prosopographic approach to describe the 
servicemen’s pre-war habitus formation, which includes an overview of their pre-war life before they 
enlisted, which will serve as a baseline understanding of biographic factors that influenced the 
formation of a collective military habitus and the accumulation of social capital. Within the broad 
tapestry of their ethnic, cultural, educational, and military experiences, the discussion focuses 
specifically on the group of ex-servicemen that pursued political careers at the national level after 
the war. The discussion uses the ex-servicemen’s memoirs and biographies to position their 
experiences within the broader ex-serviceman community and to contextualise their differences from 
the ordinary. As stated, middle-class soldiers tended to use their military experience to advance their 
middle-class careers. 
2.2 THE BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE EX-SERVICEMEN  
As the previous chapter argued, South Africa’s declaration of war against the Axis Powers in 1939 
further entrenched white divisions. Jan Smuts’s grand experiment of ‘South Africanism’ to bring the 
English and Afrikaans-speakers together into one nation was left in tatters. DF Malan’s Afrikaner 
nationalism and rising fascism not only drove a wedge between English and Afrikaans-speakers but 
also raised the spectre of antisemitism.461 Caplin encapsulates the antagonism of the early months 
of the war: 
All through these early months of the war the Opposition vented their rage upon the Prime Minister 
rather than upon the British section; Dr. Malan, Mr. Pirow, General Kemp, and the young Turks 
of Nationalism breathed fire and brimstone against the Jew and the Jingo, the Imperialist, the 
Capitalist – all, it would seem, personified in the Prime Minister. What venom they had left to 
them, after expending it upon General Smuts, was directed upon those Afrikaners who followed 
him, branding them as renegades, loyal Dutch, Hanskhakies, Jingo serfs, and British 
postillions.462 
 In the 1930s, Afrikaners nationalists had emulated the fascist and anti-Semitic conditions in Europe 
in South Africa. DF Malan and his supporters eagerly encouraged populist behaviour, hoping to 
dilute British influence in South Africa. The Afrikaans community broke into two factions, checking 
future reconciliation with the broader white society. The bruising parliamentary debate over the entry 
into the war, where each camp clearly articulated their positions had entrenched these divisions 
further.463 As Herman Giliomee, argues  
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The decisive turning point was in fact South Africa’s entry into the Second World War on a split 
vote in Parliament and the sharp cleavages that developed during the war between pro-war and 
anti-war factions in the white community, which largely ran along language lines.464  
Thus, at the beginning of the war, separate Afrikaans and English-speaking communities could be 
identified, with different cultures and political beliefs, thereby providing a typology for analysis within 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework. The Afrikaner nationalists’ casting of the Jewish community as an 
unabsorbable minority during the 1930s reinforced the Jewish community as a separate typology, a 
community separate from other Whites. Although they were White, “…they were of the wrong 
race”.465 Joshua Lazerson, in his analysis of South African radical politics in the 1950s, treats the 
Jewish community as a coherent sub-group in South African politics, arguing that the 
disproportionate role that the Jewish community played in radical circles, further justifies analysing 
them as a subset.466  
The divisions in South African society were so glaring that Smuts when he assumed office as Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence in 1939, had to confirm the loyalty of his general staff. After a vetting 
process, he appointed loyal officers to replace those suspected of fascist or ultra-nationalist 
leanings.467 Smuts had already anticipated Italy’s entry into the war and in order to circumvent the 
restrictions in the Defence Act, astutely decreed that all volunteers should take the Africa Service 
Oath.468 Although the institution of the oath had removed the more ardent nationalist soldiers from 
the force, it also further reinforced divisions within White South African society.  
The call-to-arms, officially made on 22 September 1939, was enthusiastically answered by those 
who supported the war. In some cases, even before the official announcement.469 Scrubs Hartshorn, 
the mobilisation officer for the Witwatersrand Area, recalled, “In the last, climatic, few days during 
which Germany invaded Poland, and Great Britain issued its ultimatum to Hitler, the Johannesburg 
Drill Hall became the focal point of seething masses of A.C.F. soldiers …”470 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Union Defence Force (UDF) rapidly expanded and by July 1940, 
the UDF had one brigade in the field in Kenya. By November 1940, the brigade had grown to a 
complete division, and by June 1941, a second division was en route to Egypt.471 The South African 
Air Force (SAAF) and the Seaward Defence Force (SDF) experienced similar expansion. The rapid 
expansion of the UDF was made possible by the broad base from which the volunteers came. The 
initial recruits represented the entire White male population, regardless of religion, race or class.  
 
464  H Giliomee, The Afrikaners, xvii. 
465  Shain, A Perfect Storm, 5. 
466  Lazerson, Against the Tide, 82. 
467  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 183. 
468  Van der Waag, 185. 
469  Lambert, ‘An Identity Threatened’, 63; Orpen, The Cape Town Highlanders, 110. 
470  Hartshorn, Avenge Tobruk, 14. 
471  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 186. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
The scale of the first wave of recruits, and that officially no volunteer could be turned way created 
persistent problems for the UDF.472 The UDF had to balance the manpower requirements of the 
military with that of industry. Artisans and skilled workers, whom the National Supplies Control Board 
had identified as industrial key men, had to be returned to their occupations.473 Furthermore, 
although the UDF had imposed humanitarian restrictions, such as minors requiring parental 
permission to volunteer, and the exclusion of older men from combat, recruiters often adhered to 
these exclusions half-heartedly. As no recruit was turned away, the later ‘combing out’ of key men 
and youth from the regiments during training depleted the regiments that had recruited from industrial 
and administrative centres.474 Secondly, as the first wave had severely depleted the recruitment pool 
of volunteers, subsequent recruitment efforts faced difficulties.475 
The following discussion covers the nature of the early habitus of post-war politicians that 
volunteered to serve in the war from the perspective of cultural identity, class formation and age. 
The discussion adopts the three broad identities, Afrikaner, Jew and English-speaking, that had 
crystallised in South Africa before the war. The influence of the social status of the volunteer 
references their schooling and occupation on volunteering.  
2.2.1 Ethnicity of volunteers 
Determining the language of the UDF volunteers has vexed historians. The UDF did not record the 
home language of volunteers, to obscure societal divisions. However, the UDF did record the religion 
of the soldier, which considering the cultural centrality of religious faith during the period, provides a 
significant cultural and language marker. In South Africa, the White culture was predominantly 
linguistic-religion based, allowing for the argument that religious faith provides an accurate indicator 
of home language.476 Despite apparent cultural differences between the White groups, inter-
marriage did occur, and only after 1948 did their disentanglement become a matter of government 
concern.477 Jonathan Fennell, using both religious affiliation and surnames, analysed a sample over 
a thousand service cards to determine the ethnicity of the white volunteers.478 He provides an 
overview of the language of the UDF volunteer by year, as presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Volunteers by Language (n=1082)479 
 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
Number in sample 37 569 140 150 82 74 30 1082 
English  49% 73% 46% 53% 51% 69% 87% 64% 
Afrikaans 51% 27% 54% 47% 49% 31% 13% 36% 
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Significantly, Fennell’s survey contradicts the widely held belief that the majority of volunteers were 
Afrikaans speaking. Interestingly, Fennell opted to classify the Jewish soldiers as English, despite 
the Jewish community being a coherent ethnocultural sub-group. (Jewish soldiers indicated religion 
as Hebrew, Jewish and Atheist on attestation).  
This study surveyed 153 post-war politicians (see Appendix: List of Ex-Servicemen considered in 
the Prosoprographic Study), with war service, using a similar technique to Fennell, replicated 
Fennell’s observation that more members of the English-speaking community volunteered for war 
service, as indicated in Table 2.2. The ethnic distribution of the 153 people in the group being 37 
Afrikaners, 33 Jewish, and 83 English speakers.  
Table 2.2: Post-war politicians who served in the Second World War by year of attestation 
and Ethno-linguistic association (n=153)480 
 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
Sample 29 75 15 14 12 7 1 153 
 
English 
38% 57% 53% 64% 50% 71% 100% 54% 
 
Jewish 
14% 24% 20% 14% 33% 29% 0% 22% 
English and 
Jewish 
52% 81% 73% 79% 83% 100% 100% 76% 
Afrikaans 48% 19% 27% 21% 17% 0% 0% 24% 
 
The cultural differences between the three groupings, English-speaking, Afrikaans-speaking and 
Jewish, would have influenced the motivation for volunteering and how the individual soldiers 
experienced the war. A broad survey of the foundational habitus or upbringing within each cultural 
typology provides insight into the influence that early life experiences had, how the soldiers 
experienced the war and the war’s influence on later political involvement. These differences are the 
initial habitus that the war experience had either enhanced or displaced, to produce a common ex-
serviceman political identity. 
2.2.1.1 Afrikaner community 
Smuts assiduously selected and staffed the upper echelon of the UDF with a near-perfect balance 
of English and Afrikaans officers, which resulted in a loyal cadre of Afrikaans officers.481 The support 
of the officer cadre, and Afrikaner loyalists within the South African Party or Bloed-sappe, enabled 
Smuts to mobilise a significant segment of the Afrikaans community in support of the war.482 
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Brigadier General Keith van der Spuy, the Military Advisor in London, expressed relief when South 
Africa declared war in September 1939, stating “It was a glad day when the news came through that 
the South African Government had been defeated and, with General Smuts once again in the saddle, 
we had, naturally, cast our lot with the Allies.”483  
Sailor Malan, an Afrikaans-speaker from Wellington in the Western Cape, experienced the rise of 
authoritarianism in Germany in his frequent visits to Hamburg and Keil as a merchant sailor before 
1939. Identifying Nazism as the enemy, he joined the Royal Air Force (RAF) in preparation for the 
war.484 His British loyalism and revulsion of fascism were shared by his brother “Bull” Malan, who 
participated in the invasion of Madagascar in 1942.485 
Ernst Malherbe, recounts a conversation with fellow Afrikaner, Leo Marquard, in the Western Desert 
which summed up the Afrikaner support for the war: 
I said to Leo, “Do you realise that about 40 years ago your father and mine shared a tent in the 
Anglo-Boer War fighting against the British? Now you and I are here fighting with the British, Isn’t 
that remarkable?” “Not really, “E.G.’“ replied Leo, “Our fathers were fighting for their freedom 
against British imperialism. Now we are fighting against a worse imperialism, namely Hitler’s. 
History is the story of man’s eternal struggle for freedom”. With these words Leo virtually 
epitomised the feelings of so many Afrikaners who volunteered to serve in this war against 
Nazism.486  
Both Malherbe and Marquard were archetypical ‘South Africanist’ Afrikaners.487 Marquard’s and 
Malherbe’s fathers were Boer padres who had been captured and interned together during the Boer 
War.488 After the Boer War, Ernst Malherbe Snr, as the padre at Villiersdorp, came under the 
patronage of the wealthy Graaff brothers, who had restored the local church and school (de Villiers 
Graaff School) at his request. When confronted on why, as a seventy-year-old Boer War Veteran, 
Malherbe Snr had joined up for the Second World War, he would retort: “I am not fighting for the 
British. I am fighting with the British against our common enemy, the Nazis.”489 
Malherbe Jnr had pursued an academic career in the United States of America between the world 
wars. He first came to prominence in South Africa in 1920 as a driving member of the Carnegie 
Commission that studied South Africa’s poor White problem. His appointment as Director of the 
Department of Census and Statistics in 1939 made him a natural choice to head up the UDF’s 
information services and invigorate the Directorate Military Intelligence when the war broke out.490 
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Marquard had studied at Grey University College and Oxford University and was a history teacher 
at Grey College in Bloemfontein. He had served in the First World War in the RAF. After that war, 
Marquard founded the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) in 1924,491 in the hope 
that NUSAS would bridge the ever-widening gap between students at the Afrikaans-medium and 
English-medium universities.492 Marquard became well-known for his Marxist interpretation of South 
African politics in the book ‘A Black Man’s Burden’ which he published in 1943.493 Both men returned 
to academia after the war. 
Not all Afrikaans-speaking volunteers came from the Afrikaner gentry or had ‘South Africanist’ views. 
Poor Whites, who were mostly Afrikaners, further supplemented loyalist Afrikaner numbers in the 
UDF.494 A stable income and better service benefits for foreign service enticed them to join.495 David 
Brokensha, an English-speaking soldier from Natal, recalled 
A disproportionate number of Afrikaners joined the army, partly because of their relative poverty: 
the depression of the 1930s had caused many Afrikaner bywoners (those who squatted on farms, 
having no land of their own) to leave the farms and migrate to the towns.496 
Fred Carneson, an English-speaking soldier, recalled that a number of his fellow NCO’s were semi-
literate and battled to draft letters in their own language.497 Peter Brown, a soldier from a wealthy 
Natalian family, also remembers that:  
“[t]here were certainly some Afrikaners I met – from a poor background – who I think went into 
the army because it provided an income, security and … of those, I think, although they were not 
particularly interested in the War, probably volunteered to go overseas”.498  
A substantial sector of the Afrikaans community was against Smuts’s war policy and rejected the 
‘South Africanism’ of the United Party (UP).499 Incessant Afrikaner nationalist propaganda and rising 
fascism in South Africa further divided the Afrikaners as a political grouping.500 Afrikaans soldiers 
were directly affected by this tension which upset their comrades-in-arms. Carneson noted that 
“some of them were being beaten up when they went to their home towns and their dorps [towns] 
and so forth, by these anti war elements”.501 Often tensions between soldiers and the anti-war 
Afrikaners turned violent. Brokensha, tells of an incident that occurred in Potchefstroom between the 
soldiers and students from the Afrikaans-medium University: 
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The troops would return from weekend leave in Johannesburg on the last train, alighting at a small 
siding, a mile from our camp. One night one of the stragglers, a small and mild and popular man, 
was found with a broken leg, having been attacked by a group of townspeople. In retaliation, an 
angry mob of soldiers invaded the university, thrashing all the students they could find. (Neither 
Paul nor I took part in this reprisal raid.) My fellow soldiers boasted that they had found a grand 
piano, played God Save the King, forced the students to stand to attention and then thrown [sic.] 
the piano over a balustrade.502 
Despite the open opposition to the war by the National Party (NP), many Afrikaner nationalists were 
not averse to fighting in the war. Sir De Villiers Graaff, son of Sir David Graaff, recalled after the war 
that “in fact many of them later enlisted in the Army”.503 Hartshorn, who had served as brigade major 
with the 1st Brigade, observed that: “Among the troops [in 1 SA Bde] were a great many who came 
from Nationalist families and whose political thinking undoubtedly had been nationalist”.504  
The Afrikaner nationalist parties were able to retain an element of support even among the soldiers 
that were on active duty, despite these parties being either anti-war or sympathetic to the German 
side. In the 1943 ‘Khaki’ elections approximately 4 per cent of soldiers on active duty voted for 
Afrikaner nationalist parties.505  
The Afrikaans-speakers’ motivation for volunteering to fight in the war varied tremendously. The 
‘South Africanist’ Afrikaner found justification in principle and was loyal to Smuts. For the poorer 
working-class, volunteering for the war service provided an escape from abject poverty, and for the 
restless, the war provided the promise of adventure and travel. Whatever the motivation for 
volunteering, the substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that the Afrikaans-speaking soldiers 
made up for at least 50 per cent of the UDF personnel.506 (However, Fennell’s recent empirical 
evidence discussed previously, does dispute the accepted view). 
The war aggravated the fissions within Afrikaner politics. The anti-war and anti-British rhetoric of the 
Afrikaner nationalists failed to swing all of Afrikanerdom into the Nationalist camp. Despite the 
Afrikaner nationalists’ efforts to politicise Afrikaner culture, the loyal Bloed-sappe support for the UP 
remained unwavering. In the 1948 elections, an estimated 39.5 per cent of the Afrikaner electorate 
voted for Smuts.507 South Africanism and Afrikaner participation in the war left an indelible mark on 
the Afrikaner Bloed-sappe. In 1959, the Bloed-sappe invoked the Afrikaner participation in the wars 
when they pleaded to stem the predominantly English-speaking break-away to the Progressive Party 
(PP): 
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We the United Party Afrikaners have stood by you for many years. On two occasions we have 
made your wars our wars also. If you desert us now you will destroy our confidence in what we 
have stood for all these years. You give us a knockout blow from which we will never recover.508  
2.2.1.2 Jewish community 
The Jewish community in South Africa was always a small minority living on the edge of the English-
speaking community. However, the persistent antisemitism in the tottering Russian Empire (1880-
1918) and the subsequent spread of antisemitism into Eastern Europe before the First World War 
led to a substantial injection of Eastern European Jews into South Africa.509 Gideon Shimoni, a South 
African Jewish historian, estimates that approximately 40 000 Jews entered South Africa between 
1880 and 1910. The majority fled from the Russia Pale of Settlements, specifically Lithuania.510 
Young Jewish men, of the Pale of Settlements, were influenced by a cocktail of Zionism, communism 
and Bundist socialism that was sweeping through Eastern Europe in the 1880s and onwards.511 
These Jews brought with them a socialist tradition that drew them towards political action.512 By 
1917, enough Jews in South Africa had joined the International Socialist Legion, the forerunner of 
the CPSA, to have warranted the formation of a Jewish or Yiddish-speakers branch.513 The rise of 
Nazism in the 1930s also brought about 3 600 fleeing German-Jews to South Africa’s shores which 
further strengthened the Jewish community.514 By 1936 there were 90 645 Jews in South Africa 
which comprised 4.5 per cent of the White population.515 
The coming to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany in January 1933 triggered the surfacing of several 
fascist movements in South Africa, emulating the Nazi and Fascist movements of Germany and 
Italy.516 Hitler’s known hatred of the Jews made the appearance of Nazi-sponsored behaviour in 
South Africa particularly distasteful.517 Hitler began almost immediately to separate the German-
Jews from German society. In April 1933 he passed the Law for the Restoration of the Professional 
Civil Service to remove all Jews from the German civil service. In response to growing harassment, 
38 000 Jews left Germany in 1933, in 1934 another 22 000 left and in also 1934 another 21 000 
fled.518 Aaron Berman, a Jewish Cape Town City Councillor warned in 1934 that “[t]here would 
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always be Jews scattered all over the world regarded as ‘different’ from the people among whom 
they lived. If fascism arose they were bound to be persecuted in the name of ‘unity’”.519 
In November 1936 a group of Stellenbosch University academics, which included Professors 
Hendrick Verwoerd, Krissie Schumann, Johannes Basson and Dr Eben Dönges supported agitation 
to prevent the German Liner Stuttgart from docking in Cape Town with 537 German-Jewish refugees 
aboard.520 Such academic endorsement stoked anti-Semitic sentiment in the country further.  
Wolfie Kodesh, a Jewish schoolboy from Cape Town, remembers that in the 1930s “the prejudice 
amongst the Afrikaaners [sic.] against the Jews was terrible … at that time they used to beat up old 
men coming out of the synagogues…”521 Growing antisemitism, which was inherent in fascism, 
politicised the Jewish community. In the mid-1930s, fascism triggered the first sense of political 
awareness for Rusty Bernstein, a Jewish junior architect studying at the University of the 
Witwatersrand (Wits), which drew him into left-wing politics, he recalls, “… I came into politics not 
because of the racial question but as an opponent of fascism and in an attempt to stop the rise of 
fascism.”522  
In May 1938, the rise of the Black-shirt and Grey-shirt movements on the Rand troubled Leo Lovell, 
a Jewish lawyer, and his wife to the point that they mobilised the Jewish community in Benoni to 
disrupt anti-Semite meetings.523 He recounts: 
Is this Berlin or Benoni?” I cannot believe my own eyes and ears. And we were told to keep away 
and not to provoke these hooligans? What, and let them terrorise everyone and get control of 
bigger and bigger crowds? And then who will stop them? Isn’t this what happened in Germany? 
Nobody stopped them when they were few because they were hooligans; not because they were 
few. And now no-one stops them, not because they are hooligans, but because they are too 
many! We took a vow, my wife and I, there and then, in the street near the library, that no Nazis 
would ever hold their meetings again in Benoni, not if we could help it!524 
The Jewish community, motivated by antisemitism in Europe and the growth of fascism in South 
Africa, supported the war effort. The South African Jewish Board of Deputies called on the South 
African Jewish community to support the war effort, declaring:  
At this critical hour when Nazism is destroying the liberties of nations and individuals, and 
challenging the fundamental ideals of civilisation, this Congress of South African Jewry solemnly 
affirms the obligation of every citizen resident in South Africa to rally to the defence of the country, 
and further pledges that the Jewish community will do all in its power to assist the Union and its 
allies in the fight for victory.525 
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Kodesh explains the mood at the time, neatly merging race, Jewish-ness and anti-fascism into a 
single call-to-arms: 
one of the very good reasons why a lot of us joined - For instance myself, was not only that I was 
against racialism of any sort, but of course being of not orthodox but being Jewish I would be a 
victim of Hitler.526  
Despite the disproportionately large number of Jews volunteering to fight in the war, there were still 
incidents of antisemitism in the UDF. In 1940, the Director General Medical Services (DGMS), 
Colonel Sir Edward Thornton, had to address antisemitism in a regiment where the Afrikaner officers 
were agitating for the replacement of Jewish doctors. However, Thornton remained adamant that 
doctors would be judged only on their medical competency and not their religion.527  
The rise of antisemitism both in South Africa and in Europe informed the Jewish community’s 
motivation to volunteer. Officially, the Jewish Board of Deputies argued that their willingness to 
sacrifice as a community proved their loyalty and assimilability as South Africans. The total number 
of Jews serving in the UDF was estimated to be 10 000. The Jewish community at the time 
represented about 4.4 per cent of the White population.528 Despite the efforts of the Jewish 
community to support the war effort, assimilation into White South African society remained reliant 
on the softening of the racial identities of the dominant White groups. 
2.2.1.3 The English-speaking community 
The most pliable White identity in South Africa was the English-speaking community. Although cast 
as the diametric opposite of the Afrikaner community, the English-speaking community was not 
homogenous. John Lambert, a historian of the South African-English, explains that “[t]he fact that 
most British South Africans … define themselves as British should not mask the fact that they were 
not a monolithic group and that there were as many differences as commonalities between British 
South Africans.”529 
Although a shared British heritage provided the foundation of the English-speaking identity, Afrikaner 
nationalist’s casting of the English-speaking community as the opponent of Afrikaner nationalism 
also contributed to the English-speaking identity construction. Umberto Eco, an Italian academic and 
essayist, explains how such adversarial identity formation creates symmetrical sympathy between 
identities; “Having an enemy is important not only to define our identity but also to provide an obstacle 
against which to measure our system of values and, in seeking to overcome, to demonstrate our 
own worth.”530  
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The enemy is cast as a foreigner, someone who looks different, behaves differently and speaks 
differently, and these differences or ‘otherness’ become the symbol of the threat.531 Thus the English-
speaking identity expanded to include not only those of British descent but also any other outsider 
to the Volk. All Whites, who were part of the Afrikaner’s ‘other’, were declared ‘Engelse’.532 George 
Calpin explains that “[t]he Jew, the Jingo, the Imperialist, the Liberal, and the Britisher are thus 
bunched together in a mass as unnational and anti-Afrikaner. The terms Jewry, Jingoism, 
Imperialism, Liberalism are synonymous in the language of the Afrikaner Nationalists.”533 
Despite the apparent diversification and expansion of the English-speaking typology, Giliomee 
perpetuated the myth of a homogeneous English-speaking community in binary rivalry against the 
Afrikaner by arguing that “The Afrikaner-British rivalry should be understood as a typical fight over 
relative group status and symbols similar to other such struggles around the world.”534 The Afrikaner 
nationalists’ and later Afrikaans historians’ portrayal of the Engelse (South African English-Speaking 
Community) as a coherent mirror of the Afrikanervolk (Afrikaner Nation) has obscured the diversity 
of this group.  
The English-speaking community was comprised of waves and trickles of immigrants from Britain, 
and the rest of the world. The timing of their arrival and where they had settled resulted in several 
distinct English-speaking identities emerging: 
There was … not much in common between the British of Cape Town whose identity was 
interwoven with Cape traditions and Cape liberalism; those of Natal with their strident anti-Indian 
and anti-Afrikaner sentiments; or those of Johannesburg with their more materialistic outlook.535 
However, the constant engagement with the ‘home country’ kept the South African-British culture 
attached to a broader sense of Britishness and provided a semblance of continuity between the 
various groups, even if South Africans seemed archaic to their European counterparts.536 As British 
immigrants did not flee oppression, there was a lack of grievance with the ‘home countries’ which 
meant that they did not seek to create a new identity in South Africa consciously. Instead, they sought 
to replicate the best of their old ways within a new context, underwritten and protected by a British 
Hegemony.537 Culturally, the English-speaker looked to Britain for their values. Their consumption of 
British literature instilled a sense of Whiteness and masculinity in the English-speaking youth.538  
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British-settler masculinity, with its emphasis on duty and service, was further reinforced by 
sociocultural institutions such as churches, schools, volunteer regiments and social societies.539 The 
masculine hegemony was not exclusively or dominantly ‘English’, but rather an amalgamation of the 
Irish, Welsh, Scottish and English, tempered by engagements with other South African cultures. Of 
these, the South African-Scottish maintained a unique but subsidiary identity by the formation of 
Caledonian Societies and military regiments.540 Calpin portrays the Scottish influence as “…if there 
is a band to play the British to church or city hall on some day of memory or protest, it will be provided, 
kilted and piped, by the Caledonian Society, not by an English brass band, Burns and St. Andrew 
taking precedence over St. George and Merrie England”.541 Despite the differences within the 
English-speaking community, the common thread that held them together was the British Crown and 
membership of the British Commonwealth.  
The English community was generally loyal to the crown, the idea of empire and a connection with 
Britain, but within a South African context.542 In the interwar period, the community developed a 
strong sense of South Africanism, similar to the South Africanism advocated by Smuts, Hofmyer and 
Malherbe.543 The English-speakers did not experience any contradiction between loyalty to the 
British Crown and the ideals of South Africanism.544 Charles Evenden, the founder of the Memorable 
Order of the Tin Hats (MOTHS), sums up the English-speaking community’s affinity to ‘South 
Africanism’ as espoused by Smuts, “Smuts made you proud you were a South African”.545  
The English-speaking community was vigorously in support of the war in defence of the 
commonwealth.546 Only one English speaking MP voted against entering the war. Furthermore, the 
populist nature of Nazism and Fascism was the antithesis to a long tradition among the English-
speakers of individual rights and constitutional governance.547 Joining up to fight against Germany 
and Fascism was more than political, it was also a moral duty to King and Country. Carneson 
expressed this sentiment succinctly: 
We used to see them walking round [sic.] with their swastikas and their grey shirts and all the rest 
of them, you know, in Pietermaritzburg… It takes on added significance now, because there’s 
always the possibility of a fascist solution, not just the sort of heavy handed military police brutality 
methods that we’ve got now but these madmen taking over - there is that possibility, although I 
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think that there (are) a hell of a lot of whites who’ll be looking at this, including Afrikaaners [sic.], 
and not liking it one little bit, because in a sense it runs across a lot of their own internal democratic 
traditions…548 
The masculine hegemony, instilled by the English-speaking community’s institutions, was so 
ingrained that the idea of duty, service and loyalty was synonymous and the schoolboy ideas of 
“…loyalty to team, house and school, … translated seamlessly into loyalty to country, empire and 
monarchy”.549 Walter Hain, a schoolboy from Pretoria Boys High School (PBHS), recalling his 
decision to volunteer was a moral duty, “When there is such a war then you have to be involved. It’s 
your duty”.550 The explanation of Brown, a former Head boy at Michaelhouse, further illustrates how 
ingrained moral obligation was in the habitus of the English-speaking community. Volunteering was 
simply ‘common sense’: 
It wasn’t because I was drawn in any way to the military life, because I hated cadets at school 
too. But there was no question that that was what one wanted to do as soon as one got out of 
school, and parents, of course, tried to hold it up or postpone it for as long as they could, I think.551 
Len Lee-Warden, a printer that had emigrated to Cape Town from Britain in 1936, experienced a 
similar inarticulate compulsion to fight in the war: 
A letter from my mother told me that my younger brother Reg was with the BEF in France while 
Jack was in the RAF. I wanted so desperately to play a part. By March 1940 a mobile printing unit 
had been started by the Government Printer and I enlisted.552 
For Colin Eglin, his joining was also a matter of course. However, he was allocated to the Cape 
Garrison as part of the 10 light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, he quickly became dissatisfied with guard 
duty in Cape Town and became restless. 
I hadn’t joined up to spend my army career in base camp. I sought and obtained a meeting with 
the officer commanding my unit and explained my wish to ‘go North’. I was assigned for active 
service in the middle East.553 
Thus, generally, masculinity and a sense of moral duty were deeply embedded within the English-
speaking community and motivated men to enlist. Such moral compulsion to do one’s duty was not 
only limited to English-speaking men, but also extended to women, albeit to a far lesser extent. 
Eglin’s mother also signed up for service as a secretary at the SAAF area headquarters at 
Youngsfield. She later transferred to defence headquarters in Pretoria.554  
Lambert summarises the stakes at play for English-speaking South Africans. They believed that 
“…they were fighting for a righteous cause, to free the world from oppression…”; that they were 
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fighting for personal loyalty to friends in South Africa and Britain; and that the war would be an 
adventure. Finally, “the survival of Britain was now at stake. Her survival was seen as a vital South 
African interest but also aroused an instinctive emotional reaction among many of those English-
speakers who flocked to enlist”.555  
2.2.2 Schooling 
The South Africanist’s inability to interrogate their volunteerism beyond ‘common-sensical’ 
responses, suggests that the deep inculcation of a masculine code, which emphasised duty and 
adventure as part of their habitus, occurred during their early-life development. Schooling, especially 
at elite schools in South Africa, may have been responsible for instilling such an unquestioning, 
almost unconscious, need to sustain the dominant hegemony. Bourdieu identified the education 
system as a means for elite reproduction, whereby the dominant classes institutionalised their value 
systems in society and transferred symbolic and social capital to the next generation.556  
Robert Morrel elaborates on Bourdieu’s concepts to argue that schooling in South Africa reinforced 
the dominant masculine-based hegemony in three ways. Firstly, the school provided access to the 
overlapping networks of elites. Past pupils became prominent members of society, creating an ‘old 
boys’ patronage network (which alienated women and ‘lesser’ men). Secondly, the schools quickly 
became ‘defining institutions’ as prominent ‘old boys’ were able to exert indirect control over society’s 
norms and values. Lastly, through the repetition of gendered tasks, a consistent understanding of 
masculinity could be negotiated between schoolmasters, prefects, and pupils.557 
The elite South African schools, both private and government, both English and Afrikaans medium, 
drew inspiration from the Victorian public school model. Lord Alfred Milner, as an administrator of 
the Transvaal before Union, had made it a matter of administrative policy to establish state schools 
based on the model.558 The schools emphasised a sense of loyalty to school and country, and 
perpetuated the “rituals of Anglicanism, masculinity and Englishness”.559 John Honey, elaborates 
further:  
…the influence of the English public school model can be seen in many aspects of South African 
high schools—in private schools (obviously) but also in English-medium government schools, and 
even to some extent in Afrikaans-medium schools also. Indeed, I would go further, and say that 
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in some notable respects, South African high schools are stuck fast in the 19th century model of 
the English public school….560 
The elites schooling system in South Africa has been characterised by:  
…certain distinctive conceptions of the role of headmaster and staff; an internal organisation and 
hierarchy of discipline based on prefects and a “house” system; compulsory organised games; 
uniform, assembly (whether in hall or chapel) and a range of other phenomena designed to 
emphasize the concept of the school as a self- conscious community, attracting to itself the loyalty 
both of its past and of its present members, and aiming to exert on its pupils an emotional hold 
not just during their schooldays, but for life.561 
Peter Randell concurs in his description of both elite private and government schools in South Africa: 
They are boys’ schools; their early headmasters were mostly public school men from England; 
and they display typical public school features such as a strong academic bias and the retention 
of Latin as an important part of the curriculum; a private mythology and the fostering of ‘school 
spirit’ and tradition; boarding houses and intense inter-house rivalry; prefectorial and fragging 
systems: governing bodies - largely symbolic since effective power is vested in the provincial 
authorities; compulsory uniforms and games; waiting lists of the children of past pupils; powerful 
Old Boys’ societies; and they often have preparatory schools associated with them and acting as 
their main feeder schools.562 
The status of the elite English schools appealed to prominent Afrikaans-speakers who sent their 
sons to these schools. Table 2.3 shows that within the sample group, there was a fair amount of 
Afrikaans attendance at these schools. Furthermore, Afrikaans schools also adopted the essence of 
‘the model’: 
Yet, almost everything that is familiar in an English school appears in them [Afrikaans School] 
with illuminating meaning; the school crest, the school motto, the school house system; the prefect 
or monitorial order; all that is typical of that most typical English institutions, the English public 
school, translated into the Afrikaner idiom.563 
The schools upheld a tradition of military volunteerism, and during the First World War, the elite boys’ 
schools of South Africa564 provided a constant flow of volunteers, both in the form of teachers and 
scholars, for the South African war effort.565 The memory of the Great War was seamlessly entwined 
into masculine hegemony and school rituals by the symbolism of remembrance. Brokensha’s 
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experience at Durban High School is insightful in understanding how ritual, hierarchy and tradition 
was perpetuated and ingrained in schoolboys:  
Proudly wearing my new boater (the school straw hat, commonly referred to as a ‘basher’), I 
walked under an arch, and was promptly told by one of the school prefects to follow him. I knew 
this senior boy – everyone knew Skonk Nicholson (head boy, captain of both cricket and rugby) 
– and I wondered why he should deign to notice me. Taking me into the ‘boot room’, where several 
other prefects lounged about, he told me to bend over, and, with no explanation, he caned me. It 
was not very painful: I remember feeling above all puzzled as to what my offence was. As I left 
the room, one of the prefects said, ‘Next time, you will pay respect and remove your basher.’ Later 
I learned that the arch was a memorial to DHS boys who had been killed in World War 1. 
Such ritualistic behaviour implicitly instilled the need to protect the school, country and 
commonwealth. Along with the physical masculinity, a ‘Christian’ sense of stewardship (inherited 
from the involvement of the Anglican Church) was also prevalent. Lovell, a pupil of Grey High School, 
touches on the more spiritual aspect of the ‘English Tradition’ of Education,566 reflecting that “… the 
system of discipline was firm, a sense of balance, and above all justice pervaded the school.”567 The 
founder of Michaelhouse, James Todd, summed up the ethos of these schools in his Speech Day 
address in 1897, “Our aim is to make, not accountants, not clerks, not clergymen, but men; men of 
understanding, thought and culture”.568  
Table 2.3 lists the schools that produced many of the post-war politicians who served in the war. 
Elite schools dominate the list. These schools were structured according to the English public school 
model, implicitly and explicitly reinforcing Victorian masculine values. A 1971 study of the White elite 
in South Africa, confirms how persistent these schools were at elite propagation. The study lists the 
schools that were most prolific at perpetuating the South African White elite. The list included Paul 
Roos Gymnasium, Grey College, Paarl Boys High School (Dual medium), Paarl Gymnasium, 
Wellington Seun’s Hoërskool, Jan van Riebeck Hoërskool, Durban High School, South African 
College School (SACS), King Edward VII School (KES), St Andrew’s College, Bishops College, 
Jeppe High School for Boys (JHSB), Rondebosch High School, PBHS, St John’s College, 
Michaelhouse, Kingswood College and Grey High School.569 
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Table 2.3: Alma mater of ex-serviceman politicians (n=153)570 
School571 Pupils Type of school Province 
 Afr Eng Jew  Total   
Durban HS - 4 3 7 Government (English) Natal 
Diocesan (Bishops) 1 5 - 6 Anglican  Western Cape  
KES 1 3 1 5 Government (Milner- English) Transvaal 
PBHS - 2 3 5 Government (Milner- English) Transvaal 
SACS - 4 1 5 Collegiate (English) Western Cape 
Dale College - 3 1 4 - Eastern Cape  
Ficksburg HS 3 1 - 4 Government (Afrikaans) Free State 
Grey HS - 3 1 4 Government (English) Eastern Cape  
Maritzburg College - 4 - 4 - Natal 
Michaelhouse - 4 - 4 Anglican  Natal 
St John’s College - 4 - 4 Anglican  Transvaal 
Hilton College - 2 1 3 Anglican  Natal 
Jeppe BHS - 2 1 3 Government (Milner) Transvaal 
Paarl BHS  4 - - 4 Government (Dual Medium) Western Cape 
De Villers Graaff HS - 1 1 2 Dual Medium Western Cape  
Grey’s College 2 - - 2 Collegiate (Afrikaans) Free State 
Parktown BHS - 2 - 2 Government (English) Transvaal 
Rondebosch BHS 1 1 - 2 Government (English) Western Cape 
 
A survey of the scholastic experiences of ex-servicemen referred to in Table 2.3 shows that a 
substantial number involved in post-war politics had similar schooling, which may have shaped their 
disposition before the war and may have contributed to their politicisation during and after the war. 
The following discussion traces how the schools influenced the pupils’, old boys’ and teachers’ 
disposition towards volunteering to serve in the war. 
The schools, unashamedly Archaic Victorian in nature, sustained the aura of Britishness by sourcing 
teachers mainly from England and Scotland after the First World War.572 Inadvertently, the imported 
schoolmasters, many educated in England after the Great War, brought with them new ideas of 
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social justice and equity that were gaining traction in post-war Britain at the time. At Bishop’s, 
Reverend Birt, an Oxford graduate, was headmaster from 1919 to 1943.573 At Hilton College, in 1928, 
only one teacher, the Afrikaans master, was from a South African University, the rest had graduated 
in Britain.574 At Michaelhouse, Elred Pascoe, a Cambridge graduate, was appointed rector in 1917 
and between the wars slowly reduced the school’s dependency on British graduates.575 James Lang, 
a master at PBHS and later rector at Grey’s School was originally from Scotland.576 Cecil Williams577 
came from Cornwell in 1928 and taught at KES and PBHS after completing his degree at Wits.578  
At elite schools, pupils held teachers in high esteem, which allowed the teachers to influence their 
charges’ political dispositions. As a pupil at KES, Bernstein, experienced his school teacher, 
Williams, as “outspokenly iconoclastic and immensely popular with the boys”.579 Bernstein who later 
studied at Hilton College noted that the College imported “their teachers from British universities and 
they had a few very good teachers including one580 who really introduced [him] to the question of 
fascism because he had been an active anti-fascist in Britain”.581 Bernstein further added that “[s]ome 
of his hatred of fascism must have come away with me”.582 The Rector of Michaelhouse, Fredrick 
Snell, who had studied at Oxford, had brought a liberal influence to Michaelhouse.583 He introduced 
an exchange programme between Michaelhouse and Adams College584 and instituted race relations 
as a post-matric subject.585 Brown was substantially influenced by these liberal currents and 
innovations that occurred at Michaelhouse while he was a pupil.586 At Diocesan (Bishops) College 
the Deputy Headmaster, Captain Hubert Kidd, established a debating club, which allowed pupils to 
explore politics. Graaff, as a member of the club, developed his political thought and “found it the 
most worthwhile thing I did at school”.587  
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Less prestigious government schools had also sought teachers from abroad, who had similar effects 
on their charges. John O’Meara, a militant teacher of Irish origin, influenced Joe Slovo, a Jewish 
pupil, during his time at the Observatory Junior High School.588 Slovo recalls that O’Meara “took me 
along to the junior left book club, and that was the first time that I actually sat next to a black man.”..589 
The liberalising efforts of these teachers were endorsed when Lord Harlech (William Ormsby-Gore), 
the High Commissioner to South Africa, at a Speech Day at Michaelhouse, on 1 October 1942, 
predicted that war would cause a move towards the political left in South Africa, and that “racial 
relations have got to be put on a better footing”.590  
Often teachers were also transferred and promoted between the schools. James Lang, father of 
John and Colin Lang, was a respected deputy Headmaster at PBHS before accepting the Rectorship 
of Grey’s School in Port Elizabeth in 1934.591 In 1940, AD McDonald left PBHS to become the 
headmaster of Potchefstroom Boys High School.592 Ronald Currie, the first South African rector at 
Michaelhouse, was transferred between Michaelhouse and St Andrews College in Grahamstown 
during the war.593 The resulting consistency in the schooling system, allows for the generalisation of 
specific observations. 
When the war broke out, the teachers reinforced the masculine ethos of the schools by volunteering 
to fight in such large numbers that the elite schools faced staffing difficulties. By 1940, the 
volunteering of ten masters from JHSB prompted the school’s Governing Board to institute measures 
to stop the deluge of teachers.594 From PBHS, 12 masters volunteered of which only half were 
permitted to join up.595 By 1941 the Rector of Michaelhouse reported that more than a third of his 
1940 staff complement was on active service.596 In the group under consideration, eight 
schoolmasters joined up.597 To cope with the shortage of male teachers, schools received special 
dispensation to employ female teachers temporarily.598  
The senior boys, some not waiting to matriculate, shortly followed their masters into service. The 
PBHS school magazine lamented in 1941 that “[w]e were scarcely settled for a good year’s work 
 
588  Rhodes University. ‘History of Joe Slovo’ (2019). Available: 
https://www.ru.ac.za/lilianngoyi/joeslovo/historyofjoeslovo/ [Accessed: 25 September 2019]. 
589  SAHA, AL2460, ‘Interview with Joe Slovo by J Fredrickse’. 
590  Cardo, Opening Men’s Eyes, 35. 
591  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 92. 
592  Illsely, 92. 
593  APC, OHP ‘Interview with Peter Brown by Norman Bromberger’. 
594  D Etheridge, ‘Childe’s Jeppe, 1937-1943’, in H Cunningham and N Mitchell (eds.), A History of Jeppe 
High School for Boys 1890-1990 (Johannesburg: Jeppe Schools’, 1990), 18. 
595  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 90. 
596  Barret, ‘A History of Michaelhouse, 1896-1952’, 142. 
597  These were C Williams (KES), JJ O’Meara (Observatory Junior High School), PA Moore, KC McIntyre, 
AC Martins (Escort High School), Leo Marquard (Grey’s College), Rev JB Chutter (Michaelhouse), and 
VCH Brown. See DOD Archive, PA. 
598  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 90; Barret, ‘A History of Michaelhouse, 1896-1952’, 143. 
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when a number of our most experienced and enthusiastic Student Officers and NCOs left in order to 
join some branch of the Fighting Services.”599 
As the war progressed the call to service, embedded in the school ethos and dutifully answered by 
schoolmasters, old boys and fellow pupils, it incited the younger boys who were too young to 
volunteer to complain that, “for the younger of us there were many pangs of envy as we saw our 
seniors go off to join the forces. As the war developed we awaited our turn to get into uniform and 
join them”.600 The call-to-arms mobilised 50 per cent of Michaelhouse Old Boys, and over 1 000 KES 
Old Boys served in the Transvaal Scottish regiment alone.601 Enough PBHS Old Boys (Phobians) 
had volunteered that in POW camps 35 and 47 in Italy, there were sufficient to establish an old boys’ 
association in each camp.602 Furthermore, in Camp 47 there were sufficient old boys from Hilton 
College and Michaelhouse to organise an ‘inter-school’ baseball match.603  
At home, the schools lionised the serving old boys in their magazines, which kept a careful tally of 
the old boys’ movements and adventures.604 School magazines published past pupils’ letters, 
movements and promotions regularly, for instance Vause Raw was among the old boys from PBHS, 
who wrote periodically to his alma mater. Even today these schools have continued to nurture the 
traditions of remembrance established after the Great War, adding the fallen to their ‘Roll of Honour’ 
(indicated in Table 2.4) and keeping count of their heroes’ decorations and medals.  
  
 
599  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 96. 
600  Illsely, 97. 
601  Lambert, ‘Their Finest Hour?’, 73. 
602  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 99. 
603  Barret, ‘A History of Michaelhouse, 1896-1952’, 137. 
604  Barret, 138. 
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Table 2.4: Decorations and medals of ‘Old Boys’ of Prominent Schools  
Decorations and medals Michael 
house605 
Jeppe606 KES607 PBHS608 Bishops609 
DSO 6 3 9 4 7 (1 bar) 
MC 13 6 17 10 19 
DFC 20 
(2 bars to 
DFC) 
11 37  
(4 bars to 
DFC) 
15  
(1 Bar to 
DFC) 
27  
(3 Bars to 
DFC) 
DSC 1 1 2 0 4 
AFC 1 1 3 1 3 
DFM - 1 3 - - 
DSM 1 - 1 - 1 
MM 6 4 4 4 4 
DCM 1 1 1 1 1 
BEM 2 - - - 1 
George Medal - - 1 - - 
Kings Medal for Bravery 1 - - - - 
CMG 1 - - - - 
GCB - - - - 1 
KCB - - - - 1 
KBE - - - - 1 
CBE 2 - 2 - 4 
CB 1 - - - 3 
OBE 9 2 10 3 15 
MBE 7 - 14 3 13 
Soldiers About 1205 Over 2000 Over 2000 1600 1532 
 
As in the Great War, the South African elite schools provided soldiers to the war efforts. The school 
not only shaped the habitus of the pupils towards values of service and duty but inadvertently 
provided an environment for the pupils to develop independent, possibly liberal political views. 
Additionally, the old boy’s connections gave them access to social capital that had a ‘middling effect’ 
on their social status and attitude, which framed their military experience. The schooling system gave 
these men both the will and means to pursue meaningful political careers after the war.  
2.2.3 Age of volunteers 
Age can be a determining factor of both habitus and social capital. As discussed previously, age 
solidifies the habitus, and the passing of time allows for the accumulation of various forms of social 
and economic capital. The age of a recruit can thus provide an indicator of both his social class and 
his disposition. The need for manpower and the UDF’s recruitment practices meant that, unlike 
 
605  Barret, ‘A History of Michaelhouse, 1896-1952’, 135 note 9, 12. 
606  Plaque in Jeppe Boys High School hall entrance. 
607  Digby, ‘From Playing Field to Parade Ground’. 
608  Illsely, Pretoria Boys High, 254. 
609  ‘Bishops War Record’, 70-99. Additional decorations and medals were added to the list after 1950, as 
they were awarded or became known. 
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conscription, men and later women of all ages were recruited, trained and deployed together, which 
allowed for both inter-generational and inter-class engagement.  
As indicated earlier in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, the majority of volunteers joined in the first two years 
of the war, leaving the pool of White men depleted for recruitment in later years. In the early years, 
both old and young men volunteered to fight “up north”. In some cases, all the adults in a household 
volunteered. For instance, Malherbe, his wife Janie, his two sons and his father, a 70-year-old 
veteran of the Anglo Boer war, all joined the war effort.610 Hain’s father and two older brothers 
enlisted immediately, and he joined later when he turned 18.611 Helen Joseph’s father (RAF), brother 
(British Army) and husband (UDF) had volunteered before she joined the South African Woman’s 
Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF).612 For the war-supporter, their commitment was both individual and 
reinforced by a broader family and community network. 
Older volunteers, eager to participate, attempted to evade recruitment and utilisation restrictions by 
volunteering to forgo their ranks or by lying about their age. Van der Spuy, the South African Military 
Advisor in London at the time, faced the challenge of interviewing retired South African officers. 
Some were as old as seventy and eighty. Despite their age, they who were willing to forgo their 
previous ranks to re-enlist as privates in the Home Guard.613 Aaron Berman, a Cape Town City 
Councillor, when enlisting in 1940, understated his age by seven years in order to experience combat 
in East Africa. After returning to South Africa, he secured a transfer to the British Army (who were 
less rigid regarding age) so that he could see combat duty in Europe. He reunited with his son, who 
had been captured at Tobruk, in Mortara in Italy in 1944.614 Lovell, when meeting one of his old 
schoolmasters, Mr Gamble, in the North African desert, was “careful not to ask him what age he had 
inserted in his recruitment papers!”615  
On the opposite extreme, youths were willing to add years to their age to avoid securing their 
guardian’s permission to volunteer. Scholars and students who either had finished or abandoned 
their studies tried their luck to deceive the recruiters. As the recruitment pool depleted, the number 
of youths who successfully ‘duped’ the recruitment officers increased. Carneson willingly added 
years to his age in order to join up.616 Also, Brokensha later noted how complacent the recruiting 
officers were when he joined in 1940: 
I put the date of my birth back a year, making it 23 May 1922 (instead of 1923). The recruiting 
sergeant drily remarked we had a clever mother as the age difference on our forms showed an 
 
610  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, 211. 
611  Hain, Ad and Wal, 5. 
612  Joseph, Side by Side, 25-26. 
613  Van der Spuy, Chasing the Wind, 214. 
614  South African Jewish Board of Deputies, South African Jews in World War Two, 63. 
615  Lovell, For the Love of Justice, 23. 
616  Carneson, Red in the Rainbow, 86. 
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interval of only six months, but he cheerfully admitted us to the Second South African Division 
Signal Company, allocating us our army numbers, 3738 for me, 3739 for Paul.617  
In 1943, Slovo, who was 18 years old at the time, went to volunteer against his father’s wishes. 
Slovo, along with other two young ‘comrades’, added years to their age to avoid securing their 
parents’ consent.618 Brown, who joined up in 1942 recalls that one of the men who volunteered with 
him even went so far as to change his name: 
There was one chap, about my age, that was with us right through, and after about two years or 
something, they suddenly discovered that he’d joined up under a false name -because his parents 
didn’t want him to.619 
The broad spread of age evident in the volunteer army allowed for inter-generational networking 
among the servicemen as was evident in Brokensha’s experiences: 
At one early-morning [toilet] session I was joined by Bill Payn, a popular teacher at Durban High 
School, who had joined the army despite being forty years old. Mr Payn jollied me out of my 
discomfort, saying, ‘Dave, everyone has to shit, and this is the way we do it in the army. You will 
get used to it.’ Although I never really got used to it, it did become less upsetting. 
Another significant new friend was Leslie Rubin, an attorney in Durban. Many years later, when I 
asked what he recalled, Leslie wrote to me: “I remember the day, not long after I had joined up, 
when [your father] whom I knew well as a senior colleague – Brokensha and Higgs was one of 
the older legal firms in Durban – came up to me as I was on my way to court, and said he had 
heard I was with the Second Division Signal Company. ‘My two boys are in the same unit and I 
would appreciate it if you would keep an eye on them.’ I sought out Paul and David…”620 
The sample group being ex-servicemen who became involved in post-war politics reflects the 
broader experience, as indicated in Table 2.5. In the initial wave, the volunteers’ ages varied widely 
between under-20 to over-61 years of age. The majority of volunteers were between 21 and 35 years 
of age. As the war progressed, and the recruitment pool became depleted, both the number of 
volunteers reduced and the age distribution narrowed and became younger. The age distribution of 
these men indicates that support for the war was intergenerational and that older soldiers were in a 
position, within the military context, to influence the opinions and dispositions of younger comrades.  
  
 
617  Brokensha, Brokies Way.  
618  Slovo, Slovo: The Unfinished Autobiography, 27. 
619  APC, OHP ‘Interview with Peter Brown by Norman Bromberger’. 
620  Brokensha, Brokies Way.  
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Table 2.5: Sample group’s age and year of volunteering for war service (n=153)621 
  Age at volunteering  
 
 

















1939 4 3 5 6 3 3 4 - - 1 29 
1940 6 20 17 13 9 5 4 1 - - 75 
1941 2 6 2 3 1 - 1 - - - 15 
1942 4 3 2 2 1 - 1 - 1 - 14 
1943 5 3 2 1 1 - - - - - 12 
1944 4 1 1 - - 1 - - - - 7 
1945 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 
 Total 26 36 29 25 15 9 10 1 1 1 153 
  
The depletion of the White male population had other consequences. The UDF’s measure to mitigate 
the shortfall of White men on the front-lines undermined White masculine hegemony. In January 
1941, a new medical category was applied, which made it difficult to discharge anyone on the 
grounds of being medically unfit. A ‘Steel Commando’ recruitment campaign toured the rural areas, 
and recruiters pushed for a second campaign.622 In order to release able-bodied men for combat, 
women and Black soldiers increasingly filled non-combat roles. Increased pressure was placed on 
Lieutenant Colonel (Mrs) Reintge Lugtenburg and Lieutenant Colonel (Mrs) Doreen Dunning to 
recruit more women. The resulting efforts led to the recruitment in 1942 of Ms Jacqueline de Villiers 
and Ms Joseph, two women that would rise to political prominence after the war as WAAF information 
officers.623  
The encompassing nature of volunteerism in the UDF created an intersection for people of ethnicity, 
gender and age. However, the intergenerational transfer of habitus was not the only characteristic 
of a volunteer force. Social capital, in the form of occupation, accompanied the volunteer into the 
military.  
2.3 OCCUPATION OF VOLUNTEERS 
The urgency of the initial mobilisation of forces not only meant diversity in age and culture of the 
volunteers but also meant that the volunteers came from a wide range of occupational classes. 
Occupation, often a culmination of schooling and education, provides an indicator for social class. 
Part of the enlistment process required candidates to indicate their occupations. Although occupation 
may not have guaranteed a commission or better appointments, as a part of the habitus, it did 
contribute to how the servicemen interpreted their military service.  
 
621  Table developed by Author from DOD Archive, PA. Permanent Force soldiers and soldiers already in 
the UDF (ACF) were treated as volunteers for war service in 1939. 
622  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 105. 
623  DOD Archive, PA, Personnel Service Files, de Villiers f268744, and Joseph f268727. 
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Fennell determined the social standings of the enlisted British soldier in comparison to other 
Commonwealth soldiers by classifying soldiers according to their occupation, as indicated in Table 
2.6. He adopted the UK Ministry of Labour occupational categories. In his comparison, the UDF 
soldiers seem to have come from a broader cross-section of society and on average were better 
skilled.624 The skill difference between the UDF and British Army recruits is even more marked when 
considering that skilled artisans had been declared key men and were ‘combed out’ of the regiments 
and returned to the industry after they had volunteered. The UDF’s exclusion of key men may have 
biased the representation of these occupations within the UDF. 
In Table 2.6 the occupations of the sample group of politicians with war service (using data extracted 
from primarily service records and political party curriculum vita) are sorted according to Fennell’s 
categorisation and compared to Fennell’s study. The data suggests that the group came from 
predominantly professional and intermediate occupational groups.  
Table 2.6: Occupational class of Second World War soldiers  
Class Occupations625 UK soldiers626  UDF soldiers627 Political ex-
servicemen628 
(Sample Group  
n = 153) 
Professional doctors, dentists, 
engineers, writers 
0,9% 3,1% 28% 
Intermediate pharmacists, chemists, 
teachers, editorial staff 
4,4% 8% 41% 
Skilled  
 
shop assistances, clerks, 
lorry drivers (SA only 
Farmers) 
68,4% 74,6% 20% 
Semi-skilled caretakers, railway 
porters, land workers 
11,3% 9,6% 0% 
Non skilled labourers, factory 
workers, cleaners 
15,1% 4,8% 0% 
Unknown  0% 0% 10% 
 
Using the data mentioned above, Table 2.7 triangulates occupation with the date of attestation. The 
distribution of occupational class over time reinforces the trend identified regarding age in Table 2.5. 
As with the distribution of age, the distribution of occupation was more diverse among the earlier 
volunteers (1939-1940) than the later volunteers (1941-1945), confirming the UDF had depleted the 
 
624  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 186–87. 
625  Fennell, 186–87. 
626  Fennell, 187. 
627  Fennell, 189–90. 
628  Commissioned Permanent Force Officers, students and scholars are included in the intermediate 
occupations. Farmers are included in skilled occupations to be consistent with Fennell’s methodology. 
Other agricultural occupations are included in the intermediate occupations. Where occupations were 




recruitment pool early in the war and became more dependent on scholars and students to replenish 
the forces as the war progressed.  
Table 2.7: Occupational class and year of volunteering of ex-servicemen politicians (n=153)629 
 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
Professional 5 26 5 4 1 2 - 43 
Intermediate 17 18 5 9 9 4 1 63 
Scholars and Students 1 4 1 4 4 3 1 18 
Skilled 1 23 4 1 1 1 - 31 
Unknown 6 8 1 - 1 - - 16 
Total 29 75 15 14 12 7 1 153 
 
The South African soldiers came from a generally higher occupational class than those conscripted 
into the British armed forces. Furthermore, the volunteer that would become involved in post-war 
politics came predominantly from the skilled and professional occupations. The volunteers’ transition 
from highly skilled pre-war occupations into the military environment exposed them to a different 
class and ethnic perspectives. The drastic change in context and status allowed for a recalibration 
of ideas and concepts which they had previously held as gospel. Such exposure may have 
broadened and deepened their political perspectives, making them more aware of the social 
injustices and divisions. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a broad survey of the demographics of the South African politicians that fought 
in the Second World War. The rise of fascism in Europe and South Africa’s declaration of war in 
1939 further exacerbated the divisions that existed from the onset of the union in 1910. These 
divisions allowed for the identification of three distinct communities in South Africa, the Afrikaans-
speaking, the English-speaking and the Jewish communities. Within the Afrikaans-speaking 
community, the Afrikaner nationalists were quick to undermine Afrikaner support for the war. 
However, despite their violent efforts to discourage their fellow Afrikaners from supporting the war, 
a significant number of Afrikaners volunteered to fight. Their motivations, however, ranged from 
higher principles to escaping poverty, or just adventure. Where the Afrikaans-speaking community 
stood divided during the war, the English-speaking and Jewish-speaking communities supported the 
war effort. Where the Jewish community reacted to rising antisemitism, the motivation of the English-
speaking community’s commitment was more nuanced, based on a complex interrelationship 
between their past, culture and religion.  
 
629  Commissioned Permanent Force Officers, students and scholars are included in the intermediate 
occupations. Farmers are included in skilled occupations in order to be consistent with Fennell’s 
methodology. Other agricultural occupations are included in the intermediate occupations. Where 
occupations were left blank on service cards, occupational classes were derived from UP Curriculum 
Vita, Biographies and Obituaries. 
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The English school system encapsulated the complexities of the English-speaking community 
habitus formation, and also reinforced views regarding duty, masculinity and class. A substantial 
number of politically prominent ex-servicemen, English, Afrikaans and Jewish, attended these 
schools and had similar recollections. The rituals and rigours of these schools instilled at least a 
sense of duty into the boys and provided a framework for independent and inquisitorial thought. The 
link between school and military service during the First World War, identified by Lambert, persisted 
into the next war. 
The age of volunteers had a wide range during the first two years of the war but narrowed as the 
recruitment pool dried up. The average age also declined. In terms of age and date of attestation, 
the group is reflective of the general trend. However, the group included 11 permanent force soldiers 
who were in service at the start of the war. The broad age distribution allowed for an inter-
generational exchange of ideas.  
The occupations of the volunteers were diverse. Within the UDF the volunteer soldier was better 
qualified than his conscripted British Army compatriot. Likewise, the volunteers that were to become 
active in post-war politics had either secured access to or were already in a better occupation than 
their comrades in the UDF. In selected occupations, such as medical and engineering, these 
occupations secured the volunteer military status. Otherwise manning the combat forces took priority 
over the qualifications of the volunteer, which the volunteers accepted.  
The general biographic profile of the ex-serviceman politician reflects the broader society from which 
they volunteered. The Afrikaans-speakers, however, tended to be ‘South Africanists’ who shared 
interlocking networks with the English-speaking community such as similar schooling and loyalty to 
Smuts and the United Party. The English-speaker and the Jewish volunteers harboured a similar 
revulsion towards fascism and authoritarianism. Furthermore, the schooling and occupations of the 
group suggest that the group had strong middle-class affiliations and experienced themselves as 
part of the dominant hegemony. The habitus of the group made them susceptible to liberal and anti-
authoritarian ideologies even before the war. 
Volunteering threw men and women from different cultural backgrounds, of different ages and 
different classes and occupations into the meat grinder of war. War’s near-total disregard for class, 
education, occupation, and culture created conditions which would allow for the construction of a 
shared identity which intersected culture, class and generation. The new identity of the South African 
soldier, as suggested by Tylden, would form ex-servicemen and women that were “quick to size up 
a tactical situation, and [was] intensely critical … [and] ... inclined to think themselves as good as 
their officers”.630 Chapter Three addresses the ways in which the war shaped the political views of 
these ex-servicemen.  
 




THE MILITARY SERVICE OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE EX-SERVICEMEN  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the biographic profile of the men under consideration before they 
volunteered for war service. The various biographic profiles highlight the similarities and differences 
between their foundational habitus before the war. The chapter provided insight into how the 
volunteers’ disposition before the war shaped their war experience and influenced their later political 
disposition. During the war period, some individuals like George Calpin, the editor of the Natal 
Witness, hoped that the experience of war would displace the divisions in race and class. 
A more encouraging note can be struck by reference to the good fellowship that existed and exists 
between the two sections of the army itself. For the first time the unilingual English Natalian, urban 
born and bred, came into close contact with his unilingual Afrikaner fellow, possibly of the Orange 
Free State and the veld, and to everyone’s knowledge developed friendships that may well be to 
the powerful and lasting good of the South African whole, even as it is fruitful in the success of 
the South African armies in the field of battle. The growth of the nation, though recorded in legal 
enactments and social statutes, is a slow process of the intangibles turning the tangibles. Among 
those intangibles in South Africa are the goodly fellowships between men of different races and 
widely different social status.631 
As previously discussed, Geoffrey Tylden had proposed that a uniquely South African military 
typology had emerged from the war, an idea that Randolph Vigne expanded further to include a 
particular liberal political perspective.632 Thus, there was hope that the melting pot of war service 
would bring the divided South African society together, and that such engagement would lead to the 
creation of a unified typology, possibly with political implications.  
The view that wartime service, with the discipline, comradery, and danger that accompanies combat 
had forged an ex-serviceman identity and typology was not unique to the Second World War. After 
the First World War, to give meaning to the carnage, the ‘South Africanists’ had constructed a 
national mythology, based on combat experience. Bill Nasson describes the effect:  
Moreover, for those attached to Jan Smuts and Louis Botha’s cause of constructing the new post-
1910 Union of South Africa as a British Dominion based upon a unified white nationalism, the 
Somme carnage represented a rich historical transition. Shoulder to shoulder in battle, English 
and Afrikaner had finally found each other. However heavy the loss at Delville Wood, its ‘unifying 
blood sacrifice’ had helped to seal the shared European citizenship of previously fractured English 
and Afrikaner community.633 
 
631  Calpin, There Are No South Africans, 368. 
632  Tylden, The Armed Forces of South Africa, 30; Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid, 4–5. 
633  B Nasson, ‘Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration’, The English Historical 
Review, 119, no. 480 (2004), 63. 
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The First World War had mixed the various South African cultures, fleetingly constructing a common 
White ‘South Africanism’. The 4 SA Infantry Battalion (South African Scottish) seamlessly 
appropriated war cries from the Zulu nation, volksliede (cultural songs) from the Afrikaners and the 
bagpipes and kilt from Scots, rounding it off with the regimental mascot, a Springbuck called Nancy. 
The various White South African communities, English, Irish, Welsh, Jew, Afrikaner and Polish, were 
initiated into this Afro-Gaelic mix.634 The South African press lauded these men’s suffering and loss. 
Their blood sacrifice was needed to unify the White communities of South Africa and to inoculate it 
“against the debilitating virus” of Afrikaner Nationalism and isolationism.635  
The soldiers’ appropriation and merging of numerous cultural totems, such as kilts, Zulu war-cries 
and African animals (Springbuck) as regimental mascots, created a uniquely South African dominion 
identity separate from the rest of the Empire. The soldiers fought a dogged defence against German 
aggression, constructing a myth of daring, mobility, bravery, and unrelenting resistance or 
bittereinder from the ashes of Deville Wood.636 Similarly, the Great War provided other dominions in 
the British Empire with unique military mythologies on which to build their national identity, such as 
Australia at Gallipoli and Canada at Vimy Ridge.637 War experience had allowed the emergence of 
dominion identities separate from an overarching British identity. In South Africa, the construction of 
a shared national military character had obscured fermenting tensions in the White society.638  
Smuts probably hoped to build on Deville Wood’s mythology to bind the White community together 
with a common martial tradition. He expressed this sentiment to the soldiers of the 1 South African 
Brigade (1 SA Bde) on their departure for East Africa in July 1940:  
You are going to face danger, hardship and sacrifice – perhaps death itself – in all its fierce forms. 
But through it all you will gather that experience of life and enrichment of character which are 
more valuable than gold or precious stones. You will become better and stronger men. You will 
not return the same as you went. You will bring back memories that you and yours will treasure 
for life.639 
When analysing the political, socialising influence of the war on servicemen that later became 
politically active, this chapter explores three issues. First, it explores the structural stratification of 
the UDF in terms of service and rank. Second, it analyses the influence of the different theatres of 
operations and POW status on the servicemen. Finally, it discusses the deliberate efforts to influence 
 
634  Nasson, ‘Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration’, 63; Hyslop, ‘Cape Town 
Highlanders, Transvaal Scottish: Military ‘Scottishness’ and Social Power in Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Century South Africa’, 98. 
635  Nasson, ‘Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration’, 62–63. 
636  Nasson, 61. 
637  Nasson, 63. 
638  Lambert, ‘South African British?’, 214–16. 
639  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 15–16. 
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soldiers, which may have edged servicemen into post-war politics, such as membership of the 
Springbok Legion (SL) and Army Education Scheme (AES).  
3.2 SERVICE AND RANK 
Military organisations are hierarchal and stratified, both vertically and horizontally. Vertical structural 
divisions relate mostly to domains of warfare, with specific services, Army, Air Force and Navy, 
primarily responsible for activities in their respective domains. A dominant hierarchal structure of 
officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) creates two distinct classes within the military, the 
leaders and the ordinary soldiers. Further differentiation occurs between combat, combat support 
and support echelons.640 Each distinction generates entitlements and cultural totems which, when 
layered, creates distinct military identities within a broader military culture. The most dominant 
military organisations are the services, and within these, the most rigid and persistent class 
distinction is between the men and the officers.641  
3.2.1 Service 
Within the UDF, the Army was the largest and most dominant service. The Army, although based on 
the British Army in training and doctrine, had a distinctly South African culture. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the Union Defence Force (UDF) depended exclusively on volunteers, many of 
whom were leaders in their occupations, thereby making the South African Army more democratic 
and less authoritarian than its British counterparts. Carel Birkby, a war correspondent, recounted 
that Major General Douglas Dickinson, the commander of the British troops in East Africa, 
commented to him on the culture of the UDF, “They’re democratic, to say the least of it”.642 As a 
result, the South African soldier was probably more politically aware than soldiers in a conscript 
army.643  
The South African Air Force (SAAF), although the darling of the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Sir 
Pierre van Ryneveld, was at the start of the war a mere extension of the Army. South Africans who 
were unable to join the South African Air Force (SAAF) as pilots before the war often joined the 
Royal Air Force (RAF). Twenty-one South African pilots, including Sailor Malan, fought in the Battle 
of Britain in 1940 as part of the RAF.644 During the war, the SAAF rapidly expanded and became 
infused with a culture like the RAF. The Seaward Defence Force (SDF), born out of tensions between 
the Royal Navy and the UDF, incorporated the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (South Africa) 
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(RNVR(SA)) into the UDF formation and appropriated the cultural traditions of the Royal Navy.645 
Although the UDF comprised different services, the Army as the senior service set the cultural tone 
for the South African military. 
Not only was the Army the senior service, but also the largest. The distribution of White men between 
the services (Permanent Force and Active Citizen Force (ACF)) before the war was approximately 
21 414 men, of which 18 872 were in the Army, 1 736 in the SAAF, and 806 men in the naval forces 
(RNVR(SA) 800 men and 6 in the SA Naval Service). During the war, the numbers increased 
dramatically to 132 194 White men in the Army, 44 569 in the SAAF and 9 455 in the SDF. The rapid 
expansion of the SAAF can be better appreciated when considering not only the 40-fold increase in 
numbers, but also the relative increase to the size of the total force, from 8 per cent to 24 per cent 
as a proportion of the whole UDF. The number of South Africans in the RNVR (SA) obscures the 
similar expansion in naval capacity. 
Table 3.1: UDF personnel according to service 1939-1945646 
Table 3.1 presents the service representation of the sample group of 153 ex-servicemen. 
Interestingly, the sample group is distributed proportionately between the services, which suggest 
that despite the smaller services having developed separate cultural identities during the war, these 
nascent identities did not deviate far from the dominant military identity in terms of politicisation.  
3.2.2 Rank 
Within the military, the second cultural divider is rank, which horizontally stratifies the organisation. 
In the hierarchal system, embodied by the rank structures, the position of rank becomes an overt 
marker of status within a hierarchal class system. The rank hierarchy institutionalises barriers 
between officers and men, with men expected to defer to the authority of officers. Officers and senior 
NCO’s are expected to provide leadership and enforce discipline on the NCO and soldiers.647 In 
1939 the UDF officer corps constituted a small component of the overall force. Within the permanent 
force in 1939, only one man in 14 was an officer. In the SAAF, as a technical service, the ratio was 
one in 12.648  
 
645  I van der Waag, ‘‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’: Anglo-South African Relations, Dominion Nationalism 
and the Formation of the Seaward Defence Force in 1939-1940’, Contemporary British History, 24, no. 
4 (2010), 442. 
646  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, 176, 185; DOD Archive, PA.  
647  Mcdermott, ‘Old Soldiers Never Die’, 26. 
648  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, 27–28. 
 
Army SAAF SANF and RNVR(S.A.) Total 
1939 18872 (88%) 1736 (8%) 806 (4%) 21414 
1945 132194 (71%) 44569 (24%) 9455 (5%) 186218 
Ex Servicemen in 
sample n=153 
112 (73%) 37 (24%) 4(3%) 153 
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As indicated in Chapter Two, a large proportion of volunteers, even more so in the sample group 
under consideration, came from professional and skilled occupations meaning that many had to 
forswear their civilian social privileges and status when enlisting. Men, who would have been 
considered officer material in peacetime, were thereby enlisted as soldiers.649 George Brink was 
aware that several members of the South African business elite were under his command; his staff 
could “rattle off the names of a dozen or more officers and men in the Witwatersrand units alone who 
were millionaires or near millionaires …”,650 which may have contributed to his consistent reluctance 
to risk high causalities.651  
The mixing of volunteers of divergent classes and occupations further strengthens the idea proposed 
by Tylden that a uniquely South African military typology had developed. Birkby romanticised the 
point in his book Springbok Victory; “… in a citizen army in which often the “boss” would be a private 
in a platoon commanded by one of his clerks and the colonel and the “quarter-bloke” might be regular 
golfing partners in peacetime.”652 Dickinson also noticed the difference in the UDF soldiers when he 
confided in Birkby that “[t]he n.c.o.’s and even men [of lower ranks], act instinctively and with sound 
judgement when they have to rely on themselves. Your chaps have an unusually high level of 
education and intelligence.”653 
Such observations support Tylden’s typology although he tracks the South African soldiers’ 
confidence back further, observing that they were “inclined to think themselves as good as their 
officers, no doubt a relic of the old commando days, when, as any commandant could have told, 
most of them were apt to think themselves better than those in command”.654 The military’s rank 
stratification weighed heavier on volunteers who had received a rank lower than their civilian social 
status. 
Sir De Villiers Graaff and Peter Brown, both from wealthy families, experienced the social 
stratification and conditioning that the hierarchal military structure created. As an NCO, Graaff, a 
British peer and wealthy Cape farmer, often found himself at odds with the military social structure. 
For instance, he would, as an NCO, pose as a chauffeur to dine in public with his friend, Major Lawrie 
Wilmot in Pretoria.655 For Brown, his status as a private accentuated the class system of the military 
and that the war had “established a sort of other rank/officer, sort of class conflict” where he was 
located on the “lower - bottom end – of that class conflict”.656 The volunteers’ mixed occupational 
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origins, and their displaced civilian social status, gave the UDF a unique ‘democratic’ nature and in 
some cases blurred the rigid military class distinction between the officers and men.  
Table 3.2: Ranks of sample group at volunteering by year and occupation class (n=153)657 
 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
Officers 21 39 6 9 3 1 - 79 
Professional 4 15 2 3 1 1 - 26 
Intermediate 13 10 2 6 2 - - 33 
Skilled 1 9 1 - - - - 11 
Unknown 3 5 1 - - - - 9 
NCO 3 32 9 5 7 5 1 62 
Professional 
 
9 3 1 - 1 - 14 
Intermediate 2 7 3 3 6 3 1 25 
Skilled 
 
14 3 1 1 1 - 20 
Unknown 1 2 - - - - - 3 
Unknown Ranks  5 4 - - 2 1 - 12 
Professional 1 2 - - - - - 3 
Intermediate 2 1 - - 1 1 - 5 
Unknown 2 1 - - 1 - - 4 
Total 29 75 15 14 12 7 1 153 
The differences observed by Dickson was one of the consequences of the UDF being a volunteer 
force. When volunteering, the UDF bureaucracy decided on the volunteer’s military utilisation.  
Table 3.2 shows the relationship between the pre-war occupational class (as discussed in Chapter 
Two), the year of attestation and the rank upon enlistment of the sample group. For approximately 
half, the sample group’s previous social capital, which included past military experience, professional 
occupation, and social connections, transformed peace-time civilian status into similar military 
status. Occupational class translated into access to a commissioned rank, almost two-thirds of 
professional men received a commission, almost half of the intermediate professions enlisted as 
NCOs and skilled workers were twice as likely to enlist as NCOs. Thus, at the beginning of the war, 
the occupational class had a marginal advantage in securing a commission. For the rest, the military 
represented a new world which stripped away previous social class and privilege as experienced by 
Brown and Graaff. Table 3.2 also suggests that as the war progressed the chance of receiving a 
commission on attestation also declined. The differences in the war-experience of the members of 
the sample group suggest that instead of a singular uniform formative experience, the war influenced 
the men in different yet overlapping ways. Not only rank and occupation, but also the periodisation 
of service seems to separates these groupings. Thus, the war provided the soldier with a collective 
identity in which varied and contradictory political and class views could co-exist. 
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The advantage of previous social capital is most evident during the expansion phase of the UDF 
between 1939-1940. During this phase, Smuts realigned the command structure by appointing 
loyalists from the permanent force, ACF and society into crucial command and staff posts, allowing 
the transfer of social capital from the civilian field to the military field which is collaborated in  
Table 3.2.658 Of the sample group, Colonel James Mitchell-Baker assumed the appointment of 
Quartermaster General (QMG).659 Colonel Rupert Pilkington-Jordan, an ACF officer and prominent 
Cape Town Lawyer, became Deputy Adjutant General of the UDF and General Brigadier General 
Keith van der Spuy was recalled from London to become Director General Technical Services 
(DGTS).660 Brigadier General Brink was appointed Deputy CGS. Ernst Malherbe was taken up from 
academia to head up the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI). Smuts considered both political 
loyalty and competency when appointing these men, with many of those appointed remaining loyal 
to Smuts’s ideals after the war. 
The immediate demands of war also influenced the volunteers’ access to rank. The UDF targeted 
volunteers who possessed the required specialisations and appointed and promoted them 
accordingly. The UDF, to fill its immediate requirements, favoured volunteers from the medical and 
engineering occupations. The rapid expansion of the medical services allowed many doctors and 
nurses to join up within their competency. Dr Bernard Friedman, a UP Member of Parliament(MP), 
served as a major in the SA Medical Corps (SAMC). Another UP MP, Dr Henry Gluckman, accepted 
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and acted as the parliamentary liaison with the SAMC, before 
accepting the appointment of Minister of Health in 1945.661 Dr Jan Steytler, son of politician Louw 
Steytler, also served as a Captain in the SAMC from 1940 until 1944.662 Jock Isacowitz, a pharmacist, 
served a year as a gunner in East Africa, before being transferred to the SAMC in Kenya.663 His 
former psychology Professor, Simon Biesheuwel (appointed as a Colonel), ensured Isacowitz’s (who 
was an NCO despite his academic qualifications) eventual transfer at the SAAF Air Force Aptitude 
Centre in October 1941. Here Isacowitz met fellow left-wing activist, John O’Meara.664  
In the same vein, the SA Engineer Corps preferred “making soldiers of engineers” than “making 
engineers of soldiers”.665 Similarly, other corps facilitated the entry of skilled volunteers, for example 
Len Lee-Warden’s occupation as a printer made it possible for him to join the mobile printing unit 
which had been started by the Government Printer.666 The needs of the SA Signal Corps allowed 
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Fred Carneson to use his experience in the post office to mislead the recruitment officer about his 
age.667 Malherbe, when establishing the AES, also actively recruited servicemen and volunteers with 
the academic qualifications. For example, in 1942, the need for female welfare and Information 
Officers (WIO) led to the recruitment of Ms Helen Joseph and Ms Jacqueline de Villiers, mainly 
because of their university education. Joseph recalled: 
I read a press announcement, calling for university and professional women to attend an intensive 
training course for welfare and information officers – the female counterpart of the male 
information officers in the South African Army Education Service. Any women selected at the end 
of the course would become full-time lieutenants in the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force or the 
Women’s Auxiliary Army Services. Others could remain in the forces as privates or simply go 
home again.668 
Although the UDF acknowledged the volunteer’s social capital, in many cases, the volunteers were 
reluctant to use their influence to avoid dangerous appointments or secure preferential treatment. It 
seems that they did the opposite, eager to engage the enemy; they eschewed the temporary status 
and safety that staff appointments and military rank could provide.669 The reasons for this may have 
been varied. Some might have been motivated by adventure, others by masculinity or a sense of 
duty. While for others military service abroad might have been an opportunity to accumulate some 
form of capital that could be transferred to another field after the war.  
In 1940, Harry Oppenheimer, initially appointed as Lieutenant in the Intelligence Corps to be 
stationed in South Africa, soon requested for a transfer to an Armoured Car Company, to see action 
in Egypt. Smuts, as a friend of Ernst Oppenheimer, however, was adamant that the front was no 
place for the heir to the Oppenheimer fortune. Only in July 1942, Harry Oppenheimer relented and 
returned to South Africa.670 Graaff and his brother initially refused to attend an officers’ course 
primarily because they suspected that Smuts, who was a friend and political colleague of their father 
Sir David Graaff, had taken a personal interest in their military careers.671 Leo Lovell’s initial attempt 
to join the SAAF was unsuccessful despite him being a Sergeant Major in the Benoni Rifle 
Association. He finally was able to secure an appointment, as a Staff Sergeant in the Indian Service 
Corps after an interview with Lieutenant Colonel George Morris, the Corps’ Officer Commanding.672 
War-time military hierarchies had further complicated South African social structures resulting in the 
volunteers having to renegotiate their positions within the military hierarchy. These volunteers were 
wary of converting much of their social capital from civilian life into the military field. They believed 
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that not only social capital in the military field was limited to the war, but it could also hinder their 
access to the front, and the adventure of participating in the war.  
The volunteer’s willingness to place themselves subservient to the needs of the UDF continued 
throughout the war, becoming more pronounced for the sample-group. Table 3.2 shows that as the 
war progressed the ratio of officers to NCOs declined, indicating that the UDF required fewer 
commissioned officers. Scholars and students volunteering later in the war, after either completing 
or abandoning their studies, did not expect preferential treatment despite their academic 
qualifications or social connections. In 1942, Brown, despite coming from an influential Natalian 
family, accepted the rank of private, reflecting later in life that it “would have bothered me if I had 
been promoted”.673 Colin Eglin also enlisted as a bombardier despite his university education as he 
recognised that by 1943, the Army had sufficient officers.674 Within the sample group, almost half 
enlisted as NCOs despite possessing the required social capital to secure commissions. They 
probably saw their military service as a separate temporary distraction from their civilian occupations 
rather than a new career. Their willingness to be part of the ranks and to broaden their social 
perspectives outweighed their need for the military to recognise their civilian social capital.  
However, as approximately half of the group did not enlist as NCOs, they were not exposed to the 
equalitarian experience of being part of the ranks. Furthermore, as the war continued, many NCOs 
were commissioned as officers. By demobilisation, the number of NCOs within the group had 
decreased by 22, as indicated in Table 3.3. Malherbe, to staff the AES, had recruited many NCOs 
with academic qualifications for information officers.675 Of the 22 NCOs who received commissions 
during the war nine became information officers in the AES. 
Table 3.3: Ranks of ex-servicemen on attestation and demobilisation (n=153)676 
 
 Rank at demobilisation 
















 Officer - 78 1 79 
NCO 40 22 - 62 
Unknown 1 9 2 12 
Grand Total 41 109 3 153 
The AES, which tracked the morale and opinions of the soldier, provides some insight into the 
officer’s political opinions. In 1944, an information officer, Captain Bernard Notcutt, who after the war 
became a Professor in Psychology at the University of Natal, conducted an opinion survey on 
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approximately 7 000 servicemen to determine their attitudes to South Africa’s various problems. The 
purpose of the survey was to guide and direct the work of the AES and the information officer.677 
Table 3.4, extracted from the 1944 that AES Attitude Test, titled “What do you Think? – Wat dink 
Jy?”, suggested that commissioned officers tended to be more liberal in attitude than NCOs 
regarding the issues of employment, education and political rights for Blacks.678 
Table 3.4: Race attitudes of UDF personnel (n=7 000±)679 
 In favour for more job 
opportunities for [Black 
Africans] 
In favour for more Book 
Learning for [Black 
Africans] 
In favour for more political 
rights for [Black Africans] 
Officer 80% 81% 71% 
NCO 50% 51% 41% 
Despite the levelling effect of the volunteer force, with a high number of volunteers from the 
professional and specialist occupations being NCOs, a substantial difference in attitudes remained 
between the ranks, with officers being more tolerant of racial reform. Considering that over half the 
sample group were commissioned officers on demobilisation, the military’s rank stratification caused 
a bifurcation within the sample group’s military experiences. Where the commissioned officers’ 
political disposition reflected a cautiously liberal approach, a broader diversity of political opinions 
and class confronted the NCO within the sample group.  
At least half of the group successfully transformed their peacetime social capital from the civilian 
field to the military field, taking with them their previous political views. For the other segment, sharing 
space with more socially and politically diverse volunteers probably broadened their perspectives 
and even could have accentuated the otherness of their political views, thereby confronting and 
dislodging beliefs that had shaped the habitus before the war. The following section discusses the 
military campaigns in which these diverse elements came together in common cause.  
3.3 WAR EXPERIENCE 
The discussion of the war experience focuses on how the war both shaped the sample group’s 
political disposition and contributed to their social, symbolic and cultural capital in the military field, 
which could have contributed to later involvement in post-war politics. The discussion tracks the 
group through their initial training, and their involvement in the two primary theatres of war, Africa 
and Italy, emphasising three aspects. Firstly how the volunteers had built bonds around a shared 
identity, secondly how the soldiers’ interaction with the local populations had influenced their world-
view, and lastly how the physical destruction of war, both as participants and witnesses had affected 
their political views. 
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3.3.1 Common experience of service 
The recruitment and training of volunteers followed a general pattern. Regiments mobilised and 
accepted volunteers until their regimental allocations were full, after that a local recruitment office 
accepted recruits to full units that had either not filled their quota or did not directly recruit. Recruits 
were then allocated their mustering and concentrated at Kafferskraal near Klerksdorp. From there 
they were dispersed to various training camps and regimental concentration areas in places such as 
Premier Mine (Johannesburg), Potchefstroom, Cullinan, Zonderwater, Barberton, Ladysmith, before 
being deployed into the operational areas of East Africa, North Africa or Italy.680 The rapid 
mobilisation meant that men who would never have met on an equal socio-economic footing during 
peacetime now had to share accommodation, ablutions, and experiences. During mobilisation and 
training, social standing and economic status associated with civilian life gradually eroded.  
The shared experience of training, with shared facilities, ablutions and purpose, led to bonds 
developing between the soldiers that transcended class, culture and politics. For the insular English-
speaking Natalian, the immersion into a pool of class and cultural diversity was incredibly moving. In 
training David Brokensha, who came from an affluent Natalian family, befriended several Afrikaners, 
led him to realise how unjustified the feeling of superiority the “English-speaking Natalians felt, 
regarding Afrikaners”.681 Brokensha had developed a close relationship with an Afrikaans-speaker 
“Piet” Pieterse, who had originated from a poor background and had spent time at a juvenile 
reformatory.682 Similarly, Brown, a wealthy Natalian, forged a strong friendship with a White miner 
from the lower working class.683 After the war, Brown reminiscently noted how civilian socio-
economic divisions often dissolved between men during active service: 
I suppose the most important part of that [war] experience, from my point of view, was that one 
came into contact with a cross-section of white South African society, anyway, which probably 
wouldn’t have happened otherwise. And made very substantial friendships with people from all 
layers of our society. So that was very good for somebody like me.684 
However, Geoffrey Wilson, an anthropologist, expressed reservations about the value and 
permanency of the bonds forged in training; 
A farmer, a farm foreman, a road foreman, a fireman and a couple of others whose professions 
and statuses I don’t even know, are my chief contacts to date. But ‘contacts’ is all wrong: the 
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relationship can only be described in the army vernacular as ‘mateship’: it is a matter of 
borrowing or lending generously, of not pushing people nor pinching trifles…685 
The shared experience of training melded volunteers from diverse backgrounds into combat units 
with a singular purpose. Living and training in close proximately soon resulted in common comradery 
supplanting previous dispositions, status and occupations. For recruits from insular and cloistered 
backgrounds, the opportunity to transcend previous social divisions broadened their perspectives 
and opened new avenues for social interaction. 
3.3.2 Combat theatres 
As alluded to in Chapter One, the UDF deployed in the African and Italian theatres. In Africa, the 
South African involvement included Italian East Africa (Abyssinia), Madagascar and North Africa. 
Soldiers were awarded campaign medals for participation in each campaign. The Stars derived their 
names from each campaign, such as the Africa Star medal and the Italy Star medal. Along with other 
decorations and medals, these medals provided material evidence of the soldier’s military career 
and participation in combat, giving the wearer credibility and a measure of cultural capital. The 
receipt of campaign medals is used as a proxy to identify soldiers with African campaign and Italian 
campaign experience.686 Other campaign medals such as the Burma Star, Atlantic Star and the 
British Defence Medal also indicated service outside South Africa. The recipients of the Africa Star 
and Italian Star were distributed among the group as follows: 
 
Table 3.5: Service stars of sample group (n=153)687 
Rank Africa Star Africa and Italian Stars Italy Star Only Italy Star 
Officers 63 23 34 11 
NCO 26 11 20 9 
Rank Unknown 3 1 1 - 
Total 92 35 55 20 
Table 3.5 presents the number of recipients of the Italian and African campaign medals within the 
sample group. Table 3.5 shows that 92 ex-servicemen served in the African campaigns, of which 35 
then served in Italy. Another 20 of the sample served only in Italy, which brings the total of ex-
servicemen in the sample with the Italian Star medal to 55. Thus, in total, 112 of the sample served 
in either Africa or Italy. Considering the ratio between Commissioned Officers and NCOs in each 
theatre of operation as presented in Table 3.5, the number of officers in the sample group is highest 
among those that volunteered early in the war and participated in the African campaigns. The decline 
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in ratio of officers to men in the sample group during the Italian campaign can be attributed both to 
the number of POWs captured at Tobruk and the transition between the 1 South African Division 
(1 SA Div) and 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div). When isolating the new 
volunteers that only fought in the Italian campaign, the ratio of officers to NCOs is at the lowest. 
Table 3.6: Average date of birth by campaign medal688 
Date of Birth  Africa Star Italy Star Africa and Italian Stars Only Italy Star 
Officer  1910 1912 1912 1912 
NCO 1914 1920 1919 1921 
Unknown 1917 1922 1922 - 
Average  1911 1915 1914 1916 
When considering the average age of the soldier in each campaign, Table 3.6 illustrates the age 
differences between the African and Italian campaign volunteers. Where the officer corps remained 
a stable age cohort throughout the war, the NCOs came from progressively younger cohorts as the 
war progressed, with the NCO being around 26 during the African campaigns (1940) and the NCO 
in the Italian campaign (1944) being between 23 and 24 years old. The reduction of the average age 
of the volunteer between the African and Italian campaign suggests that the supply of White men 
had declined as the war progressed. Furthermore, the difference in age and ratio between officers 
and NCOs between the campaigns within the sample group suggests that the younger ex-
servicemen may have experienced the war differently to their older comrades and may constitute a 
separate group or class. 
3.3.3 War in Africa 
3.3.3.1 East Africa 
The East African campaign in 1940-1941 placed the White South African soldiers into a multinational, 
multiracial force, in an environment that was separated and alien to the political White supremacy 
views of South Africa. This applied even to the South African military component. The White combat 
soldiers relied on the support of a large contingent of Black and Indian soldiers for sustainment. 
Furthermore, the fighting in East Africa occurred in desolate areas spotted with small concentrations 
of inhabitants which limited the soldiers’ engagement with the local population.689 Even the 
concentration area at Gilgil was located far from the developed centres of Mombasa and Nairobi. 
Gilgil’s location gave the UDF substantial control over the little interaction the soldiers had with both 
the local and British communities in Kenya.690 Furthermore, within the combat areas, there was a 
distinction between the belligerents and the indigenous populations, with the loyalty of the indigenous 
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populations to any side being mercurial and undependable.691 The South African soldier separated 
from his country, in an alien environment, would find his assumptions of racial superiority questioned. 
The collapse of the Italian forces in Abyssinia in mid-1941 left the White Italian population at the 
mercy of the indigenous people that they had previously conquered. The Italian forces’ retreat in the 
face of the Allied advances, had left the Italian civilian population unprotected. When the Allied 
Forces were preparing to capture Diredawa on 29 March 1941, the Italian Assistant Governor-
General of Diredawa appealed to the Allied forces for protection from the indigenous population.692 
He delivered a passionate appeal to the advancing Allied forces: 
Sir, I come to you to beg you that entre with you soldiers before falling of the night into town as 
we are very seriously menaced by the natives. There are no soldiers of ours in the town of Dire 
Daua [sic.] so that you will not find any more resistance everywhere. Sir, I assure you of this 
giving you my word of honour as official.693 
Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Colonel Scrubs Hartshorn, the Officer Commanding of 1 Transvaal 
Scottish, had to deploy South African and Nigerian soldiers that night to quell the ensuing riots and 
prevent the massacre of the European population at Diredawa.694 Similarly, when the Italians 
surrendered in Addis Ababa in April 1941, the Allied forces faced the challenge of protecting Italian 
civilians. As a general rule, the Allied forces left the surrendering Italian soldiers armed for reasons 
of self-defence.695 The Italian defeat at the hands of a multiracial force served to undermine the myth 
of White supremacy. 
The nature of the East African forces during the Abyssinian campaign placed substantial pressure 
on the South African racial myths that underwrote South Africa’s segregationist society. The reality 
of fighting in multiracial and multinational forces confronted White South Africans, despite South 
African Black and Coloured soldiers being officially unarmed. During the war, White South African 
soldiers, both as part of the UDF and other British Forces, fought alongside armed African and Indian 
soldiers from British colonies.696 Lovell, who was an officer in the South African Indian and Malay 
Corps, highlighted the irony of the South African position, noting that while the South African 
opposition was against arming Black and Coloured soldiers, those doing the actual fighting were less 
opposed; 
…the men of our unit being coloured … could not be issued with rifles … This foolhardy policy 
was dictated by the sensitivities of the South African government to protests from the disloyal 
opposition, who objected to the arming of coloured men even outside the borders of South Africa! 
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We found the situation quite intolerable and it didn’t take us long to scrounge captured Italian 
rifles and provide our men with at least some defence against attack.697 
Similarly, Carneson, who served as a signalman during the Abyssinian campaign, reflected that “the 
South African soldiers were fighting together with Indians and African troops…They saw people of 
different races fighting together on the same side against a common enemy. This couldn’t but have 
an effect on their general thinking”.698  
The shifting of racial attitudes during the campaign was also noted by Malherbe, as the Director of 
Military Intelligence. After the war Malherbe claimed that the soldiers’ letters home revealed a 
positive change in attitude towards Black soldiers, particularly South African Black soldiers. He 
claimed that South African soldiers after having “experience with other Africans and particularly the 
Abyssinians” regarded their Black countryman as “far superior”.699 Furthermore, South African 
soldiers, as part of the spoils of victory, celebrated as soldiers do, across the colour bar. Their brief 
stay in Addis Ababa and other Abyssinian towns, such as Decamere, provided sufficient opportunity 
for inter-racial sexual liaison.700 As Carneson wryly points out “a hell of a lot of White soldiers made 
contact with Black women for the first time in their lives … The Immorality Act didn’t apply as far as 
the soldiers were concerned, I can assure you”.701  
The South African Jewish soldier may have had more personal and spiritual interactions with the 
local population, as the Jewish community was well represented in Abyssinia by the Falashas or 
Abyssinian Jews. The shared religious culture allowed individual Jewish soldiers to engage with their 
co-religionists to celebrate religious events such as Seder, a feast as part of the Passover traditions. 
The close nature of these interactions resulted in the Falasha community elders attending the funeral 
of Sergeant Major A Levy who fell at Diredawa.702 The close religious and emotional ties that the 
Jewish soldiers could develop with the local population in the combat theatres gave them a broader 
personal insight into the societal suffering and injustices that war accentuated. 
Soldiers were deployed far from home, in an environment where racial segregation was difficult to 
enforce. They found themselves able to bridge the racial divide both in the course of their military 
task and socially. The blurring of these divisions may have modified ex-serviceman’s habitus by 
confronting their previously held political and racial views, and may have made them more 
sympathetic towards political and racial reforms at home. 
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3.3.3.2 North Africa 
The North African campaign occurring after the successes in Abyssinia, pitted the South Africans 
against the combined German and Italian forces in the North African desert. Much like in Abyssinia, 
in North Africa, the majority of the fighting occurred away from populated areas. However, the desert 
was an isolated, arid and flat place, starkly different from mountainous East Africa. Padre W. 
Yesorsky, a Jewish chaplain to the 3rd SA Brigade, described the noticeable absence of civilisation 
“We have so long now been here in emptiness…that the sand and dust seems to have entered into 
our very bones and have become part of us”.703 It is such reminiscences that highlight how varied 
the South African war experience was between different theatres of war, which made for diverse war 
experiences. 
The UDF used the vastness of the terrain in Egypt to heavily curtail the soldiers’ social interaction 
with the local population in the rear areas, with the South African camps at inconvenient distances 
from urban centres or as Brown expressed it, “plonked right in the middle of the desert”.704 Forays 
into Cairo were limited, and the UDF strenuously discouraged any interaction across the colour 
bar.705 Soldiers mostly occupied themselves in camp with sport and other activities. The boredom, 
inherent in military camps like Helwan, led some men to ponder over the future of South Africa. 
During periods of inactivity in Egypt in 1944 while waiting for deployment to Italy, Brown read the 
book The Black Man’s Burden by Leo Marquard, while shaping his views on the race problems of 
South Africa.706 When trips became available to Cairo and Alexandria, socially connected soldiers 
were able to interact with the European Elite, while others enjoyed forays of military tourism at the 
historical sites and brothels.707 Jewish soldiers were not only able to interact with the local Jewish 
communities to observe their religious practices, but Aaron Alexander, a leading member of the 
Egyptian Jewish community, provided them with entertainment. Alexander had a unique association 
with South Africa, as his brother Morris Alexander was a member of the South African Parliament.708 
The UDF’s continued attempts at perpetuating segregation among the South African soldiers in 
Egypt kept the contact between the South African soldiers and the indigenous population at a 
minimum, inadvertently shielding the soldiers from the civilian cost of war.  
The separation of the soldiers from the broader society in the operational area meant that deep 
friendships developed between soldiers, which endured after the war. The already politicised soldier 
was able to find fellow-travellers in North Africa and also recruit sympathetic followers. The case of 
Ivan Shermbrucker is illuminating. As a signaller, he was seconded to the British 8 Army and served 
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in North Africa from 1941 until 1942, whereafter he returned to South Africa. While in North Africa, 
Shermbrucker befriended fellow signalmen Wolfie Kodesh and Carneson. Carneson, already a 
member of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), had joined the Army in 1939 and, intending 
to politicise fellow soldiers, had been instrumental in forming the SL, which is discussed later in this 
chapter.709 Kodesh, whose twin sister had exposed him to the CPSA, had joined the SL soon after 
enlisting.710 In the army, Kodesh had become a vigorous advocate for the leftist SL which he had 
joined in 1942. He regularly engaged in long political discussions with fellow soldiers, such as Ivan 
Schermbrucker and Wilson.711 Years after the war, Kodesh claimed to have recruited Wilson to the 
SL during their deployment together in North Africa. Kodesh and Schermbrucker soon became 
known for their communist sympathies. Brian Bunting, a fellow member of the CPSA, deployed 
nearby as an information officer, further strengthened the group.712 On returning to South Africa in 
1942, Schermbrucker joined the SL, and later Carneson formally recruited him into the CPSA.713 The 
war in North Africa had provided the radical left soldiers with the social capital to consolidate and 
expand their political networks among the soldiers.  
The radical left soldiers did not restrict their political work to politicising only White soldiers. Their 
interaction with fellow Black South African soldiers in the operational areas only confirmed the 
discrimination inherent in South Africa’s segregation policy. Carneson’s concern for the Zulu batmen 
allocated to his unit caused his colleagues to tease him relentlessly. They accused him of wanting 
to allow the Zulu soldiers to eat with the White soldiers.714 Kodesh, who returned to Egypt in 1943 in 
preparation for the Italian campaign, was similarly perturbed by how the Indian, Coloured and African 
soldiers attached to his company were “given all the menial jobs, and they had spears to go on guard 
duty”.715 During this period, Kodesh as an active member of the SL exploited the disinterest of his 
fellow NCO, whom he remembered as Sergeant Bezuidenhout, to lecture the African soldiers on the 
policies of the SL. When an officer accused him of inciting mutiny, it was an information officer’s 
evidence at his hearing which contributed to him being found not guilty.716 Such interaction suggests 
that efforts at politicisation of the radicalised soldiers, such as Kodesh and Carneson, were not 
always successful or welcomed. 
These accounts show that although radical left soldiers exploited the opportunities available in the 
Northern desert to conduct political work, their efforts were not always appreciated by the military or 
fellow soldiers and as such, they achieved mixed results in moving White soldiers’ political opinion 
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leftwards. Although soldiering is predominantly a mixture of boredom and routine tasks, it is direct 
battle that defines and solidifies the martial and masculine aspect of a soldier’s identity.  
3.3.3.3 North African battles  
In North Africa, two particular battles stand out as South African affairs, Sidi Rezegh in 1941 and the 
Surrender of Tobruk in 1942. The sample group’s involvement in the two battles in North Africa 
endowed them with not only shared combat experience, but also social and symbolic status in the 
military field. The outcome of both Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk bestowed accolades on the surviving 
soldiers who had escaped either annihilation or capture, and for the captured soldiers, the ordeal of 
being a Prisoner of War (POW). A later section discusses the POW experience separately. At Sidi 
Rezegh, Captain Oppenheimer and Private Jack Hodgson, as a member of the 4 South African  
Armoured Car Regiment, provided a reconnaissance screen for the 7 British Armoured Division,717 
and had warned the 5 South African Brigade (5 SA Bde), of the advancing Germans, and had 
narrowly escaped the fighting.718 Hodgson, who returned to South Africa with stomach ulcers in 1942, 
was immensely proud of being a ‘Desert Rat’.719 However, at Sidi Rezegh, those in the 5 SA Bde 
were not so fortunate.  
Of the sample group, the experiences of Captain Leo Kowarsky, and Corporal Roger Brickhill of the 
3 Transvaal Scottish, highlight the two outcomes that the South African soldiers faced. Kowarsky, 
although injured, escaped capture by the Germans. He was lauded for bravery and invested as an 
MBE for his efforts.720 His citation read:  
This officer served in the Third Transvaal Scottish and the Fifth South African Brigade in 
Abyssinia and Egypt. He was present with his regiment at Sidi Rezegh in command of a 
company, where he displayed great courage on the battlefield. He was badly wounded on that 
occasion and was subsequently evacuated to the Union.721 
Corporal Brickhill, however, was less fortunate and spent the next three years in a POW camp and 
narrowly escaped death when the POW ship he travelled on to Italy was torpedoed.722  
Similarly, the surrender of Tobruk to the Germans in 1942, became a psychological scar on the 
UDF’s psyche. Birkby chronicles the fall of the outpost when he stated “[I]t fell with such speed and 
entirety that it shocked the Commonwealth. Most of all it shocked South Africa. For it was the greatest 
disaster that had ever befallen South African arms”.723 The soldiers at Tobruk faced the choice 
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between the indignation of surrender or the equally embarrassing option of fleeing from the German 
advance. For the officers in the sample, the responsibility of maintaining order further complicated 
their choice. For example, Graaff, who was the adjutant of Die Middellandse Regiment, then invested 
with the 2 South African Division (2 SA Div) in Tobruk, when ordered to surrender, had his request 
to break out denied and was told: “to make sure [his] men were surrendered without causality, and 
then it was each man for himself”.724 A more fortunate Captain Ralph Parrott of 1 Transvaal Scottish, 
was able to rally his company in an escape, thereby earning himself a commendation from Major 
General Dan Pienaar and an immediate Military Cross.725 Carneson was also able to escape with 
his unit.726 However, both men remained cagey about their escape experience, despite Parrott’s 
involvement in the writing of his regimental history, as a member of the Transvaal Scottish 
Regimental History Committee after the war.727  
Despite losing 10 722 South African soldiers as POWs at Tobruk, the escape of handfuls of South 
African soldiers provided some consolation for the regiments that were bagged by the Germans. The 
South African experiences in North Africa were not edifying, and not only distracted from the South 
African successes in Abyssinia but also undermined the soldiers’ sense of confidence. Even among 
those that had escaped capture, some were reluctant to capitalise on the military accolades they 
had received. 
Due to the nature of the battlefields in Africa, and restricted interaction of South African soldiers with 
the local populations, the soldiers in these campaigns rarely comprehended the social cost of the 
war and the full destructiveness of authoritarian regimes. In camp, the radical left’s attempt to 
politicise soldiers had mixed results despite the difficulties that the UDF faced in enforcing 
segregation. On the battlefield, the UDF commanders had mixed results. In Abyssinia, the South 
Africans advanced almost effortlessly against the Italians; however, in North Africa the South African 
commanders were less successful in delivering victories that would have validated their soldiers’ 
sense of martial identity. Thus, the African experience may have contributed to reinforcing a sense 
of shared White South Africanism and the possibility of a unified White South Africa. 
3.3.4 War in Italy and Europe 
When the 6 Armoured SA Division arrived in Italy in 1944, they faced a very different situation to that 
of Africa. The Italian theatre was totally unlike the flat, hot, dry, and sparsely populated deserts of 
Egypt where they had been training. Italy was mountainous, wet in spring, icy cold in winter and 
densely populated.728 The countryside’s nature meant that neither the battlefield nor the soldiers 
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could be isolated from the local population. Furthermore, Italy’s surrender to the Allies on 3 
September 1943 at Cassabile, meant that by 1944 the Italians were co-belligerents fighting alongside 
Allied forces, and the Italian population now saw the South Africans as liberators from the occupying 
German forces, and not as adversarial conquerors.729  
The following discussion elaborates on how these characteristics of the Italian campaign helped 
shape the political views of the servicemen. The discussion emphasises the effect of the destruction 
of the war on Italian infrastructure and society, the intimacy that developed between the South 
African soldiers and Italian society and the strengthening of bonds between soldiers. The discussion 
also partly covers the period of demobilisation in Italy between 1943 and 1946, and the soldiers’ 
return to South Africa. 
The close proximity of the Italian population to the fighting in Italy meant that soldiers interacted 
frequently both officially and unofficially with the local population. On the front, the UDF requisitioned 
Italian homesteads, hostels and schools for accommodation and headquarters.730 In the rear, the 
UDF had less success at keeping the South African soldiers segregated from the population than in 
Africa, despite the establishment of service clubs in local hostelries.731 Although service clubs 
provided for the soldiers’ social needs, the soldiers sought intimacy from Italian women. Although 
prostitution flourished, some South African soldiers developed real relationships with Italian women 
and returned to South Africa with Italian wives.732 When on leave, soldiers were also given the 
opportunity, in a lottery system, to take rest leave to visit Rome and other sites in the rear. Such 
visits exposed the soldiers to a microcosm of Italian culture, and the impact of the war on Italian 
society and infrastructure.733 Fighting in Italy affected the South African soldiers in a more intimate 
and personal manner than the African theatre as this section shows.734 
The density of the population and villages meant that soldiers witnessed the destruction of villages 
and farmsteads from previous fighting when moving between the front and the rear.735 These factors 
had a varied impact on these men. For soldiers with communist sympathies, such as Kodesh while 
his unit moved through Italy, it seemed that the poor suffered the brunt of the destruction of the war. 
He recounts that it  
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had a terrific impact on me, because I equated these poor people with the Coloured people 
that I knew lived in hovels, you know, and the Africans who lived in tin shanties that I knew…736 
Such observations in Italy reminded Kodesh of his own experiences of injustice in Cape Town before 
the war and further strengthened the political awakening he had undergone in North Africa. Kodesh 
was not the only one to compare the Italian class structure with the South African race structure, as 
James Chutter made a similar connection, albeit under different circumstances. As a POW in Italy, 
Chutter made a similar comparison between the Italian peasant and Black South Africans. He stated 
“The poverty of the [Italian] peasants was noticeable. It is doubtful indeed whether their chattel value 
was higher than that of the Zulu in his kraal…”.737 
However, unlike Kodesh, or even maybe Chutter, Joe Slovo was not convinced that such 
observations awoke South African soldiers to the injustices in the Union. Slovo felt that the pre-war 
racial attitudes of the South African soldier were already too deeply embedded for any war 
experience to significantly or permanently dislodge or alter previously held views. As Slovo argued 
after the war: 
It was an army riddled with racist attitudes; in Italy, most members of my unit would quite 
happily have forgotten Hitler and turned their weapons against an American black walking arm 
in arm with an Italian blonde. And experience taught me that this type of gut feeling was not 
just an Afrikaner syndrome; if anything, the purse lipped racism of the English gentlemen from 
Natal was more irreversible. The Jew was slightly less rabid, but even he saw little connection 
between the Jewish ghettos in Europe and the black ones in South Africa.738 
Jonathan Fennell, who reviewed censor reports from the war, supports Slovo’s prognosis that racial 
attitudes among the soldiers were too embedded for them to consider social equality between 
races.739 Although the destruction of war may not have awakened the soldier to the inequalities at 
home, it did accentuate the menace of authoritarian regimes. While fighting, men were preoccupied 
with survival, isolated from the press and sequestered from the full magnitude of the war. Once the 
fighting had ended, soldiers were able to focus on their surroundings, and many soldiers were able 
to use their military pass to visit many of Europe’s war-ravished cities. Eglin recounted that the end 
of the war brought to the fore a greater realisation of the atrocities of Nazism and Fascism. As Eglin 
recalled: 
we began to learn from uncensored sources of the death and destruction and human misery 
the war had brought to Europe. Added to this were first-hand accounts of the beastiality [sic.] 
of the Gestapo, of the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps, and of the callous killing of 
millions of men, women and children in Hitler’s gas chambers.740 
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Brown, exploiting his pass, was able to travel as far as Munich and Berlin after the cessation of 
hostilities. During his travels, he observed “the terrible devastation in these places...the terrible 
poverty of those people who had nothing to eat…”741 The witnessing of the depravities of 
authoritarian governments and the destruction of European society implanted a dislike for fascism 
in the soldiers and provided retrospective justification for their participation and sacrifice in the war. 
This had left an indelible mark on the Italian campaign veterans’ habitus. 
The familiarity that had developed between the South African soldiers and Italian population drew 
the radical left soldier into the Italian communist fraternity. The Italian resistance movements that 
surfaced to fight alongside the Allies were anti-fascist and left-wing in nature.742 Communist soldiers 
such as Bunting, Carneson and Shermbrucker worked with the Italian partisans and Communist 
Party in Italy and were acquainted enough to organise joint May Day parades with the local Italian 
populace in 1945.743 When Germany surrendered in May 1945, Slovo’s unit was just outside Turin. 
Slovo articulated his involvement in the celebrations in utopian socialist terms as he describes that 
he had “linked arms with the local peasants and workers. We moved from street to pub and back 
again, exchanging flowers, laughing, weeping, singing and talking about the beautiful future”.744 For 
Rusty Bernstein, the experience of interacting with the communist partisans was similarly heady: 
Everything about Italian civil society was in a fascinating ferment of change. Partisans and 
freedom fighters all around us were unmasking Fascism and struggling to create a new 
democracy. In their centre were the communists and left radicals with whom I shared an 
ideology. I was striking up friendships with some of them outside the Army…745  
The communist soldiers attributed the liberation of Italian towns to the communist partisans. For 
these soldiers, the communist partisan symbolised the forefront of the revolution.746 However, less 
radicalised soldiers were not so naive. While awaiting demobilisation Eglin, having befriended 
Mariella, a university student, became well-versed in “the political battle lines being drawn in Turin, 
as in the rest of the industrial heartland of Italy, between the Communists led by Pietro Nenni, and 
the conservative Christian Democrats led by Palmiro Togliatti”.747 Thus, the serviceman’s experience 
of the Italian campaign indicated a symbiotic relationship between their previous dispensations and 
lived experience where habitus framed experience as much it was formed by experience. 
As in both the African campaigns, the shared military experience became a foundation on which 
enduring bonds of friendship formed and gave the ex-serviceman social capital, such as networks. 
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The Italian campaign created not only new bonds but also strengthened previous acquaintances that 
had predated the war or had developed during the African campaigns. For instance, in 1943 
Carneson met Bunting on a troopship, the Sibyak, en route to Italy and thereby became firm friends. 
On the trip, they had endless discussions about politics.748 As indicated previously, Shermbrecker 
had linked up Carneson and Bunting, old comrades from North Africa. Eglin and Major Lionel Murray, 
who had already received a Military Cross for bravery in the battle of Monte Sole in April 1945, met 
in Italy, with both men later entering post-war politics. Bernstein met up with his old schoolmaster, 
Cecil Williams, in Italy through their shared involvement in the SL.749 After demobilisation, Bernstein 
and Monty Berman, another member of the SL, celebrated Christmas in 1945 in a transit camp at 
Foggia “drinking bad wine…”.750 After the war, just the shared Italian experience was sufficient to 
ignite a familiarity among the ex-servicemen, as years later their shared participation in the Battle of 
Monte Stanco would cement the friendship between Brown and Walter Hain of the Liberal Party 
(LPSA).751  
The Italian campaign occurred in the last stages of the war, and unlike the African campaigns, was 
fought among the population. Soldiers bore witness to a society that had born the full destruction of 
war. Soldiers schooled in Marxist class dialectic quickly compared the Italian class structures to the 
South African race structure. Their engagements with Communist partisans further strengthened 
their doctrinal adherence. For the less politicised soldier, witnessing the deprivation war had on the 
Italian society, and the destruction of the countryside made them disdainful of authoritarianism as a 
political system. The bonds of friendships created from the shared military experience also provided 
the servicemen with enduring social capital. 
3.3.5 Prisoners of war 
The military disasters at Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk resulted in approximately 3 000 and 10 722 soldiers 
taken POW respectively.752 In total, over 14 583 South African soldiers were POWs during the war.753 
Table 3.7 indicates the POWs within the sample group of 153 ex-servicemen. Of the 153 ex-
servicemen that became involved in national post-war politics, 21 or about 12 per cent had been 
captured during the war. The majority, mostly commissioned officers from the 2 SA Div, had been 
captured together at the fall of Tobruk, and two were captured at Sidi Rezegh. The remainder 
became POWs in East Africa, Crete and Greece.  
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Table 3.7: POWs in the sample group (n=153)754 
Rank Sidi Rezegh Tobruk Other Total 
Officer 1 11 3 14 
NCO 1 4 1 6 
Total 2 15 4 21 
South African writers have argued that the POW experience had a cathartic effect on the POWs, 
drawing them towards more liberal views about class and race. Karen Horn argued that POWs 
“experienced some shift in their orthodox ideas of race and class as they were exposed first-hand to 
the attitudes of peasants and forced labourers while in work camps”.755 For Malherbe, POWs had 
“lots of time to think”, about “how far South Africa itself fell short of those ideals [democracy and it’s 
principles] for which they were supposed to be fighting, particularly when it came to applying them 
to the under-privileged races…”.756 These new world views may have made the POWs more 
sensitive to and disapproving of the extremist nationalist view that had gained traction in South Africa 
during and after the war. Despite the POWs returning to South Africa with a clearer political vision 
after prolonged periods of self-reflection, Horn argues that the POW experience did not result in a 
heightened post-war political activism as “the former POWs were more concerned with their own 
welfare interests after having been held captive and at the mercy of others for so long”.757 Thus the 
ex-servicemen listed above are exceptions to Horn’s findings. The discussion below explores these 
POWs’ activities during captivity.  
Being captured was traumatic and embarrassing for the soldiers and disrupted their confidence and 
sense of being. Chutter wrote afterwards “[i]t is seldom appreciated that being captured by the 
enemy, in addition to physical discomfort, involves a severe shock to the whole personality”.758 For 
the South African soldier, surrender was incredibly painful as, “many of them [were] men of standing 
and responsibility who had sacrificed much to serve”.759 Chutter, in his religious duties, provided 
comfort to all belligerents and all ranks, thereby gaining insight into the difficulties experienced by 
officers and men alike.760 For Chutter, the shared trauma of captivity soon dissolved any residual 
class differences that had survived military training. Chutter “found that the social strata, so carefully 
laid down by financial resources, quickly disappeared”.761 Chutter experienced that even race 
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differences were weakened during incarceration, for at Stalag VIIA “fifty British officers, a hundred 
American airmen, a hundred South African Bantu men and fifty Palestinian Labourers” were 
quartered in a barracks together in racial harmony.762 Being a POW levelled any residual class 
distinction, eroded social capital and allowed new leaders to emerge.  
Soon after capture, the POWs settled into the camp routine and organised themselves in various 
committees, revealing the leadership aptitude of the captured men. The committees organised 
activities such as lectures, classes, debates, and other forms of entertainment. At the Tarhuna camp 
near Tripoli, Lionel Cooper, a Johannesburg lawyer, set up an informal adult education effort, 
persuading his fellow inmates to present.763 At the same camp, Private Dave Katzeff, interned in 
mid-1942, organised the Jewish service of Rosh Hashana and Kol Nidrei for fellow Jewish POWs. 
As a POW in Italy and Germany, he edited and produced the camp newsletter, named The Observer. 
He claimed that he started the project because the already established wallpapers snubbed his 
literary efforts and because “he had very little else to do”.764 His role as editor of the Observer placed 
him centrally to a hive of activity of writers, artists and support staff.765 He was able to retrieve all 
copies of the newspaper, and on return to South Africa, he issued the paper in a single volume called 
The Observer Stalag IV B, in aid of the SL.766  
On arrival in Italy, the POWs continued to present lectures to one another.767 In Campo 21, at Chieti, 
the POWs formalised the lectures into formal classes in law, economics and farming.768 The Law 
School that developed at Chieti was attended by five officers that would after the war become South 
African judges, namely Neville Holmes, Anton Hawthorne, Taffy Harcourt, Blen Franklin and Denis 
Fannin.769 Chutter was involved with the Theological Society, which practised the Anglican 
sacrament and conducted theological studies.770 When Italy surrendered to the Allied forces in 1943, 
the POWs at Chieti were dispersed to various camps in Germany, where they continued conducting 
lectures and learning. Chutter continued lecturing on his transfer to Camp Oflag 79 in Braunschweig. 
He estimates that before the war ended, 400 officers at the camp had sat for public examination, 
and no fewer than eight theology students had successfully undertaken the General Ordination 
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Examination of the Church of England.771 The ordeal of capture had disrupted the military hierarchal 
structure, revealing suppressed leadership potential among the soldiers. 
For men that had previous political experience, incarceration allowed them time to reflect on the 
political future of South Africa. The most prominent South African politician to be captured was 
Graaff. Before the war, in April 1939, Smuts had made it clear to Graaff that he expected him to 
follow on from his father in politics and “that he [Smuts] couldn’t have us young men running around 
too long when there were jobs to be done in politics”.772 In this vein, the UP had nominated Graaff 
for election in 1943 despite him being on active duty. Naturally, he found himself involved in 
discussing post-war scenarios with fellow POWs, including Fannin, in the Modena officers’ camp.773 
Graaff further consolidated his stature among the other POWs by his contribution to the education 
of fellow POWs. A strong clique of POWs emerged with Graaff at its centre, which included of the 
sample group, Montgomery (Monty) Crook, Harold van Hoogstraten and Walter (Wally) Kingwell.774 
After the war, Gideon Jacobs, an officer with the Royal Marines and future UP MP, observed that 
Graaff had “evoked immense loyalty from all that were with him”.775 In recognition of Graaff’s actions 
as a POW he received an MBE after the war.776 Graaff’s enduring stature among the POWs led 
fellow POW, Captain Eric Hyland, to describe Graaff as “a great asset to South Africa in years to 
come – politically and otherwise”.777 For Graaff, his POW experience had endowed him with crucial 
social capital in the form of a trusted inner circle of loyal courtiers and the reinforced belief in his 
leadership skills.  
Although the trauma of capture and incarceration had stripped away class distinctions between 
servicemen, and forced introspection about the future of South Africa, the POW experience had not 
dramatically dislodged the political disposition of the servicemen. However, the POWs that were able 
to organise their environment and immerse themselves in efforts to help fellow POWs seem to have 
not only escaped the scars of their detention, but also have developed social capital in the form of 
new social networks, and standing.778 The reminiscences of POWs, such as Graaff and Chutter, 
emphasise the durability of the bonds and loyalties formed by the trauma of capture and shared 
captivity. 
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3.4  POLITICISATION DURING THE WAR 
The above sections dealt with how the soldiers’ war experience had contributed to both shifts in their 
political dispensation and had contributed to their social and cultural capital by strengthening social 
networks, and the accumulation of cultural capital in the form of rank, decorations or status. The 
discussion now moves to discuss attempts to politicise the servicemen, firstly by covering the 
soldiers’ efforts to self-organise as a pressure group in the form of the SL, and secondly, in the UDF’s 
efforts to direct the political education in the form of the AES. 
3.4.1 Ensuring a fair deal and the Springbok Legion 
Enduring memories from the previous war’s demobilisation inspired the rise of soldiers’ organisations 
to secure post-war justice for soldiers. Wary of the reluctance of the British Empire Services League 
(BESL) formed in 1921 and the Memorable Order of the Tin Hats (MOTHS) formed in 1927 to assist 
them, led to the soldiers striking out on their own.779 The subsequent organisation, the Springbok 
Legion, rejected the a-political stance of previous veteran organisations and pursued a political 
agenda from the onset. The political nature of the SL provided politicised soldiers with a platform 
from which to conduct their political work, thus associating the SL with communism. 
The formation of the Legion was partly due to the inability of both the MOTHS and the BESL to gain 
resonance with the soldiers, as neither were strong proponents of political pressure and self-
reliance.780 A flurry of activities initiated by the soldiers soon filled the vacuum that these 
organisations’ inertia had created. By 1941, soldiers had organised themselves into debating 
societies and ‘Soldiers parliaments’, both in South Africa and up North. In South Africa, the core 
group were soldiers of the 9 Reconnaissance Battalion of the South African Tank Corps, and up 
North the soldiers of the 1 SA Bde. In the SA Tank Corps at Kafferskraal, Vic Clapham, son of Vic 
Clapham Snr who having served in the previous world war had initiated the Comrades Marathon,781 
and Hodgson, a Communist Unionist,782 played a prominent role in establishing a soldier’s 
movement. At about the same time, in the 1 SA Bde (Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Rifles), John 
Morley783 and Carneson,784 both members of the CPSA, took the initiative in establishing a similar 
movement.785 Morley became known as the ‘Red Sergeant’ when he flew a red flag on his vehicle 
during the East African campaign.786 Many of the founding members of these movements were either 
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members of the CPSA before the war or harboured radical-leftist or liberal sympathies.787 Carneson 
provides an overview of how the different initiatives developed: 
I was active in the sort of political work that was developing among the soldiers in the Army, 
Springbok Legion. When we were in the desert, myself and a chap by the name of John Morley, 
we formed a union of soldiers … there was a strong feeling amongst South African soldiers 
that we were certainly not British, whatever else we were - we were South Africans first and 
foremost … [W]e wanted our own ex-servicemen’s organisation to cope with the problems we 
knew would face us when we got back home, so John and I started what we called a Union of 
Soldiers ... Then we heard about the Springbok Legion that had started almost simultaneously 
down in South Africa from ex-servicemen who for one reason or another found themselves 
back in the … Union of South Africa, Jack Hodgson, for instance, who was active there, so we 
linked up with them, and from then onwards we were busy recruiting for the Springbok Legion, 
and it became a vehicle in the South African Army for a lot of progressive thinking, on the race 
issue as well, amongst white South African soldiers…788 
As evident in Carneson’s explanation, much of the initial organising was undertaken by soldiers with 
previous political exposure, who were frustrated by the lethargy of the previously established veteran 
organisations.  
It did not take long for the various soldiers’ movements to consolidate into the SL. Although the initial 
stimulus for the Legion was to prevent these soldiers from enduring the same neglect as the soldiers 
of the First World War during their demobilisation, the Legion quickly appropriated other issues that 
concerned the soldiers. Such issues included the arming of Black soldiers and the end to the 
differentiation between soldiers based on their race.789 Carneson, in a wandering reminiscence, 
captures the thought behind the SL: 
But we were very interested in the war. The fight against Fascism, and also there was a feeling, 
because of the nature of the struggles, it was an anti-fascist, anti-nazi struggle, linked up with 
an anti-nazi struggle, back home struggle for white democracy, if you like, back home that was 
under threat. But there was a feeling that the struggle was not going to end when the war was 
over. We have got to get back and we will have to fight a political struggle as well. Not 
necessarily, we all recognised that the ex-serviceman’s organisation could not go on forever, 
but certainly there would be a period, when ex-servicemen, as a political grouping, would be 
able to make a bit of an impact in South Africa. It was a whole collection of ideas that were 
floating around of this nature that led to the Springbok Legion. It was not just going to be an 
ordinary ex-serviceman’s organisation – a “do-goodie” organisation.790 
On the amalgamation of the various initiatives, Isacowitz and Williams emerged as the SL’s most 
prominent leaders.791 The SL appealed to the fighting soldier who was recruited by SL members who 
were active both in deployed units and at home.  
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As previously mentioned, by the end of the war, the SL boasted a membership of over 50 000, which 
included men awaiting demobilisation and men already discharged from service earlier in the war.792 
The SL soon become a haven for both soldiers who were active in politics before the war and those 
for whom the war was a political awakening experience. Working in the SL drew these men and 
women into a close, self-reinforcing network of influence, strengthened by similar political views. 
Many of the servicemen who had ‘cut their teeth’ in the Legion would continue with politics after the 
war as the following chapter will show. Of the sample group of 153 ex-servicemen that were active 
in post-war politics, 29 of the 153 were office-bearers of the SL as can be seen in Table 3.8. Table 
3.8 illustrates that as a Soldiers’ Union, the ranks of the office-bearers were confined mainly to junior 
officers and other ranks.  
 
Table 3.8: Rank of Springbok legionnaires on demobilisation (n=153)793 
Officers Number NCO Number 
Capt 4 WO. 1 
Lt 6 Sgt 3 
  Cpl 1 
  LCpl 1 
  Pte 9 
  Unknown NCO 4 
Total 10  19 
The involvement of CPSA members in the formative years of the SL led to the SL’s association with 
communism despite the SL’s appeal to all soldiers. As seen from the previous sections, the CPSA 
members used the Legion as a vehicle to propagate their ideology and find like-minded soldiers. For 
instance, Rowley Arenstein saw the war and SL as a vehicle to spread their leftist views and grow 
the CPSA’s membership. According to Neil Roos, Arenstein claimed that by 1942 the CPSA had 
hoped that the war would enable the party to win White soldiers over to their leftist ideology of a non-
racial working class.794 As Carneson noted, “I was against the war, but I also knew that where there 
were soldiers you had communists - I mean this is - this is what I was thinking”.795 
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Similarly, for men like Bernstein, who had been a socialist as a student at the University of 
Witwatersrand (Wits) before the war, the SL allowed him to carry on with “a little bit of political activity 
in the army” by trying to attract members.796  
Furthermore, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 led to a wave of CPSA members 
joining the UDF, with the objectives of the SL attracting additional communist membership.797 Some 
of these men, such as Slovo, Bernstein and Bunting, had complied with the CPSA’s previous 
opposition to the war, but when the Soviet Union as the principal advocate for communist ideology 
came under threat, the CPSA’s position changed. After the war, Bunting claimed that the SL had a 
“big influence on thinking during that period, and the mood of the soldiers, the opinions of the soldiers 
changed during the war”.798 He argues that “it was mainly the anti-Nazi current that was spread 
during the war and generated automatically by the war which influenced the soldiers, and they moved 
considerably to the left”.799 CPSA members, such as Bernstein and Carneson, have emphasised the 
contribution of the work of the SL to the leftward shift in opinion among many soldiers at the expense 
of other contributing factors.800 
Personal accounts of other men, like Kodesh, reveal the combination of factors that influenced 
soldiers’ political views. For Kodesh, participation in the SL was less significant than exposure to the 
devastation of war in his political awakening. In an interview after the war he described how fighting 
in Italy had politicised him, “…what I saw there I think probably politicised me even - yes, the Legion 
played a big part the [sic.] - even more than anything else”.801 Thus efforts by the CPSA members to 
politicise and convert servicemen to a more leftist persuasion had varied success. Bunting concedes 
that despite the number of CPSA members that found their way into the SL, membership was not 
exclusively leftist, with ex-NP and UP supporters also joining,802 which suggests that for the soldiers, 
political affiliation may have been a side issue in the pursuit of the serviceman’s collective interests.  
Although politically aware soldiers with predominantly leftist views initiated the creation of the SL, its 
pursuit of the collective interest meant that the movement attracted the membership of soldiers of all 
political views. However, the leftist leanings of the SL’s leadership allowed the CPSA to use the SL 
as a vehicle to propagate their ideas, thereby creating the impression that the SL represented a 
leftward shift in the soldiers’ political disposition. Furthermore, the concentration of soldiers with 
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similar political disposition and habitus together in one soldier’s movement, not only reinforced the 
left’s already insular community, but had also blinded them to the possibility that their efforts had not 
pushed the ordinary soldier’s political views leftward as far as they claimed. The next section 
discusses the official UDF response to the war’s political context.  
3.4.2 Looking to a more liberal future (AES) 
As the soldiers were forming the SL, liberal academics identified the requirement to address the 
inroads that anti-government and Nazi propaganda had been making in South Africa and possibly 
the UDF. In 1940, aware of the educational programme of the British Army, the Minister of Finance, 
Jan Hofmeyr, suggested that the Secretary of Education, Professor MC Botha, investigate the 
possibility of a similar programme in the UDF. However, Professor Hoernlé, a philosophy professor 
at Wits and leading liberal, pre-empted Botha by convening a meeting at the Wits on 10 September 
1940, to discuss a similar educational scheme.803 The meeting agreed that such a scheme should 
not only focus on providing an understanding of why the war was necessary but also focused on 
providing an antidote to boredom and intellectual stimulation to those soldiers who wanted to 
continue their studies after the war.804 At the same time, Leo and Nell Marquard had also written to 
Hofmeyr with a proposed scheme for political education in the UDF. Their proposal expanded on 
Hoernlé’s suggestion by recommending the establishment of a specially trained corps of educators 
for the task. Hofmeyr subsequently passed the baton to Malherbe, the Director of Census and 
Statistics who had become the DMI. Malherbe, appealing to the military’s love for new organisational 
structures, redrafted Marquard’s letter for Smut’s approval.805 In the motivation Malherbe appealed 
to Smuts’s philosophy of Holism and a desire to unify White South Africans: 
One of the main ideas [underpinning the AES] is to consolidate and consciously to formulate 
the spirit of co-operation at present existing between Afrikaans-speaking and English- speaking 
men in the field as a result of their doing a common job and of facing danger together. It is 
hoped that this spirit will constitute the foundation for building a united South Africa after the 
war - and to outgrow the present rather terrible state of political cannibalism into which South 
Africa has fallen.806 
By 1941, the various independent efforts by prominent liberals to shape the idle minds of the soldiers 
had converged into the AES. 
Although the liberal academics had conceived the scheme to combat boredom among soldiers and 
stimulate intellectual development, by the time the idea had reached Smuts for approval, it had 
developed explicit political ambitions. Following Smuts’s approval in February 1941, Malherbe and 
 
803  Monama, ‘Wartime Propaganda In the Union of South Africa 1939-1945’, 80; Malherbe, Never a Dull 
Moment, 215. See also Roos, ‘The Second World War, the Army Education Scheme and the ‘Discipline’ 
of the White Poor in South Africa’, 645–59. 
804  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 147. 
805  Cardo, 148. 
806  Cardo, 144. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
Marquard set about establishing the AES. Malherbe selected information officers individually from 
soldiers that were already in the combat zones, to ensure that the information officer had credibility 
among the soldiers. The recruitment of Gerald Gordon was typical of Malherbe’s style: 
At an outpost in North Africa’s desert one bleak morning I was in my dugout, a young private 
twiddling the knobs of a battered wireless set to get the day’s news from the regiment. Imagine 
my astonishment when a colonel clambered down the steps and without any military’ bull’ said, 
‘Good morning Gordon, I want you in my outfit. They tell me you are a well-informed and active 
chap. I’ll make you an officer’.807 
By the end of April 1941, the first Information Officer course had been conducted in 
Voortrekkerhoogte, after which 30 Information Officers were commissioned.808 The work of the 
information officer was primarily to stimulate debate on pressing political and social concerns of the 
soldiers. To achieve this, the AES established ‘Soldiers parliaments’ and debating societies and 
provided a conduit for books from South Africa to the soldiers. The information officer became a 
valuable conduit for discussions between the soldiers and the military administration. An example of 
the information officer’s role as the representative of the soldiers’ concerns is the election of Percy 
Niehaus, an information officer and former assistant Attorney General of South West Africa, to fly to 
South Africa to present the views of soldier-farmers to the South African government.809 
The involvement of Malherbe and Marquard in the AES’s final design caused a duality in the 
conceptual foundation of the AES. Michael Cardo identifies the internal tension by pointing out that, 
although both Malherbe and Marquard “were united in their opposition to Afrikaner nationalist 
republicanism”, each man pursued a different liberal agenda within the AES. Malherbe sought to 
“counter the appeal of an exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism as espoused by DF Malan’s gesuiwerdes” 
(Afrikaner Purists),810 and hoped to shape the post-war society using the AES instructors as a 
catalyst: 
We have to prepare South African citizens to meet the difficult adjustments that will come after 
the war. These officers and men, after they are demilitarised, will act as a powerful and salutary 
leaven amongst their own folks when they get home in the different parts of South Africa. 
Special attention should be paid to the needs of the Afrikaans-speaking troops and it is 
essential that the majority of these ‘political’ instructors should be thoroughly proficient in 
Afrikaans.811  
Whereas, Marquard was concerned with “the rising clamour of African nationalist voices insisting on 
full citizenship rights”,812 and pushed further to criticise the UP’s unworkable position of race 
relations.  
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In 1942, Marquard revised the book A Black Man’s Burden which was widely read by information 
officers (as AES officers became known), and soldiers, like Brown, who sought answers to South 
Africa’s race problem.813 The nuanced differences between Marquard and Malherbe allowed for an 
AES vision which accommodated both a unified White South Africanism and a tolerance for the 
extension of rights to Blacks in South Africa. Both Cardo and Roos argue that the AES provided a 
possible resolution of the South African race question which “was not principally concerned with the 
exclusion of blacks from the body politic”.814 In this way, the AES reconciled ‘South Africanism’ and 
liberalism as progressive political forces during the war.815 
The information officers embraced Malherbe’s South-Africanist agenda. Izak (Sakkies) Fourie, who 
had left the rectorate of the University College of the Orange Free State to become the information 
officer of the 2 SA Div, emphasised the need for reconciliation between the White populations of 
South Africa. Just like Malherbe, Fourie also focused on preparing a unified White population for a 
post-war South Africa. He emphasised to his division that:  
they were fighting for the free democracy Afrikaans and English South Africans [that] had 
struggled for centuries, [for] the freedom to elect their own government and to tell the 
government what sort of a better South Africa they wanted to build after the war.816  
Although Malherbe’s South Africanist agenda attracted like-minded liberals to the AES, radical left-
wing servicemen found resonance with Marquard’s experimentation with Marxist theory in his book 
A Black Man’s Burden. Increasingly, soldiers sympathetic to the CPSA, or at least concerned with 
race relations, also found their way into the AES. According to Arenstein, servicemen who were 
members of the CPSA, made a conscious effort to use the AES as a front for the pursuit of radical 
politicisation. As Arenstein stated, they wanted to use the AES to “capture intact the more 
progressive elements of the White working-class—those who had volunteered to serve in the UDF”, 
much like they had done in the SL.817  
Several CPSA members, including Arenstein, Bunting, Roy du Preez, and Guy Routh, successfully 
became information officers.818 The presence of communist soldiers in the AES made Marquard 
suspicious. When he noticed that O’Meara had attended the second AES course, he warned that 
lone tracked socialism or dialectic socialist rhetoric was insufficient for an information officer’s task. 
He argued instead for an empirically based approach, which would gently nudge the soldiers to 
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realise the need for liberal changes after the war.819 Although both Marquard and Malherbe were 
suspicious of the SL, they tolerated both the inclusion of Springbok legionnaires in the AES and the 
SL’s leftist agenda.820 
The philosophical underpinnings of the AES, the strong academic nature of the work and the AES 
selection and qualification criteria favoured university graduates, who soon dominated the AES.821 
Malherbe’s bias towards university graduates was vindicated in the previously mentioned 1944 AES 
survey, which found that on average soldiers with academic qualifications had a more liberal 
disposition. Table 3.9 is extracted from the AES report that indicated that higher levels of education 
had had a liberalising influence on servicemen, which is particularly evident when comparing the 
responses from university graduates with those soldiers who had only completed Standard VI or 
less. 
Table 3.9: Education and racial attitude among UDF soldiers822 
 In favour for more job 
opportunities for [Black 
Africans] 
In favour for more book 
learning for [Black 
Africans] 
In favour for more 
political rights for [Black 
Africans] 
University 84% 85% 77% 
Matric 73% 75% 63% 
Junior Certificate 49% 55% 41% 
Std VI and less 30% 39% 27% 
Malherbe was especially proud of the academic qualifications of the information officers, both during 
and after the war. In his memoirs, he estimated that over the four years of the war he trained about 
350 information officers, of whom 40 were women trained to serve in the various Woman’s Auxiliary 
forces and services.823 Malherbe proudly boasted that among the information officers there were six 
that held doctoral degrees, 15 master’s degrees and others were chartered accountants, advocates, 
and university lecturers.824 Malherbe on his retirement traced the post-war careers of the information 
officers and counted among them 19 lawyers, 35 teachers, 21 university staff, and 48 involved in 
national affairs. Of the 48, two had become senators, one a cabinet minister, and one a party 
president.825 For Malherbe, the information officers’ educational qualifications, status and success 
validated his project.  
Within the sample group, the tendency of university graduates to gravitate to the AES is reflected, 
with Table 3.10 providing a profile of the sample’s information officers, being ex-servicemen that 
entered into post-war politics. As can be seen in Table 3.10, 17 (15 males and 2 females) of the 153 
 
819  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 160. 
820  Cardo, 160. 
821  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, 216–17. 
822  Malherbe, ‘Race Attitudes and Education’, 12–14. 
823  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, 219. 
824  Monama, ‘Wartime Propaganda In the Union of South Africa 1939-1945’, 225. 
825  Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, 218–19. 
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selected servicemen were information officers. All except one, Clapham, had completed tertiary 
education before the war. Five were involved in the legal profession before the war, six held 
appointments in education (three teachers and three university-based academics), and two were 
involved in agriculture. 
Table 3.10: AES officers’ occupations (n=153)826 
SN Initials Surname Rank  Occupation pre-war  Pre-war Academic 
Qualification 
1 LH Marquard Lt Col Teacher (Grey College) BA (Oxford) 
2 JL  Horak Capt Argiculturalist BA LLB (UNISA-Pretoria) 
3 G Gordon Capt Lawyer BA LLB (Cape Town) 
4 I S Fourie Capt Academic (Free State 
University) 
BA, BA(Hons) (Free State, 
Oxford) 
5 G H Durrant Capt Academic (Natal University) BA, Teaching Diploma 
(Cambridge) 
6 LI Rubin Lt Lawyer BA LLB (Wits) 
7 JJ O’Meara Lt Teacher Probable degree 
8 JPdM Niehaus Lt Attorney  BA LLB (Cape Town) LLM 
(London) 
9 C Bekker Lt Mining Geologist BSc (Wits) 
10 L Kuper Lt Attorney BA LLB (Wits) 
11 HBM Joseph Lt (Ms) Social Worker BA(Hons) (London) 
12 JEG Hasting Beck 
(né de Villiers) 
Lt (Ms) Academic (Cape Town 
University) 
BA LLB (Cape Town) 
13 VJ Clapham Lt Artist Writer None 
14 B P Bunting Lt Journalist  BA(Hons) (Wits) 
15 VCH Brown Lt Teacher BA (Wits) 
16 AID Brown Lt Lawyer BA LLB (Rhodes) 
17 CG Starke Cpl Farmer Diploma in Agriculture 
However, some South African historians have disputed the efficacy of the AES in politicising the 
serviceman. Michael Cardo is doubtful of the AES’s success in “persuading white soldiers to ‘go into 
politics’ with a view to improving conditions for black South Africans”.827 Roos is more disparaging, 
arguing that “the postwar history of White volunteers suggests that the liberal democratic brand of 
South Africanism that inspired the formation of the AES and underpinned its curriculum had little 
appeal beyond the small coterie of ‘AES intellectuals’“828; however, for those who had been involved 
in the AES, it was a successful project. Being an information officer, had politicised Ms Joseph, as 
she stated:  
A new world was opening up for me, a new vision and new knowledge. I began to view the 
South African scene with new and better-informed eyes. As I studied the conditions in which 
 
826  Table developed by Author from, DOD Archive, PA; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information File 35, 
Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65 1 5 (part 2), General 
Election 1953 UP Candidates Information; South African Who’s Who 1948-1976 and selected 
Biographies and Obituaries. 
827  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 164. 
828  Roos, ‘The Second World War, the Army Education Scheme and the ‘Discipline’ of the White Poor in 
South Africa’, 656–57. 
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black children struggled for education and opportunity, and compared them to how most whites 
lived, I began to feel ashamed of my own position as a white. Talking about democracy brought 
home to me that the black people did not share it with me. I had a parliamentary vote and they 
did not. As I spelt it out to the WAAFs, so I spelt it out to myself, questioning my own values as 
never before. I did not turn immediately into a socialist, far from it, but I began to see people 
as human beings, regardless of colour, began to have some idea of how the other half of the 
South African world lived.829 
Both Malherbe and Bunting, who were part of the AES, referred to the previously mentioned 1944 
AES survey as evidence of the liberalising effect of education, the AES and the war experience.830 
Bunting argued:  
…soldiers’ attitudes on the position of Africans in society and so on changed during the war. 
They took up a much more progressive stance, particularly amongst the Afrikaners, because 
taken away from the Dutch Reformed Church and the Nationalist Party into the Army, exposed 
to the ideas of army education under Marquard…831 
For Bunting, the progressive shift achieved by participation in the fight against Nazism and Fascism 
endured beyond the battlefields of North Africa, extending to the home front.832 Carneson, as a 
signaller and friend of Bunting, saw the AES efforts as complementary to the progressive struggle 
as “the nature of the war and the struggle that was being fought at that stage favoured the 
development of progressive ideas”.833 Roos speculates that the AES narrative and its post-war 
ambitions “resonated with their [servicemen’s] own personal narratives for joining the UDF”.834 The 
AES did however frame the servicemen’s participation in the war within a liberal rhetoric and 
provided a moral justification for their involvement. Whether the justification led to liberal political 
activism is discussed in the next chapters.  
Even Malherbe was doubtful of the long-term tenacity of the liberalising effect of the AES. In 1946, 
at the Hornlé Memorial Lecture titled Race Attitudes and Education, he argued that the liberal 
attitudes of the ex-servicemen were context-dependent and would not survive the opposing societal 
pressure prevalent in post-war South Africa. He therefore proposed that the Minister of Education 
establish a similar adult education scheme in civilian life.835 He believed that unless this happens the 
changes in political views of the servicemen made during the war would “simply slip back once the 
war is over”.836  
 
829  Joseph, Side by Side, 27. 
830  Malherbe, ‘Race Attitudes and Education’, 11. 
831  UWC-Robben Island Mayibuye Archives, ‘Interview with Brian Bunting by Don Pinnock’, 
http://www.ruthfirstpapers.org.uk/. 
832  Roos, ‘The Second World War, the Army Education Scheme and the ‘Discipline’ of the White Poor in 
South Africa’, 656. 
833  SAHA, AL2640, ‘Interview with F Carneson by J Fredrickse’. 
834  Roos, ‘The Second World War, the Army Education Scheme and the ‘Discipline’ of the White Poor in 
South Africa’, 656. 
835  Malherbe, ‘Race Attitudes and Education’, 24. 
836  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 163. 
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Cardo believes that Malherbe’s concern was well-founded, claiming that most information officers 
soon lost their idealism when faced with the realities of civilian life.837 However, many liberals, led by 
Marquard, were not as pessimistic as Malherbe regarding the durability of wartime experience. By 
1944, Marquard believed that the leftward shift among servicemen had been substantial enough to 
influence national politics in the form of either a new political party or a solid progressive wing within 
the UP.838 Thus, although the war may have made the soldiers’ habitus more receptive to leftist 
views, the liberals doubted the resilience of such changes when exposed to South African society 
on the soldiers’ return. The following chapters include the role that these liberal ex-servicemen 
played in the post-war UP. 
3.5 RETURN TO THE UNION 
Soldiers returning to South Africa from the war often felt alienated from the broader South African 
community. Soldiers having shared experiences of regimentalisation, discipline and dangers, 
harboured both a sense of solidarity with each other and a sense of entitlement for society.839 The 
sense of solidarity and entitlement reinforced the ex-serviceman identity to which the soldier could 
relate, thereby transforming their participation in the military field into peacetime social capital. A 
sense of listlessness and alienation also made the soldiers susceptible to political ideologies that 
promised a better future. Politicised soldiers such as Hodgson, who returned from North Africa in 
1942, would gravitate towards the CPSA offices for discussions on socialism.840 Brown, who fought 
in the Italian campaign in 1945 experienced a similar period of dislocation, choosing instead to 
pursue a career in agriculture.841 He felt like many others when he thought “Well, to hell with it, this 
world now owes me a peaceful life”.842  
However, despite being disengaged soldiers soon realised that “… everything at home wasn’t as it 
should be”.843 Although the war had changed Brown, these changes had not yet surfaced in his 
habitus beyond a lingering unease regarding South African society. Lovell, who had commanded 
Malay and Indian soldiers in East Africa, had been quicker to identify the casual racism of South 
African society as a critical concern: 
Life in the Army outside of the borders of the Union, where our men were precious to 
us as soldiers whose wellbeing was our first care, tended to emphasise their worth as 
human beings, without reference to the colour of their skins. I was therefore quite 
 
837  Cardo, Opening Men’s Eyes, 172. 
838  Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 170; Roos, ‘The Second World War, the Army Education Scheme 
and the ‘Discipline’ of the White Poor in South Africa’, 656-657. 
839  Oosthuizen, ‘The Demobilisation of the White Union Defence Force Soldiers During and After the 
Second World War’, 25–27. 
840  Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 55. 
841  Cardo, Opening Men’s Eyes, 43. 
842  Cardo, 44. 
843  APC, OHP, ‘Interview with Dr Peter Brown conducted by Prof Norman Bromberger in Pietermaritzburg, 
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shocked to find on my return how ingrained colour prejudice still was among my white 
compatriots.844  
Military service, which had separated the soldier from South African society, had awakened a sense 
of shared humanity in them, which set him apart from those that had not fought. 
Even though the soldier’s isolation and alienation from South African society had made them more 
sensitive to the racial prejudice common in South Africa, not all soldiers were shocked into activism. 
Thus, the war had a different influence on these men, especially, for the servicemen who had 
undertaken political work under the umbrella of the SL. In some cases, the war had stripped the 
servicemen of their radical idealism rather than nurture it. O’Meara’s political work among the 
ordinary soldiers during the war had disillusioned him. He soon withdrew from CPSA activities:  
John O’Meara, who I mentioned to you, he had been a Party [CPSA] member and a very 
prominent figure in the army, in the Springbok Legion, but when he came back he was just 
completely deflated because - I don’t know, in his first speech to the Party members when he 
came back, he said that people mustn’t expect too much from the ex-soldiers because they 
had been used to a certain sort of lifestyle…845 
For others, a political awakening occurred only after the war. As a student at Cambridge, Brown and 
his friends went to heckle the South African born author, Peter Abrahams. Instead of heckling 
Abrahams, the engagement painfully reminded him of the “brutality and the injustice of the South 
African racial order…”,846 shaking him out of his political hiatus. For Brown, it was the Coloured 
political activist and poet, Abrahams, that made him decide to “get involved in something else apart 
from learning how to be a farmer”.847 Thus, soldiers returning to the Union, after a period of isolation 
and alienation from the home front, could see more clearly the ills in South African society. This was 
partially because war experience had changed them too much, and partially because the war had 
not changed South Africa enough. For some servicemen, it appeared as if the country had not fully 
grasped the profound societal changes that had occurred globally, triggered by the war. Instead, the 
country that they fought to protect against extreme right-wing ideologies had held onto and hardened 
its pre-existing racial beliefs. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter tracked the volunteer from volunteering, through the war and to final demobilisation. 
Much like the previous chapter showed the heterogeneous nature of the South African society, this 
chapter highlights that war experience varied and therefore did not have a singular politicising effect. 
Not only did the soldiers experience the war through different lenses or habitus, based on their social 
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and cultural backgrounds, but there was insufficient consistency in actual war experience to have 
ensured a common politicised habitus.  
Although mobilisation had disrupted the social structures of the volunteers, the sample group 
experienced the levelling effect of military training differently. Almost half of the sample group had 
evaded the worst of this social dislocation as they transformed their civilian social capital into the 
military field. However, for those that did not, the levelling effect of military service broadened their 
political perspectives which influenced their habitus towards a more liberal disposition.  
Subsequent experiences of combat also varied substantially between Africa and Italy. The African 
campaigns removed the South African soldiers from the social strictures of South African society. 
They fought alongside a diversity of Allied soldiers, of different races and classes, which soon 
accentuated their shared White South African identity. However, attempts to transcend race divisions 
were met with mixed responses from the soldiers and discouraged by the UDF. In contrast, in Italy, 
South African soldiers were confronted with war’s destructive and degradative effects. The political 
and cultural background of the soldiers fundamentally shaped their interpretation with radical-left 
soldiers identifying similarities between Italy’s and South Africa’s societal divisions and derived 
solace from the successes of the Italian communist partisans. Younger and more impressionable 
soldiers experienced a greater dislocation of their pre-war habitus and came away with an aversion 
to fascism and authoritarian governments. For prisoners, the POW experience added another layer 
of obligation and loyalty that set them apart from even the other soldiers. Thus, the war resulted in 
overlapping, yet different political experiences among the ex-servicemen. However, a combination 
of factors, including social dislocation, the age of a soldier and the intensity of the experience, meant 
that the Italian campaign probably had a greater impact on the habitus and later political disposition 
of the soldiers that fought there.  
Both conscious efforts to politicise the soldiers, one from among the soldiers and one from the UDF, 
had varied results. For the radical-left activist, the SL had become another layer of obligation, 
solidarity and identity, strengthening an already established network. Similarly, the AES brought 
together a cluster of liberally-minded soldiers, availing them an opportunity to propagate a liberal 
perspective for South Africa. These initiatives likely influenced the protagonists more than achieving 
the aim of instilling a more progressive view among the soldiers. The enduring legacy of both 
organisations was an invaluable experience as political organisers gained access to resilient 
networks of like-minded political activists who later joined their ranks  
Separated from the South African home front, both physically and psychologically, soldiers saw 
South African society from new and broader perspectives due to war experiences. The subsequent 
alienation and otherness that the returning soldier had experienced increased the feeling of solidarity 
among the ex-servicemen. This solidarity solidified the ex-serviceman status as an identity and 
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consolidated the ex-serviceman’s accrued social capital in the form of networks of loyalty, obligation 
and identity, which transcended political views and differences in habitus. Thus, to expect an ex-
serviceman’s identity to have unified and aligned their political views and attitudes, is maybe casting 
the idea of Tylden’s typology of a unique South Africa soldier too broadly. 
Although the ex-serviceman identity may not have reflected a single or shared political habitus, it did 
provide the ex-servicemen with a source of social capital to use in the civilian and political field. The 
following chapters address how the ex-servicemen capitalised on ex-serviceman identity and war 
experience in the political field. It also tracks how the varied war experience had influenced the ex-





EX-SERVICEMEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN PARLIAMENTARY AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY 
POST-WAR POLITICS, 1946-1953 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Two discussed the biographic profile of the ex-servicemen that would emerge in post-war 
politics. The chapter showed that the deep race and class divisions in South Africa also ran through 
the White community. These divisions meant that these ex-servicemen had not emerged from a 
homogeneous habitus or generic political disposition, but instead had separate but overlapping 
backgrounds. The ex-servicemen in the sample stand apart from the ‘ordinary’ soldier. The men in 
the sample had similar schooling that transcended the traditional cultural divisions and on average 
they also had better occupations, thereby embedding them into the political and social hegemony of 
the time. Chapter three tracked the melting pot of military service throughout the war. Although the 
war had created a shared ex-servicemen identity, Chapter Three showed that from a political 
perspective, the war had not influenced the ex-servicemen’s habitus homogeneously. The diversity 
of war-experience, coupled with the servicemen’s already varied background, meant that the war 
had not shaped the soldiers’ political views uniformly, or dislodged previous political views. Instead, 
the ex-serviceman’s previous habitus and political exposure often framed their perspective of the 
war. For those already disposed to radical and liberal perspectives, the experience of combat, 
fighting against fascism and a growing sense of international liberalism served to confirm their views 
and even entrench it further. For others, the politicising efforts of both the Army Education Scheme 
(AES) and Springbok Legion (SL) had introduced some to liberal and radical perspectives to which 
they had not been exposed prior to war service. Thus, the influence of the war was as variegated as 
the men’s backgrounds and war experience. 
Among radical and liberal activists, the war had created an expectation of continued liberal reform 
in South Africa.848 However, for returning ex-servicemen, who had been separated from South 
African society while fighting up north, the South Africa that confronted them seemed to have 
become more, not less, racialised and segregated. Despite feelings of alienation and otherness, 
radical and liberal ex-servicemen, on their return to civilian life, were still enthusiastic that liberal 
political reforms would continue after the war.849 The more conservative ex-servicemen, as part of 
 
848  Lazerson, Against the Tide, 54. 
849  M Susser, 'A Personal History: Social Medicine in a South African Setting, 1952–5. Part 2: Social 
Medicine as a Calling: Ups, Downs, and Politics in Alexandra Township', Journal of Epidemology & 
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the political hegemony of Jan Smuts’s ‘South Africanism’, expected to slip back into the pre-war 
status quo.850 
This chapter explores how ex-servicemen transitioned from wartime service into post-war politics. 
The chapter maps out the interactions between the veteran community and the political parties 
opposing the National Party (NP). The discussion covers both the ex-servicemen’s involvement in 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. The discussion follows how the politicised ex-
servicemen in political parties, such as the United Party (UP), Labour Party (LP) and Communist 
Party of South Africa (CPSA), and ex-servicemen movements transformed the ex-serviceman 
identity and the rhetoric of the war into a coherent political constituency between 1948 and 1953.  
4.2 RETURNING SERVICEMEN AND POLITICS 1946-1948 
4.2.1 The continuation of soldier activism after the war 
The Union Defence Force (UDF) discharged soldiers throughout the war in an uncoordinated 
manner. Smut’s appointment of Harry Lawrence as Minister of Welfare and responsible for 
demobilisation in August 1943 was the first indication of a coordinated plan to repatriate soldiers 
back home. By 1 April 1944, Lawrence had consolidated control over the demobilisation structures 
and by 28 April 1944, he had presented a ‘Springbok Charter’ or demobilisation plan to Parliament 
for approval.851 Table 4.1 shows the discharge dates of the ex-servicemen in the sample. Most of 
the sample group were demobilised and discharged between 1945 and 1946. The withdrawal of the 
1 South African Division (1 SA Div) from North Africa caused an increased number of discharges in 
1943. 
Table 4.1: Release date of sample group (n=153)852 












Grand Total 153 
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Upon their discharge and demobilisation, ex-servicemen faced the challenges of reintegration into 
society. For the ex-servicemen under consideration, these challenges went beyond only settling back 
into quotidian, civilian life. It was during this demobilisation and reintegration process that the 
influence of the war on these men became accentuated and ushered them into the political 
environment. The war had awakened a sense of socio-political responsibility in many of the sample 
group. However, their interpretation of this responsibility varied as much as their war experience. 
This section tracks their emergence onto the national political stage directly after the war until the 
1948 elections and deals with student politics, parliamentary party politics and extra-parliamentary 
politics. 
One commonality shared by these men was the foreknowledge that the war had instilled in them a 
sense of responsibility to either guard the South African status quo or to change it through political 
activism. For instance, Mervyn Susser, a survivor of Sidi Rezegh, later a pilot in Italy and a post-war 
medical student at the University of Witwatersrand (Wits), found that his wartime struggles 
demanded activism: 
The horrific Nazi ideology had provided the personal impetus for entering the struggle five years 
before. Thereafter, my main criterion for postwar life slowly evolved into a sense that whatever I 
undertook, it should be not only benign but socially and politically useful.853  
Susser’s newfound sense of social and political purpose motivated him to study medicine after the 
war. He found his purpose when he provided medical services to impoverished communities.854 
Similarly, Fred Carneson found purpose in furthering the political work that he and others had 
undertaken during the war: 
…there was a whole group of us in the army who said when…the war’s finished, we [are] not 
going to go back to ordinary jobs - we’re going to go and do full time political work one way or 
another, and we did…we just got straight into political work and activity, and some of us full 
time...855 
Thus, several ex-servicemen launched into political activism after the war. Many were further 
animated with the emerging post-war social liberalism and equated the nationalist right in South 
Africa with Fascism.856 The Afrikaner nationalist’s flirtation with fascism before and during the war 
was thus not forgotten. Those with liberal and radical dispositions were willing to collaborate and 
work within the established White political framework to oppose the NP. Since they saw the NP as 
a Fascist-tinged party, they believed their post-war fight against the NP at home was an extension 
of their military duty of fighting such regimes abroad. Many saw the fight against racism as part and 
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parcel of this struggle. As Colin Eglin argued “… with the whole growth of the movement of human 
rights around the world, following the defeat of Nazism, the issue of black-white relations became 
more and more important in South Africa.”857 Thus, the NP’s dubious wartime loyalties were brought 
back into focus and roused many ex-servicemen towards political activism. 
Despite this commonality among these ex-servicemen, they pursued their political activism in various 
forms and through a variety of platforms. Some men used the opportunities offered by universities 
to pursue their political agenda. Part of the state’s demobilisation scheme involved offering younger 
soldiers, who had interrupted their studies to fight or had volunteered directly after school, 
preferential access to further their studies by lowering the entry requirements. Joe Slovo, for 
instance, had not finished his senior certificate before the war. After the war he received a five-year 
scholarship after passing his matriculation exemption exam, “designed for illiterate ex-
servicemen.”858 Further education allowed ex-servicemen to fill professional vocations and thus gain 
access to the middle-class, which would lessen the economic burden on the state to take care of ex-
servicemen in financial need.859 Slovo and Harry Schwarz, an South African Air Force (SAAF) pilot 
during the war, were able to use this opportunity to gain a tertiary education to pursue legal studies 
at Wits to finally become attorneys.860 The opportunity to study provided the ex-servicemen with the 
opportunity to transfer their social capital accrued in the military field into the professional field after 
the war.  
Many other returning ex-servicemen accepted the state’s demobilisation offer to obtain a university 
education. Already a year after the end of the war, many ex-servicemen engulfed student life at 
various universities across South Africa. For instance, in 1946, of the 1189 students enrolled at 
Rhodes University, 464 were ex-servicemen.861 Similarly at the University of Natal, 650 of the 1 950 
registrations were ex-servicemen.862 Eglin, having returned to the University of Cape Town to finish 
his degree, recalled that ex-servicemen were able to dominate the campus because they were “a 
few years older, more mature, and determined to make up for the academic years they had 
forfeited.”863 The soldiers soon exploited their maturity and experience to dominate student politics.  
For some ex-servicemen, war service did not only grant them the opportunity to obtain a university 
education, and thereby better their career prospects, but also provided them with the tools to 
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transform their wartime political awakening into nascent political careers. Ex-servicemen were an 
easily identified interest group on university campuses, which placed them in a position to 
consolidate control over leadership positions on Student Representative Councils (SRCs). They 
included Leo Marquard, Brian Bunting, Rusty Bernstein, Jock Isacowitz and Denis Etheredge. At the 
University of Natal, Hans Meidner, a Jewish ex-serviceman and former Prisoner of War (POW), 
became the president of the SRC.864 At Rhodes University, ex-servicemen, such as David 
Brokensha, Hamish Dickie-Clark, who had fought in Italy, Murray Carlin, a former POW captured in 
North Africa and Ian Smith, Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot and future Prime Minister of South Rhodesia, 
dominated the SRC. Thus, the ex-servicemen, by dominating the country’s various university SRCs, 
emulated their comrades that had participated in student politics before and during the war. 
However, the dominance of ex-servicemen in student bodies on various campuses did not 
necessarily mean a common agenda. Brokensha, as secretary to the Rhodes SRC, opposed Smith, 
the chairman of the SRC, on issues such as the admission of Black students and initiations.865 At 
the Wits, Schwarz, crossed swords with his classmate Slovo in the student political arena.866 The 
presence of Susser and other politicised ex-servicemen in the Wits Medical School led to the 
Afrikaans-medium student paper, Spore, to declare the Medical School the heart of “Jewish 
Negrophilism” in university student politics.867 Thus, despite the fight against antisemitism and 
fascism, during the war antisemitism was still prevalent in South African society, a condition that kept 
the Jewish ex-servicemen engaged in politics. Thus, the post-war universities not only provided ex-
servicemen with access to professional occupations and the means to fund their future political 
careers, but also a platform to develop their political voices. 
The selected ex-servicemen did not restrict their political involvement to universities after the war, 
they also became committed in the broader political discourse. The ex-servicemen who did not enrol 
in a university after the war made use of other platforms to pursue their political goals.868 For 
instance, Wolfie Kodesh immediately became “…involved in politics up to …[his] neck”.869 Both the 
SL and the CPSA provided ex-servicemen platforms to counter growing NP political coercion. Ex-
servicemen, under the umbrella of the SL, moved to prevent a 1945 NP conference in Johannesburg. 
Bunting recalled these events: 
It was a very busy period after the war, soldiers coming back and so on, … I don’t know whether 
you remember the occasion when the Legion organised the campaign to get the Nationalist 
conference driven out of Johannesburg, They organised a huge mob which besieged the town 
hall, and they got them driven out. Eventually the police said well, you’ve got to close down the 
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conference and get out, because we can’t guarantee your safety! And that was the mood of the 
ex-soldiers at the time; they were very militant and very angry, and there was a lot of political work 
going on amongst them.870 
The tension between the ex-servicemen and the NP continued to fester on the streets as the 1948 
elections approached. In the Transvaal, Slovo experienced this violence in his work for the CPSA: 
…organised Fascism was once again beginning to show itself some years before the Nationalist 
victory in 1948. The City Hall steps increasingly became a physical battleground between 
defenders of the platform and the thugs who were given free reign by the token police contingent 
in the vicinity. Under the command of ex-servicemen such as George Clayton, Monty Berman 
and Jack Hodgson, we organised ourselves into defence squads, with fixed positions on the 
“battlefield”.871 
Ex-servicemen, like Slovo, associated these political clashes with the war. They saw themselves as 
continuing to carry out their military duty. Thus, they often used military rhetoric to describe its 
intensity. 
It was not only members and supporters of the CPSA that viewed the political tensions and violence 
in military terms. The UP attracted many ex-servicemen and believed that “It is traditionally a soldier’s 
privilege to grumble, but equally it is traditional to know where his duty lies”.872 Ex-servicemen rallied 
to protect UP meetings from nationalist disruptions. For instance, in the build-up to the 1948 
elections, Sir De Villiers Graaff, as a prominent UP leader in the Cape, recalled that “political 
meetings could get pretty rough and there was an awful lot of organised heckling which led to bouts 
of fisticuffs”.873 By 1948 the NP organisers led by FC Erasmus and PW Botha, had so disrupted the 
UP’s campaign in the Cape, that Graaff had to mobilise “a group of ex-servicemen led by Major John 
Newman”874 to thwart the NP efforts. Ex-servicemen within political parties found their shared ex-
serviceman identity useful to mobilise ordinary ex-servicemen for these electioneering activities.  
Ex-servicemen’s support for the UP and the LP, which maintained an electoral alliance, was not only 
based on a general distaste for the NP or an attraction to what these parties represented, but also 
out of a combination of wartime loyalty and historical family dynasties.875 Graaff, for instance, 
believed that his military credentials had provided him with a strong support base in the countryside: 
… having served in the 6th mounted regiment, which was recruited from the Cape and included 
people from the Orange River to the far Eastern Cape, and also with the Middellandse Regiment 
which was recruited largely from the Karoo and the Eastern Cape, there was hardly a town or 
village in which there was not somebody who had served with me and knew me. In fact in many 
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small villages our committees consisted almost entirely of old comrades who had decided to come 
in and give a hand.876  
Prominent ex-servicemen in politics, such as Graaff, used the appeal of familiarity of shared 
memories and regimental affiliations to transform their social capital from the military field into the 
political field. Their support base was thus probably built more on personal loyalties than particular 
political principles. 
As stated previously, apart from shared war experience, family connections also came into play. The 
UP and its supporters emphasised the political lineage of their leaders, with the establishment of 
family political dynasties. For example, Dr Jan Steytler’s constituents expected him to follow his 
father in politics. He recalled that “…the chaps then came to me and asked me whether I wouldn’t 
be the candidate, because my father used to be in politics before he had died.”877 
Graaff, whose family’s political credentials had placed him in the heart of the UP, maps out the 
interlocking family connections within the Cape branch of the UP: 
Col Hannes Faure, a brilliant fighter pilot in World War II, and son of Senator Albie Faurie…was 
a big influence among the Malays.878 
My divisional chairman…was none other than J.P. Niehaus of the Strand, who had been my uncle 
Jacobus’s election agent……and was the father of Percy Niehaus, who later led the United Party 
in South West Africa.879  
Thus, after the war, many of the returning ex-servicemen who supported or joined the UP did so 
more out of family obligation, loyalty to fellow ex-servicemen or because Smuts and the UP 
embodied the dominant hegemonic perspective in opposition to the tainted nationalist NP. 
Demobilisation from the war had reinserted ex-servicemen into the South African political arena. For 
the radicalised ex-servicemen, the post-war society to which they had returned was rift with violence 
and political coercion. The tension between their wartime idealism and the coercive nature of post-
war politics gave urgency to their political activism. However, for many who re-entered politics in the 
centralist UP treated the coercive methods of the NP at the hustings as a mere distraction. The next 
section covers how the politicised SL transitioned from a soldiers’ interest group into a political ex-
serviceman’s movement. 
4.2.2 Springbok Legion  
As previously discussed, the SL was the most prominent political veteran organisation that had 
developed during the war and provided ex-servicemen with a sense of continuity in activism after 
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their demobilisation.880 Various ex-servicemen whether leftist, communist, radical, or liberal had 
joined the SL while fighting at the front. They saw the potential that the SL offered them to advance 
their own political goals. Radical left ex-servicemen, who had been active in the SL during the war, 
reaffirmed their commitment to the SL after their demobilisation. As Piet Beyleveld recalled, he 
became fully involved in ex-servicemen politics after his discharge from the military: 
I’d just come back from the Army. I was involved in the Springbok Legion (SL) in 1948 I was a 
member of the National Executive of the SL Shortly after 1948 I become National Chairman of 
the SL.881 
Like Beyleveld other ex-servicemen such as Kodesh also tapped into the SL network upon their 
return to South Africa.  
The increase in the CPSA’s influence within the post-war Legion led the communists to believe that 
they could use the SL as a proxy organisation, to garner prestige for themselves, to attract members 
for the CPSA and to launch an inter-racial united front against the government.882 Table 4.2 shows 
the communist affiliations of prominent legionnaires, indicating the overlap between the CPSA and 
the SL. Legionnaires that had held prominent positions in the CPSA included Bernstein, Jack 
Hodgson, John O’Meara and Carneson. 
Table 4.2: The Springbok Legion and communist associated Legionnaires (n=153)883 
Ethno-linguistic group Communist Legionnaires Springbok Legion 
Afrikaans speaking 1 3 
English-speaking 9 14 
Jewish 8 16 
Total 18 32 
 
Apart from using the SL as a vehicle to attract support, the war had also given the CPSA a new lease 
on life. Added to this, some in the CPSA interpreted Smuts’s acceptance of the Soviet Union as a 
wartime ally, as tolerance for communism which further increased party membership. Such factors 
assisted the CPSA to penetrate the White electorate, garnering 11 per cent of the vote in the 1943 
elections.884 
However, this support was deceptive as the CPSA’s appeal to the ex-servicemen was not always 
for reasons of a shared communist ideology. The CPSA provided a home for those uncomfortable 
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in the White political hegemony. Bernstein, for example, had initially joined the CPSA because he 
was “expelled from the Labour Party for sort of being on the leftwing opposition group inside the 
Labour Party … So …[he] had nowhere else to go”.885 Others joined the CPSA for its non-racial 
manifesto, “because it was the only non-racial political organisation available at that time…”886 
According to Hymie Basner, a former CPSA member, some ex-servicemen joined the CPSA for a 
combination of reasons:  
… [t]here was no possible party to which a progressive young South African, whether he was a 
Marxist or … of moderate liberal views, if he wanted to work in an organised group … against 
racialism, if he wanted to work even for common social decency, never mind about world 
revolution of South African revolution … there was no room for him to work in any organisation at 
that time except the communist movement. And during that period hundreds of middle-class youth 
who would normally, in other countries would be joining the Labour Party or the Liberal Party, say 
in England or in France … would join the Communist Party.887  
According to Leo Kuper, a liberal ex-serviceman who became a professor at the University of Natal, 
the non-racialist affiliation of the CPSA led to “the progressive redefinition of communism as 
synonymous with non-discrimination on the basis of race or colour”.888 Thus, buoyed by a broad 
membership and supporters, a core group of ex-servicemen in the CPSA sought to exploit the 
intersection between the SL and the CPSA. 
The emergence of an identifiable communist caucus within the Legion had not gone unnoticed and 
had led to one of the founder’s, Vic Clapham’s, resignation from the SL’s National Executive in 
1945/6 and the Legion itself in 1948.889 Similarly, Isacowitz, the chairman of the Legion and a wartime 
member of the CPSA, also became “increasingly unhappy” with the growing “totalitarianism” in the 
post-war CPSA which “offended…[his] conscience”.890 By 1946 he had left the CPSA but retained 
the chairmanship of the SL until 1951.891 Isacowitz thereby was able to temper the communist 
influence in the SL by being the most prominent liberal voice in this organisation.892 
However, the increased prominence of communist soldiers among the SL’s leadership after the war 
led to the opponents of the Legion accusing it of communist sympathies.893 During the 1946 African 
mineworkers strike in which CPSA-aligned legionnaires participated, the government accused the 
SL, of being the “military wing of the [Communist] party”.894 The increasingly radical voice of the SL’s 
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post-war leadership confirmed that communists had infiltrated the SL.895 Despite the radical, non-
racial nature of the SL and the steady increase in the CPSA’s influence, the SL under the leadership 
of Isacowitz, tread an uncertain path between communism and partisan politics in the build-up to the 
1948 elections.896 
In the 1948 elections, the SL chose to play a supportive role, rather than push for a radical agenda 
for the establishment of a Soldiers’ Party. In the build-up to the 1948 elections, the SL argued that 
the UP-LP alliance was the preferred vehicle to defeat the Nationalists.897 At the SL’s Special 
National Conference in September 1947, the SL wed the NPs previous association with Fascism, to 
race relations and called for a united front in the elections:  
We are convinced that a victory for the HNP and its associated groups in the forthcoming General 
Election would be against the national interest, and would be a set-back to the principle for which 
the LEGION stands. We are not prepared to forget or to forgive the attitude which the HNP 
followed during the war…. We regard its policy of national isolation and racial antagonism and its 
undemocratic tendencies to be disastrous for the future of our country… We therefore call on the 
United Party, the Labour Party, and all progressive bodies and individuals to arrange a common 
front in the face of this reactionary challenge, and to fight the General Election on an organised, 
united basis.898 
Based on this call, the SL encouraged its members to “join and work in the political party of their 
choice”899 and provided both parties with a disciplined workforce against the NP.900 The SL had also 
hoped that election work would revitalise its flagging membership.901 Despite coming under 
increased CPSA control and experiencing dwindling membership, the SL still believed that it could 
marshal ex-servicemen against the NP in the elections. 
4.3 THE 1948 ELECTIONS 
4.3.1 The impact of the 1948 general election on ex-servicemen 
The defeat of the centralist UP in the 1948 general election was met with shock and disbelief by 
many ex-servicemen. Len Lee-Warden was at a theatre the night of the NP victory: 
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One evening in 1948 whilst watching a film at a local cinema we were shocked to read a flash 
announcement that interrupted the picture to inform us that General Smuts had been defeated at 
the polls and that the Nationalists were in power…902 
The failure of the efforts made by these men whether members of the CPSA, SL, the UP or LP to 
fight the NP, amplified these feelings of frustration and defeat. Additionally, the defeat at the polls of 
their military Commander-in-Chief, Smuts, added another layer of disillusionment. 
Further disbelief surfaced amongst ex-servicemen. They had enlisted to fight against German and 
Italian fascism on foreign soil. They won that war. However, a similar war on the home front was lost. 
They had failed in their military duty on the political battlefield to defeat the fascist tinged-NP. As 
Susser noted, “The years spent at war against Nazism and Fascism sharpened the obligation to 
oppose the ...[NP].” In 1948, the victory of their ideological imitators was all the more bitter.903  
The events of 1948 shocked many ex-servicemen, who had been politically inactive after the war, 
into political action. As Peter Brown explained, “it was the ongoing impact of Nationalist rhetoric and 
the beginnings of them putting into effect their policies that provided us with the push to start 
wondering what we should be doing”.904 Schwarz, similarly recounted that:  
… when the Nationalist Party won the general elections in 1948, I decided that I thought that I 
should go into politics. I was then a student. I was a [sic.] ex-serviceman. I had served in the 
South African Airforce, and I regarded the Nationalist Party as being a party that had been 
opposed to the war effort, and I therefore regarded them as being opposed to my ideology on that 
very simplistic basis in 1948 when I was a student.905 
Days after the election defeat, Eglin approached the MP for Pinelands, RJ du Toit, and told him that 
“I wanted to start working to get rid of the Nats. I joined the United Party; I was put on the committee 
in Pinelands.”906 Others only joined this struggle after the NP began imposing its policies. As Kosie 
Marais explained, it was the association of NP policies with that of Adolf Hitler’s that motivated him 
to enter politics in 1953:907 
…the actions of the current Broederbond government has convinced me that they are dragging 
the country down the same path as Hitler did with Germany, and therefore I am making myself 
available as the UP candidate for the George constituency.908  
Similarly, Gideon Jacobs evoked Second World War Nazism to explain his entry into politics in 1960, 
indicating the tenacity of both the anti-fascist rhetoric and the taint of Nazism on the NP: 
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How often did not in postwar Germany [sic.] hear children ask their parents: ‘What did you do to 
stop the Hitler regime?’ We thought our children would one day ask us a similar question. We 
wanted to be in a position to give a positive reply.909 
The NP’s dalliance with Fascism before and during the war, coupled with the vigour of their post-war 
rhetoric, evoked strong memories among many ex-servicemen. The forebodings that the NP 
government would plunge South Africa into a fascist dystopia, similar to what Nazism did in 
Germany, animated several ex-servicemen into political action. Some continued to politically oppose 
the NP by supporting the Legion while others formally joined political parties, and some took the fight 
to Parliament as MPs. 
4.3.2 Ex-servicemen in the 10th Parliament (1948-1953) 
The 1948 election’s impact on ex-servicemen extended beyond attitudes and motivations to enter 
the sphere of political activism. The election results also ushered in a shuffling of parliamentary 
seats. Table 4.3 shows the ex-servicemen that became MPs in the 10th Parliament. The 1948 
General Election delivered 11 ex-servicemen to Parliament as opposition MPs, six of whom retained 
their seats. Of the six MPs that retained their seats, three, Henry Gluckman, the former Minister of 
Health, Harold Tothill and Bernard Freidman, served in the SAMC in South Africa while retaining 
their seats in Parliament. Two, Frank Waring and James Hamilton-Russell, used their early 
discharge from the UDF to contest the 1943 elections. Albert Robinson secured his parliamentary 
seat by winning the 1947 Langlaagte by-election. Additionally, in 1950 Rupert Pilkington-Jordan 
(UP), Phillip Moore (UP) and Leo Lovell (LP) won by-elections, and in 1951 Robert Badenhorst-
Durrant (UP) increased ex-servicemen representation in Parliament further.910 Shared war 
experience resulted in the raw ex-servicemen MPs (Graaff, Robinson, Harry Oppenheimer and 
Thomas Gray-Hughes) drifting together, and they soon met for weekly lunch meetings to discuss 
political problems.911 Thus, a shared ex-serviceman identity smoothed the integration of ex-
servicemen into parliamentary politics.  
In terms of military service, Table 4.3 indicates the rank and wartime experience of the MPs in the 
selected group. Most of the ex-servicemen MPs shared a similar experience of the war with eight 
recipients of the Africa Star, and only one Italy Star. Four senior officers, Colonel Pilkington-Jordaan, 
Deputy Adjutant General of the UDF, Colonel Gluckman, Minister of Health, Major Moore, and Major 
Freidman, did not deploy outside of South Africa. Wartime MP’s include, Tothill, Gluckman, Waring, 
Albert Robinson, Hamilton-Russel and Friedman. These men, with five senior officers and nine junior 
officers in their ranks, used their social capital accrued during the war to further enhance their political 
careers. Thomas Gray-Hughes was the single senior NCO. 
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Colonel - - - 1 2 2 
Lieutenant Colonel 1 - - - - 1 
Major - - - 1 2 2 
Captain 3 1 1 1 - 5 
Lieutenant 2 - - 3 - 3 
Sergeant  1 - 1 - - 1 
Unknown 1 - - - - 1 
 
The UP used the ex-servicemen in Parliament to launch a broadside attack on the NP on defence 
issues. Ex-servicemen such as Graaff, Moore, Badenhorst-Durrant, Pilkington-Jordaan and Howard 
Henwood badgered the Minister of Defence with pointed parliamentary questions based on their 
military knowledge and contacts.913 For instance, in September 1949, Oppenheimer observed that 
Erasmus was more concerned about removing the ‘Red Tab’ from the Permanent Force uniform 
than the defence implications of the Soviet Union acquiring an atomic bomb.914 The Active Citizen 
Force (ACF) units resisted the removal of this symbolic reference of their involvement in the war, 
and 22 ACF regiments were still wearing it as late as 1952.915 The LP MP, Lovell, as a member of 
the SL National Executive Committee (NEC), used his time in Parliament to champion for Coloured 
rights when the NP attempted to disenfranchise the Coloured voters.916 The presence of ex-
servicemen in Parliament exposed the NP’s and Erasmus’, as Minister of Defence, ignorance of 
military matters. The NP’s obliviousness of military niceties would later contribute to the mobilisation 
of the ex-servicemen in opposition to NP actions.  
4.4 THE RISE AND FALL OF VETERAN POLITICS 1948-1953  
Soon after winning the 1948 elections, the NP started implementing changes and policies. As Lee-
Warden noted, the UP defeat would result in the reversal of many of the UP’s progressive wartime 
reforms; “We did not have to wait long before the government made known its intentions to halt the 
many social changes that the Smuts government had planned to institute and indeed in many cases 
to reverse the process.”917 
The NP openly opposed the liberal reforms that had been implemented by the Smuts government 
and set about undoing any integration of both White society and South African society at large. The 
association of the NP undoing the work of Smuts, their former general during the war, thus added a 
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further blow to the ex-servicemen. Also, in June 1948, the NP confirmed ex-servicemen’s perception 
that the Nationalists held Nazi sympathies when they released Robey Leibbrandt and other 
Ossewabrandwag (OB) prisoners. The rehabilitation of Liebbrandt prompted the creation of 
numerous ex-servicemen committees which co-operated with the UP and LP to organise protest 
meetings in Johannesburg and Durban in June 1948.918 
Further legislative reforms by the NP stimulated substantial debate and action among ex-
servicemen. On 10 June 1948, Eben Dönges, the Minister of Justice, provided one of the first 
indicators of the racist dystopia the NP were advocating when he moved to repeal part II of the 1946 
Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act.919 Shortly afterwards, on 19 August 1948, the defence 
community was directly affected when Erasmus announced the disbanding of the Native Military 
Corps and the Cape Corps.920 The disarming and exclusion of Blacks from the defence 
establishment was the forerunner of the exclusion of Blacks from the broader political sphere.  
To further aggrieve serving military personnel, Erasmus appointed Colonel Rudolph Hiemstra as his 
military advisor within weeks of the 1948 elections. Hiemstra had refused to take the Red Oath and 
now returned to the UDF at an elevated rank.921 Other non-oath takers, such as Major JSJ van der 
Merwe, were also rehabilitated by Erasmus to the scorn of ex-servicemen. Ex-servicemen saw these 
promotions and reforms as a slight to their war service, which resulted in a constant stream of 
parliamentary questions demanding detailed information on the running of the UDF.922 Erasmus’s 
efforts to side-line war veterans in the UDF and erase the memory of the war further pushed many 
ex-servicemen into opposition politics. 
Alongside defence reforms and repressive legislation, the NP continued to violently disrupt 
opposition political meetings beyond the 1948 elections. During the by-elections, UP and LP 
politicians depended on ex-servicemen for both political canvassing and the physical protection on 
the hustings, thereby drawing the ex-servicemen into a closer relationship with the opposition 
alliance. The SL attempted to provide electoral support in the 1949 by-elections of Mayfair and 
Vereeniging.923 When NP supporters threatened to violently disrupt UP meetings in the Newlands 
by-elections in 1950-51, a former POW, Colonel Boardman, suggested to Louis Kane-Berman to 
rally ex-servicemen to protect the UP speaker, Blaar Coetzee. A group of 300 ex-servicemen and 
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Wits Students rallied to the call. It was not long before the local NP supporters stormed their 
positions.924  
In Parliament, a dislocated UP battled to deliver active opposition to the NP. The comprehensiveness 
of the defeat in the rural constituencies in the Transvaal had fixated the UP on winning back the 
platteland vote, which required appealing to the conservative Afrikaner voter.925 In 1948, Jan 
Hofmeyr lamented:  
Must we try to compete with the Nats. in the appeal to colour prejudice? If so, can we hope to 
defeat them? Or else must we come out boldly with a liberal policy? If so, does that not mean 
giving up the hope of winning back the Platteland?926 
Many of the politically aware ex-servicemen also openly criticised the UP for neglecting the more 
liberal urban constituencies in favour of the more conservative rural voters. Marquard had already 
warned in 1946, that “the United Party is frightening off its possible friends by vainly trying to attract 
its known enemies”.927 Kane-Berman lamented that “[t]he tragedy of the UP was that in its concern 
to woo the platteland it was prepared to sacrifice principle”.928 The UP, in opposition, continued on 
the road of compromise, allowing the NP to dictate the political discourse.  
The death of Hofmeyr in 1948 left the already dislocated UP to be rudderless. The SL claimed that 
the UP had “apparently decided that the reactionary policies of the Nats, were what the people 
wanted. Since they had no clearly defined political convictions, it was not difficult to forsake the ideas 
and memory of Hofmeyr and ape the Nats.”929 Thus the 1948 elections, despite animating ex-
servicemen against the NP, had left the UP in disarray. 
Eglin, who joined the UP in 1948 had experienced the disarray in the UP, “[m]orale was low; 
organisation pathetic; policy and ideology were confused and ambivalent. In this situation, the old-
guard leadership looked for someone other than themselves to blame.”930 Vause Raw, an ex-
serviceman who had become a UP organiser in 1949, attributed this staleness of the UP ideas as a 
consequence of the war, which robbed the UP of young politicians: 
… after the war we had become a very old party. All of us who fought in the war had been out of 
politics for ten, twelve, fifteen years, or hadn’t come into it [in a way] we normally would, so the 
party had become an old party, because of the lack of [experience among the younger politicians 
who had fought in], the war… … A few came in forty-eight, like Div Graaff, and Albert Robertson 
and Harry Oppenheimer.931 
 
924  Wits Historical Papers, A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 2. 
925  White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 1948-1953’, 57. 
926  White, 57. 
927  Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, 29. 
928  Wits Historical Papers, A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 15. 
929  ‘This Does Not Fool Us... ...Nor Does This’, Fighting Talk (January 1950). 
930  Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power, 44. 
931  Wits Historical Papers, A2242 Hackland, ‘Interview with Vause Raw by B Hackland’. 
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Thus, the ex-servicemen, who had joined the UP, found a party cobbled together by pre-war 
alliances and loyalties, and in need of revitalisation and re-organisation. 
Apart from establishing a small caucus in Parliament, ex-servicemen thus slowly started to assume 
key positions in the UP. Oppenheimer and Graaff were almost immediately incorporated into the UP 
committees for finance and re-organisation respectively.932 By 1949 Bill Horak had been appointed 
the Administrative Secretary and the Secretary of the Division of Organisation.933 By 1950, Robinson 
chaired the Division of Fund Raising, and Graaff held the chair of the Division of Organisation. Graaff 
also served as the Chair of the Cape Province and was supported by John Bowring as the Secretary 
of the Cape Peninsula.934 Clapham, had become the technical director in the UP Information Division 
after his resignation from the Legion.935 Thus, these ex-servicemen had carved out an enclave within 
the UP administration. 
After Smuts’s withdrawal from party leadership in 1950, the subsequent contest for the leadership of 
the UP was resolved without much conviction in favour of Kosie Strauss, as Graaff chose to decline 
the nomination.936 Although Graaff believed his intentions were for the best, he had inadvertently 
weakened Strauss’ hand and had revealed the conservative faction in the party.937 Clifford Miles-
Warren, a UP MP, believed that the nature of the leadership contest marked the start of the end of 
the UP as he stated that “Strauss was elected leader but fifteen men had become marked men for 
daring to vote against his appointment. That fatal day was the start of the dissension within the 
party.”938 Graaff’s deference of Strauss’ ascent to the leadership of the UP accentuated the divisions 
and intrigues between the various constituent factions instead of revitalising the party. 
Arthur Barlow, a maverick politician and father-in-law of Waring, the ex-servicemen who later 
became the Minister of Sport in the NP government in 1962, believed Strauss had given the liberal 
wing of the UP more latitude than that which Smuts would have allowed. This in his opinion had 
made the liberals in the party more outspoken.939 In 1949, the conservatives, which included Barlow, 
and Waring, attempted to counter the leftward drift in the UP by consulting with DF Malan. The 
consultations were over the NP’s emerging plans to remove the Coloureds from the common voter’s 
roll, which could be seen as in defiance of Strauss. Graaff, along with Harry Lawrence and Gray-
Hughes represented the UP on the Select Committee on the Cape Coloured Vote. On Strauss’ 
instruction, they discretely lobbied the leader of the Afrikaner Party, Klasie Havenga, on the pretext 
 
932  White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 1948-1953’, 107. 
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934  UNISA-UP Archive, Central Head Office, Subject File 61, 62 (part 1), Congress 1952, ‘Eighth Union 
Congress United Party 19-20 November 1952’; White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 
1948-1953’, 239. 
935  White, 264. 
936  White, 186. 
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of discussing Friesland cattle.940 The Conservative UP MPs’ discussions with DF Malan led to Waring 
being broadly ostracised among the liberal camp with Jan Steytler referring to him as “a pathetic little 
chap”.941 Smuts’s withdrawal from the UP leadership and death in 1951 left Strauss with the growing 
challenge of reconciling the contradictions within the UP. 
The failure of the UP to present a unified front against the NP undermined their ability to oppose 
repressive legislation in Parliament.942 The ineffective UP, divided on how to reform to appeal to 
voters in by-elections led to a growth in White extra-parliamentary political activities.943 The UP’s 
vulnerability opened the door for the ex-servicemen under consideration to shore up the UP in 
opposition to the rising Nationalist star.  
4.4.1 The war veterans action committee/Torch commando 
The UP’s lacklustre and often divided parliamentary opposition to the NP opened the door for the SL 
to rally ex-servicemen against the NP. By October 1949, the SL had identified the impending removal 
of the Cape Coloured voters from the common voter’s roll, as a potential catalyst for political agitation 
against the NP. Towards the end of 1949, the Legion canvassed prominent stakeholders in 
Johannesburg for support.944 Both Smuts and Oppenheimer had shown interest in the SL’s idea. 
Oppenheimer had been “well disposed to the Legion and had promised to assist …”945 Furthermore, 
Smuts’s military status, ex-servicemen’s loyalty to him and his tacit support for the SL was used by 
legionnaires after Smut’s demise to promote the SL’s aims and garner further support. This can be 
seen for instance in the chairman’s report to the SL’s 9th Annual National Conference in 1952: 
General Smuts agreed with us …that the steps taken by the Nationalists to entrench themselves 
would one day call for a mighty extra-parliamentary struggle, … in order to crystallise the demand 
for a general election. General Smuts also agreed with us that the attempt to remove the Coloured 
voters from the common roll would be the most suitable issue for a wide-scale mobilisation of the 
opposition.946  
However, when DF Malan demurred from introducing legislation to address the Coloured vote in the 
1950 parliamentary sitting,947 the idea, without a trigger, was shelved.  
 
940  Graaff, Div Looks Back, 133. 
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In anticipation for the 1951 parliamentary session, the SL resurrected the idea and prepared its 
members to oppose the NP on the Coloured Franchise issue. In the December 1950 Fighting Talk, 
the SL’s mouthpiece warned its readers: 
The struggle will begin early in the year, when the Coloured vote legislation is introduced in 
Parliament. The government will attempt to prevent criticism and free speech generally, in and 
outside Parliament, on this vital question. The opposition will be tested inside Parliament; the 
South African public will be tested outside Parliament.948 
Legionnaires in rural towns must be prepared to take the initiative in forming an ad hoc committee 
of responsible people to run the campaign in their town or village.949  
In February 1951, the Separate Representation of Voters Bill was published for discussion in 
Parliament. In response, legionnaires Cecil Williams and Hodgson met with ex-legionnaire Clapham 
in April 1951 to discuss enlisting ex-servicemen to oppose the disenfranchisement of the Coloured 
community.950 Williams also discussed the idea with the leader of the UP, Strauss, in Cape Town on 
12 April 1951.951 The SL offered the UP access to the networks of ex-servicemen that the SL had 
already established during the 1948 National Elections and 1949 Provincial Elections.952 Thus, the 
SL hoped to revitalise the parliamentary opposition to the NP through former means.  
The SL was not alone in appealing to the ex-serviceman community. The UP organised its ex-
serviceman membership using a structure known as “the fives”,953 and Clapham, at the time of his 
meeting with Williams and Hodgson, had been organising a UP protest meeting planned for 23 April 
1951.954 Apart from the UP and the SL, another ad hoc committee of prominent ex-servicemen, 
which included Brigadier Fritz Adler, Ralph Parrott, Leo Kowarsky, John Wilson, Charles Bekker and 
Isacowitz, had been formed in Johannesburg and had lobbied Boardman and Kane-Berman to join 
their initiative to push for a mass meeting at the Johannesburg City Hall on 4 May 1951. The meeting 
was to protest the NP’s attempts to ‘violate the spirit of the constitution’.955 Clapham, seeing the 
usefulness of coordinating these initiatives, claims to have brought these groups together,956 and 
offered the UPs financial and organisational support.957 The ensuing War Veterans Action Committee 
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(WVAC), the precursor to the Torch,958 consolidated the planning for the protest meeting.959 On 4 
May 1951, the planned mass protest meeting was held in Johannesburg and drew more crowds than 
expected, with an estimated turnout of 20 000 spectators and 4 000 participants in the accompanying 
march past, which included contingents of ex-servicemen and women, university students and a 
column of Coloured ex-servicemen.960 On the same day, ex-servicemen held a similar protest in Port 
Elizabeth.961  
At the mass meeting on 4 May 1951, the principal speaker Group Captain (RAF) Sailor Malan962 
evoked the memory of the war to substantiate the need for action to protect the Coloured Franchise: 
The strength of this gathering is evidence that the men and women who fought in the war for 
freedom still cherish what they fought for. We are determined not to be denied the fruits of that 
victory. It is good to see this support in protest against the rape of the Constitution and the attack 
on our rights and liberties as free men. In Abyssinia, at Alamein and a score of bloody campaigns 
we won the right to a voice in our country’s affairs. And we are determined that our voice shall not 
only be heard but that it shall also be heeded. This bill has been foisted on us in the so-called 
name of the people - the broad will of the people. We do not like this Bill, and we are the people.963 
Although the meeting gave voice to the ex-servicemen’s growing political frustrations, it also 
articulated these emotions in terms of protecting the constitution, thereby committing the ex-
servicemen to protect the Coloured franchise.  
4.4.2 Steel commando 
Flushed with the success of the 4 May 1951 meeting, and buoyed by the support of ex-servicemen, 
the WVAC developed Isacowitz’s idea of petitioning Parliament directly on the constitutionality of the 
NP’s actions and to force the government’s hand for early elections.964 In further meetings held 
between 8 and 12 May 1951,965 the WVAC decided that:  
… a mass demonstration should be held in Cape Town where a petition in opposition to the 
proposed legislation was to be presented to Parliament. Committees of ex-servicemen were 
hastily convened in all the main towns. It was decided that vehicle convoys from Durban, 
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein should converge at the Marine Parade Cape 
Town on 21st May 1951.966 
 
958  It is difficult to determine when the WVAC became the Torch considering the inconsistencies in both 
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The planned campaign was called the Steel Commando. Ex-servicemen in Cape Town quickly 
responded to the momentum of the Transvaal WVAC. Gerald Gordon, a lawyer and former AES 
information officer, quickly formed a Cape Town branch on 15 May 1951, with Lee-Warden as 
organising secretary.967 Lee-Warden immediately took his annual leave to devote himself to the 
organisation of the march on Parliament. The UP in the Cape followed on Clapham’s promise of 
assistance when Hamilton-Russel, an ex-serviceman MP in the UP, provided the use of his office to 
the new-born Cape Branch.968 The WVAC sent Jacques Lorraine and Parrott to Cape Town to assist 
Lee-Warden and his committee with the preparations for the march. Williams, who was appointed 
the Adjutant of the Steel Commando,969 also kept Strauss informed of the developments.970 The 
Steel Commando campaign brought the WVAC, the UP and the SL together in close co-operation. 
The SL provided full-time organisers to run the logistics of the operation, and Clapham in the UP 
supplied vital information for the operation.971 During the build-up and execution of the Steel 
Commando campaign in May 1951, about a third of the WVAC executive had affiliations with the 
SL.972 As with any improvised and quickly formed initiative, the Steel Commando campaign 
represented a broad front of opposition to the NP. In the rank and file, many had wanted to storm 
Parliament to physically ‘throw out the nats.’ It seems that Isacowitz had sounded such an idea with 
John Lang.973 On the other extreme, others argued over the legalities of marching up a one-way 
street.974 Even the original idea to force an early election had become diluted when Graaff and 
Oppenheimer persuaded the organisers that the UP was not ready to capitalise on this demand.975 
Although the March to Parliament on 28 May 1951 drew ex-servicemen from across the country and 
the political spectrum into one movement, a singular act of ill-discipline resulted in the damage to 
the NG Church near Parliament. The NP pounced on this incident to accuse the WVAC of being a 
military threat and used the SL’s involvement to claim that the SL was the real organiser and thus 
the WVAC a communist front, an accusation that would later be used by the liberals in the WVAC 
against the SL.976 
The Steel Commando’s march on Parliament and the lingering possibility of a military insurrection, 
however, had unsettled the NP, with Prime Minister DF Malan warning later that year: 
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People contend that the Torch Commando [successor of the WVAC] will go a little way and then 
vanish. That is not my view. The Torch Commando is to be taken seriously because it had a 
military or semi-military character. Private Armies of that nature cannot be tolerated…If they make 
their appearance at Nationalist Party meetings as they have begun to do, you can well understand 
that there will be a reaction on the part of Nationalists …977  
Despite the Torch Commando’s (the Torch) dismissal of DF Malan’s concerns, Sailor Malan had 
initially toyed with the possibility of establishing “mobile, disciplined units” but was careful to 
emphasise that the Torch was “militant not military”.978 Furthermore, some of the WVAC members 
who later become part of the Torch’s leadership had previously in 1948 clandestinely recruited and 
trained military forces, albeit for a different purpose.  
In 1948, Lovell, Isacowitz, Korwarsky and Gordon had been at the forefront of the South African 
League for Haganah’s efforts to recruit and train South African Jewish volunteers to fight in the Israeli 
War of Independence. Korwarsky had established a Zionist military training camp on the Bacher’s 
farm in Krugersdorp. Gordon had done the same at Wemershoek in the Cape. Korwarsky, had also 
worked with his cousin Cecil Margo, a South African fighter ace who played a prominent role in the 
establishment of the Israeli Air Force, to train pilots for Israel at Palmietfontein near Germiston.979 
However, when Sailor Malan’s secret overtures to Major Keith Coster980 for possible access to the 
UDF ammunition dump at Ganspan were rebutted by Coster, Malan quickly dropped the idea of 
armed insurrection.981 Thus although the WVAC/Torch had the potential for armed insurrection, the 
leadership saw the wisdom of limiting themselves to using only constitutional means to protect the 
constitution.  
The urgency and speed of events, from the forming of the WVAC in April 1951, the organisation of 
the Steel Commando in May 1951, and the establishment of the War Veteran’s Torch Commando 
(later known as the Torch) in June 1951, opened the doors of the movement to competing interest 
groups. The WVAC-Torch’s origins had thus left the movement vulnerable to being subverted for 
short-term partisan objectives. The next sections explore the constituent parts’ contest for influence 
over the Torch. 
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4.4.3 Early contest for control of the war veterans’ action committee – Torch 
commando  
Ex-servicemen quickly cobbled the WVAC together in 1951 to provide a national focal point for the 
ever-increasing number of protest meetings around the country against the NP’s increasingly 
suppressive behaviour. After the mass response to the Steel Commando in May 1951, the WVAC 
convened a national conference at the Langham Hotel in Johannesburg on 28 June 1951, where the 
WVAC reconstituted itself as the War Veterans Torch Commando.982 The Torch had appealed to 
many groupings that wished to re-invigorate White politics after the 1948 elections. The movement’s 
mass appeal reflected the rich interconnectivity of veteran politics and the social networks of ex-
servicemen which meant that no single political entity was solely responsible for the Torch’s creation. 
Table 4.4 shows the rich interconnectivity that the leading Torchmen (Members of the Torch) had 
with the various political formations such as the SL, the UP and LP, and highlights the fault-lines in 
the WVAC-Torch that are discussed in the following section.  
Table 4.4: Rank grouping and political affiliation of the torch leadership cadre within the 
sample group (n=153)983 
Rank Torchmen UP members LP Members 
Springbok 
Legionnaires 
General Officers 6 3 - - 
Senior Officers  14 7 - - 
Junior Officers 27 11 - 6 
WO and Senior NCO 3 - - 1 
Junior NCO and Pte 11 1 2 3 
Unknown 2 - - 1 
Total 63 22 2 11 
 
The overlapping membership and loyalties of the leadership cadre of the WVAC-Torch led to the 
impression that origins of the Torch could be “attributed, to UP initiative, to the Springbok Legion, or 
to a group of leading English-speaking businessmen spearheaded by Anglo-American’s Harry 
Oppenheimer”.984 The following discussion investigates this belief further.  
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The speed and urgency of the formation of the WVAC and the Steel Commando in May 1951 had 
left the initial activities distributed across the offices of many organisations and individuals. Clapham 
explains: 
Because of the urgency of the moment, many of us drew on various organisational resources as 
a stop-gap measure during the fight against the vote Bill. I drew on the United Party. The 
Springbok Legion used its office and staff. Mr Kowarsky and others used the resources of private 
business undertakings and so on.985  
The looseness of these arrangements meant that the WVAC’s initial principles and programme of 
action had been a compromise between its constituent parts. The WVAC had crafted the initial 
message broadly enough to satisfy a diverse audience. Thus, the WVAC’s ambiguous appeal to war 
memories echoed of the ex-servicemen’s own struggle and vocalised their feelings. As a WVAC and 
later Torch spokesperson expressed, “the men who fought did so for principles they can only vaguely 
express. But we know that legislation like this is a direct negation of what we fought for …”986 When 
pushed for a policy statement from the Torch, Gordon was evasive. “Questions such as apartheid 
and the industrial Colour Bar are matters for political parties. The Torch is not a political party. It 
therefore is not required to deal with those questions.”987 Thus, when the WVAC- reconstituted as 
the Torch in June 1951 it preferred to cast itself as a mass movement that protected the constitution, 
leaving the articulation of detailed political positions to the UP. 
The WVAC-Torch’s declared division of labour focused on mobilising ex-servicemen against the NP. 
However, this did not dissuade the constituent partners and prominent individuals from swaying the 
WVAC-Torch political agenda. The initial involvement of the SL in the WVAC had allowed the 
infiltration of former CPSA members into subcommittees. Table 4.4 shows the rank differences 
between the UP supporters and the Springbok legionnaires, which suggests that where the UP was 
able to use the social capital of their members to dominate the national positions, the SL was better 
positioned to dominate the running of the lower level working committees. Ex-servicemen who had 
foreknowledge of the CPSA Trojan horse tactics were suspicious that these ex-servicemen would 
attempt to subvert the Torch. Schwarz, who had previously studied law with Slovo, “…first drew the 
attention of the Action Committee [WVAC] to their presence on certain committees.”.988  
To Clapham, it seemed that Springbok legionnaires “speak, act and vote as a bloc which has met 
and discussed committee strategy and tactics before W.V.A.C. meetings…[to] …swing the W.V.A.C. 
in line with Springbok Legion Policy.”989 For Clapham, the Legion’s behaviour was especially 
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irksome, as similar tactics had led to him leaving the SL in 1948.990 Clapham was indignant about 
removing the taint of the SL. As he noted, “The choice is clear: Get the Springbok Legion members 
off the committee - or keep them on [and] sound the death knell of the WVAC as an effective 
body…”991 Furthermore, the NP had linked the violence during the Steel Commando to the SL, and 
had labelled the WVAC as a communist front.992 In a WVAC meeting on 7 June 1951, Parrott and 
Major Jacob Pretorius, the Member of the Provincial Council for Roodepoort, used the sceptre of the 
Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 to successfully argue for the removal of the suspected SL 
members from the WVAC committees.993  
The SL’s expulsion from the Torch in 1951, coupled with the banning and disbanding of the CPSA 
the previous year in 1950, left the SL leadership without access to White parliamentary politics. The 
SL’s eviction from White politics meant that they were left to engage in multi-racial politics. SL’s 
support for the African National Congress (ANC) Defiance campaign in April 1952 positioned the 
Legion as the preferred White partner for the Congress movement. The SL used this goodwill to 
outmanoeuvre other liberals at the Darragh Hall meeting in November 1952 to become the White 
voice of multi-racial politics. Chapter 5 deals with the SL’s entry into multi-racial politics in 1952.  
The CPSA was not alone in infiltrating the WVAC-Torch. Clapham, almost taking a leaf out of the 
communists’ playbook, had ensured that UP supporters were present in all committees. He 
reassured Marais Steyn, “I am ex-officio on the main committee and on all sub-committees with an 
eye to the party’s interests…the whole outfit is well-larded with Party supporters, and I don’t think 
we need worry.”994 As shown in Table 4.4 above, the UP leveraged the social capital of the military 
ranks of its members to dominate the national committees. Thus, nationally the UP could direct 
WVAC-Torch decision-making. In the same spirit, Hamilton-Russel attended WVAC meetings to 
report the proceedings to Strauss secretly.995 Also, when the Torch formed regional committees after 
June 1951, many UP members rose to leadership positions. Eglin was “elected chairman of the 
Pinelands branch of the Torch and made the branch representative of the organisation’s Cape 
executive committee”.996 In the Cape Province, Marais chaired the Robertson Torch before standing 
in the 1953 parliamentary elections,997 and Willem Steytler, brother of Jan Steytler, was the chair of 
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the Burgersdorp Torch and the UP Branch in Rebelhoek.998 Thus, the UP having inserted its 
members into the Torch, soon viewed the Torch as merely an extension of itself. 
Despite Clapham’s reassurances that the UP could effectively influence the WVAC-Torch, another 
UP actor had also unobtrusively infiltrated the national leadership of the WVAC-Torch. Throughout 
the life of the Torch, Oppenheimer had made repeated efforts to monitor and influence the Torch. At 
the onset of the WVAC in May 1951 he pushed for his private secretary, Sailor Malan, to lead in a 
figurehead role, to check the Legion’s leftist influence.999 The ex-servicemen unanimously elected 
Sailor Malan as the National President of the Torch at the Inaugural national conference at the 
Langham Hotel in Johannesburg on 28 June 1951.1000 Oppenheimer never doubted Sailor Malan’s 
loyalty to the UP, with Malan believing that the “… movement might well throw up some useful talent 
for the Party.”1001 Sailor Malan, once in play, often consulted with Oppenheimer and the UP on Torch 
matters.1002 Oppenheimer also extended his influence over two other Torch organisers, Etheredge, 
who had come to the Torch via the SL, and Keith Acutt, an employee of Anglo-American, who Kane- 
Berman accused of being “the eyes and ears of Oppenheimer.”1003 Etheredge had come under 
Oppenheimer’s patronage in May 1951, when he had accepted part-time employment at Anglo-
American to fund his doctoral studies.1004 Oppenheimer’s final lever came about in 1952 when he 
began financing the Torch Activities.1005  
In or about 1952 I [Kane Berman] was approached by Mr Oppenheimer who suggested that the 
Torch Commando should not dissipate its efforts in fund raising … Except for regional appeals 
and small fetes, the Torch abandoned its appeal to the business community. This was, in 
retrospect, my first major blunder. It was wrong to say, as has been frequently suggested that the 
Torch was financed by the Anglo American Corporation.1006  
Oppenheimer’s indirect involvement, however, led the NP to accuse the Torch of being funded by 
the United South Africa Trust Fund and cited the presence of Sailor Malan and Acutt as further 
evidence of the involvement of ‘Oppenheimer Ltd.’1007 After the Torch had imploded in 1953, the 
appointment of Acutt and Etheredge to Anglo-American offices in Salisbury Rhodesia confirmed 
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Oppenheimer’s influence and gave credence to the idea that Anglo-American played an instrumental 
part in the Torch.1008 
Control for the ideals of the Torch was further complicated by the Torch’s Natal Region, which came 
into existence on a different trajectory as the Transvaal and Cape Regions, and persistently 
undermined the national focus of Sailor Malan. Where the Transvaal and Cape regions mobilised 
around resistance for the removal of the Coloured Franchise, the Natal regions were more concerned 
over the possibility of the government declaring a Republic. They saw the Coloured Franchise as 
only the first step by the NP to remove the equal status of English and Afrikaans and eventually the 
declaration of a Republic. The Natal leadership included prominent ex-servicemen, such as Arthur 
Selby, a retired British General, Gillie Ford, Leo Caney, Roger Brickhill and Reverend James Chutter, 
who were loyal to the concept of union.1009 They were also especially wary of the UP leader in Natal, 
Douglas Mitchell, who in turn distrusted the Torch.1010 To prevent the diluting of their concerns, they 
conceived the idea of the ‘Natal Stand’, which stated that Natal would break away from South Africa 
on the declaration of a South African Republic. They carefully marshalled the Torch into supporting 
their declaration, despite opposition from Sailor Malan. The ensuing tensions in Natal over the ‘Natal 
Stand’ did not only divide the Torch, but also contributed to a continued anti-Republican streak in 
Natal.1011  
Like the SL, liberals also hoped that participation in the Torch would provide them with a means to 
swing the UP towards more liberal policies. Marquard, a distinguished liberal who headed the AES, 
explained: 
Liberals threw themselves heart and soul into the movement but never thought it was a liberal 
movement … The Torch Commando could never be a liberal movement but it could scare the 
UP; it certainly did scare the Nationalists; put new heart into the opposition; it gave many non-
whites the feeling that all whites were not illiberal; and it might just possibly accustom a few more 
people to liberal ideas.1012  
The speed of its inception and the pace by which it grew meant despite efforts by the various actors 
to control the movement, the Torch would quickly develop independence of action.1013 Furthermore, 
the intrigues surrounding the control of the Torch indicated that although the ex-serviceman identity 
provided a unifying banner, the ex-servicemen community did not share a homogenous political 
disposition, which the following section explores. 
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4.4.4 The Torch in the United Democratic Front 
On the removal of the taint of the SL from the WVAC and the WVAC reconstitution as the Torch in 
June 1951, Sailor Malan and Kane-Berman, began the setting up of committees in towns and ‘dorps’ 
across the country in order to “…oust nationalist government by all constitutional means”.1014 The 
Torch would use these committees to support the UP and LP in electioneering. In the wake of the 
1951 Municipal elections, the UP and the Torch had agreed on 8 November 1951 that “…the services 
of the [Torch] Commando could be used in canvassing, registration, deletion, clerical and other 
organisational work in collaboration with and to supplement the efforts of the [United] Party”.1015 
Almost immediately, Torch members were critical of the UP, claiming that UP public representatives 
were “poor and lack public confidence” and that the party lacked “a definite constructive policy on 
many important issues and is much given to deliberate vagueness in order to appeal to rural and 
urban electorates”.1016 To make matters worse, the Torch felt that the old guard within the UP was 
smug and sentimental, and in turn, the UP was irritated by the involvement of the Torch in 
electioneering.1017  
In 1952, the UP and Torch expanded the previously mentioned agreement of 8 November 1951 to 
include the UP, LP and the Torch in an election pact despite the reservations of Parrott and Kane-
Berman.1018 In early April 1952, Kane-Berman and Parrott held a meeting with Strauss and Graaff of 
the UP, where the UP agreed not to oppose the LP in the upcoming election the following year only 
if the Torch agreed to the formation of a United Democratic Front (UDF or the Front), also referred 
to as the Front or the United Front.1019 Later that month, on 16 April 1952, Strauss surprised the LP 
by announcing that the UP, LP and Torch had agreed to form a United Democratic Front to fight 
against the government.1020 That same evening in Greenside Johannesburg, Kane-Berman in an 
independent press briefing threatened to call a day of national protest if the NP attempted 
unconstitutional action. Kane-Berman warned that the Torch might take further unspecified actions 
“… as good soldiers we must have something in reserve.”1021 Such independent action was not 
welcomed by the UP who viewed the Torch as a mere subsidiary. 
Later that year (August 1952), Kane-Berman’s independent streak led to a secret meeting between 
Graaff and Oppenheimer of the UP and a Torch delegation headed by Kane-Berman to “explore the 
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possibility of the two organisations merging.”1022 While the Torch pushed the UP to reform, the UP 
pressured the Torch to ‘depoliticise’ and attempted to secure the resignation of Kane- Berman.1023 
The meeting was also used as a platform for establishing machinery for coordination for the 
upcoming elections.1024 Despite some agreements over principles for a merger, nothing more came 
of the idea.1025 The relationship between the UP and Torch was exposing the fractious nature of the 
political views of prominent ex-servicemen. 
Once the Torchmen began working alongside the UP organisers in 1952, the UP’s organisational 
problems on the ground became more apparent. The UP had not addressed the issues that the 
Torch had raised during the November 1951 agreement, which added further strain between the UP 
and the Torch. On the ground in Cape Town, Eglin describes the challenges that the Torch faced as 
“The Commando was shocked at the state of disarray they found in many UP formations, and 
frustrated by the old-fashioned approach that many of the old-guard office-bearers had to effective 
organisation.”1026  
Working with the UP blunted the Torch’s mass non-partisan appeal and disillusioned many of its 
liberal leaders:  
The process is very disillusioning both for Torch’s leaders and the 234,000 supporters, none of 
whom has had any reason to be overconfident that the United Party has the drive, magnetism, or 
even the right machinery to capture the 1953 electorate majority.1027 
The Torch leadership were concerned over the UP attempts to side-line the LP in the Front, as it 
undermined the Torch’s non-partisan appeal. Furthermore, the Torch had hoped that the 
sympathetic Nationalist voters, who would not vote UP, could be persuaded to vote Labour. The 
Torch, therefore, opposed the UP’s attempt to contest seats against the LP.1028 In Natal, many who 
had joined the Torch to protect Natalian interests distrusted the UP and saw Natal’s rights and Torch 
ideals sacrificed to UP electoral expediency, which eventually contributed to the derailing of the 
Torch.1029 Thus the Front, instead of fostering co-operation between the members, only served to 
expose how morbid the UP election machinery had become. 
Despite frustrations and reservations from the Torch, it provided support to both the UP and LP 
during the 1953 elections. The Torch provided 15 full-time organisers, 5 000 cars and 60 000 
canvassers to help the candidates of the Front.1030 The use of military jargon, code words and 
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organised vehicle convoys attracted support and allowed the ex-servicemen to relive the excitement 
of war service and contributed to a sense of purpose in support of the Front. 
In the Torch Commando we set up a system of communication and mobilisation based on chain 
of telephone calls. In Pinelands we could get a convoy of up to thirty fully laden motor cars to 
assemble at a pre-determined rendezvous once a few words of a coded password had been sent. 
Morale was high, and the spirit de corps was good. Ex-servicemen relived the spirit of 
camaraderie and unity of purpose of the war.1031 
The Torch not only supported the parties to canvass and register new voters but also protected their 
meetings from NP disruption, which often turned violent and resulted in casualties on the political 
battlefield.1032 As Eglin and Kane-Berman recalled:  
The hall was overflowing with Nats, and the atmosphere was tense. We posted some well-built 
men from the Torch Commando in strategic positions in the hall to deal with any scuffles.1033 
A Torch/United Front meeting in the Johannesburg suburb of Vrededorp in June 1952 was so 
violently attacked that between 80 and 100 people had to be treated by doctors on site, while 32 
were taken to hospital. Iron bars and sticks with nails in them were used in this attack.1034 
In the George constituency, where Torchman Marais ran against the NP’s most effective 
electioneerer, Botha, matters got so out of hand at an election meeting at Karatara, that Marais drew 
a pistol in defence of his family, earning himself the nickname ‘Koos pistool’. At a subsequent 
meeting at the George showgrounds, Marais and his election manager and fellow Torchman, Major 
General James Mitchell-Baker, had to be escorted away under police protection.1035 The Front, 
despite internal disputes, presented a unified opposition to the NP in the build-up to the 1953 election 
campaign. However, two issues remained unresolved between the UP and the Torch, namely the 
issue of Republic and the growing need to engage in multi-racial politics. The next section covers 
these issues.  
4.5 PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
Two principle issues plagued the smooth running of the Front from its inception, namely the 
establishment of a Republic and race relations. Ford and the Natal Torch pushed the anti-Republican 
stance and Kane-Berman triggered the race relations issue.  
4.5.1 The Natal stand 
Ford was one of the more influential Torchmen in Natal as the chairman of the larger of the two Natal 
regions, namely the Coastal Region. He had developed a dislike for the ‘wishy-washy’ policies of the 
UP and had identified racial and linguistic differences as vantage points from which he could launch 
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a bold political move.1036 His solution would aim to both refute the increasingly centralist tendencies 
of the UP and oppose Apartheid. Within the Natal Torch, Chutter, the Chairman of the smaller Inland 
Region, and Brickhill, the Natal Torch organiser, supported Ford.1037 Their views placed the Natal 
Torch at variance with the National efforts to create a Front with the UP. Ford formulated his position 
on 6 June 1952 at a Torch Rally in Durban when he evoked an oath, which later became known as 
the ‘Natal Stand’, to protect the South African constitution.1038 Ford, with a well-prepared delegation 
for Natal, was able to elevate the Natal Stand to a Torch Resolution at the First Annual Conference 
of the Torch, on 9 July 1952:  
If, in her efforts to save Union, Natal is forced to stand alone, the Torch Commando throughout 
South Africa and South West Africa affirms its readiness to support Natal to the full by whatever 
action the National executive may deem necessary.1039  
By August 1952, at the same time that Graaff was secretly negotiating with Kane-Berman for the 
merging of the Torch into the UP, Ford was thinking of forming a new party “... based on Torch ideals 
coupled with a Federal and a progressive non-European policy.”1040 Initially, Kane-Berman was 
opposed to the idea of the Torch executive members forming a political party or even standing for 
election.1041 However, Ford, Chutter and Brickhill used the Torch to soundboard ideas and bring like-
minded people together. During 1952, Ford and Chutter attempted to consolidate support for a new 
party among the Natal Torch and attempted to ensure the nomination of parliamentary candidates 
in Natal that were in support of the Natal Stand. They hoped that by doing so, they could establish a 
kernel of a new party.1042  
Within the Natal Torch, some supported the UP. Roydon Fenhalls, a Natal solicitor that had served 
in the SAAF, argued that a new party would be futile, as the regeneration of the UP could happen 
from within its ranks.1043 Others argued that considering the upcoming elections in 1953, it was not 
the opportune time to consider a new party.1044 Ford’s machinations so alienated UP supporters in 
the Natal Torch that by October 1952, Professor Pollock, Ken McIntyre, Fenhalls and four others 
resigned from the Torch.1045  
By December 1952 it became necessary for Selby, Ford, Chutter and Brickhill to meet with a UP 
delegation that included Strauss, Graaff, and Mitchell to smooth over the relationship between the 
 
1036  Reid, ‘The Federal Party, 1953-1962’, 12. 
1037  Reid, 12. 
1038  Reid, 15. 
1039  Reid, 17. 
1040  White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 1948-1953’, 363; Reid, ‘The Federal Party, 1953-
1962’, 18. 
1041  Wits Historical Papers A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 22. 
1042  White, ‘The South African Parliamentary Opposition, 1948-1953’, 377. 
1043  Reid, ‘The Federal Party, 1953-1962’, 20. 
1044  Reid, 21. 
1045  Reid, 24. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
Natal Torch and the UP. When Strauss rejected the idea of the ‘Natal Stand’ outright, it became 
apparent that the formation of a new party would occur after the 1953 elections.1046  
On 17 January 1953, at the Joint National executives meeting of the Torch in Pietermaritzburg, Kane-
Berman reiterated the Torch’s resolution of 9 July 1952 in support of the Natal Stand.1047 Encouraged 
by support from the National Chairman, in early April 1953, the Natal Torch leaders informed him 
that they intended to launch a new party after the elections. At Kane-Berman’s request, they agreed 
to launch the party after the meeting of the Torch’s National Executive in May 1953, which would 
decide on the future of the Torch.1048 The UP’s inability to develop a straightforward political 
programme to counter the NP’s assault on the entrenched clauses of the constitution so frustrated 
the Torch in Natal that even in the build-up to the 1953 elections motions was made to establish a 
new political party. The diverging political views of the ex-servicemen made it impossible for the UP 
to formulate a satisfactorily inclusive political position in opposition to the NP. Wartime anti-fascist 
rhetoric was no longer enough. 
4.5.2 The Torch and race policy 
The UP’s inability to build internal consensus over race relations was apparent when the Torch 
received the UP manifesto with the section dealing with race relations left blank.1049 The race 
relations issue was a matter of grave concern for many Torch members, who had hoped that the 
Torch would nudge the UP towards a more progressive stance on race relations. The Torch 
harboured many liberally minded ex-servicemen, for instance, Bill Conradie, who had lost both his 
legs during the war. He was “…a man of very liberal views and was not afraid to express them no 
matter where he spoke”.1050 Lee-Warden had hoped the Torch “would give the UP the necessary 
impetus it needed to move in another direction …opposed to apartheid”.1051 Ford criticised the UP 
Policy as being “apartheid enunciated with ‘honey in the voice’“.1052 Kane-Berman and the inner circle 
of the executive “were disenchanted with the [United] Party and always hoped that possibly the Torch 
would be a catalyst for change towards a more enlightened or progressive policy”.1053  
Even within the UP, there was a belief that the Torch could nudge the UP towards a more progressive 
stance. Helen Suzman urged Kane-Berman and Wilson to make prominent Torch members available 
for election. She argued that they would then be able to reform the party from within its ranks. By 
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this time, Kane-Berman felt that “…it would be easier to join the Nationalist Party and reform it from 
within than attempt to reform the UP from within”.1054  
The test of the Torch’s progressive stance on race came in January 1953, when CR Swart as Minister 
of Justice, introduced the Criminal Laws Amendment Bill and the Public Safety Bill, commonly known 
as the ‘Swart Bills’, which gave the Minister of Justice immense powers in the event of civil unrest. 
The UP supported these bills on the grounds of national security where the Torch insisted that the 
bills conflicted with the Torch’s principles.1055 Gordon equated these bills as an attempt to introduce 
a dictatorship.1056 Kane-Berman, aware of the inroads being made by White radicals in Black politics 
at the expense of liberalism, probably felt that opposing these bills would address some of the ANC 
cynicism towards White liberals. He argued that “… unless the Torch Commando take the lead and 
the initiative in rousing public feeling against these Bills, the lead will be taken by other less 
responsible organisations (both European and non-European) …”1057  
For Kane-Berman, the issue came to a head at a luncheon hosted by Oppenheimer. He was 
prompted by Oppenheimer to elaborate on the Torch’s position. He took affront when a UP MP1058 
with whom he had served in the desert during the war, refuted his argument when he flippantly 
stated, “Louis you are talking nonsense. During the war Smuts threw many Afrikaners into prison 
without trial and now because the government wants to imprison some …[African]… trouble-makers, 
you now wish to raise all manner of objections.” 1059 
Realising that the UP would not oppose the bills he immediately called a meeting of the National and 
Provincial Executive of the Torch and invited the leaders of the UP and LP. Pilkington-Jordan, 
leading an ill-prepared UP representation, failed to convince the meeting of the UP position in 
support of the Bills. In contrast, Christie and Lovell from the LP were more convincing in persuading 
the meeting to oppose the bills.1060 The meeting of over 70 executive members of the Torch “… 
decided unanimously there and then that if these bills went ahead, we would call a national day of 
protest.”1061 Kane-Berman, on the back of the support of the meeting, drafted a brief statement which 
the executive, including Sailor Malan and Parrott, approved and called a press conference for the 
next day. Sailor Malan withdrew to Graaff’s farm that night despite Kane-Berman entreating him to 
attend the press conference.1062  
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Although the media received the press conference on 8 February 1953 positively, it divided loyalties 
among the executive, with a number withdrawing their support for the statement claiming that they 
had not authorised the statement.1063 Furthermore, big businesses and mines, unsettled by the 
economic implications of a day of protest, withdrew their funding from the Torch. The earlier decision 
to stop independent fundraising by the Torch now weighed heavily.1064  
Thus, the Torch’s ambiguous policy positions to ensure mass appeal, and its reluctance to become 
a parliamentary party proved the movements undoing. As soon as the Torch pushed in an 
independent direction, the UP and business withdrew funding and support. The Torch financially 
vulnerable and unsure of its members’ overlaid loyalties became unable to marsh the various 
stakeholders’ divergent political interests and floundered as the 1953 elections neared.  
4.5.3 The dimming of the Torch’s flame 
The fallout from the call for a National Day of Protest by Kane-Berman on 8 February 1953 and 
increased tensions between Ford and Mitchell in Natal meant that the Torch was on its final legs. 
Clapham’s ‘well-larding’ of Torch committees with UP supporters and Oppenheimer’s financial levers 
although insufficient to keep the Torch pliant to UP wishes, were enough to break the Torch’s 
cohesion. Kane-Berman blamed the UP infiltration for the implosion of the Torch, “[t]he answer may 
well be that some members felt they owed a greater allegiance to the United Party than they did to 
the Torch Commando.”1065 He believed that the UP had been opportunistic and dishonest in its 
relationship with the Torch: 
The end of the Torch Commando heralded, in my view, the ultimate collapse of the United Party. 
In retrospect perhaps the idealism of the Torch Commando was no answer to an ever-burgeoning 
nationalism more particularly when the opposition had lost direction and political integrity.1066 
After the UP defeat in the 15 April 1953 general elections, the Torch lost most of its momentum and 
faded by September 1953. In its short time, it had shed light on the UP’s inability to oppose the NP, 
and unwillingness to provide an alternative to Apartheid.  
However, the Torch’s appeal, although largely forgotten, can partly be attributed to the way the 
movement accommodated the aspirations of its members. For many ex-servicemen, the Torch was 
a platform where they could express solidarity in a vision forged during the war and under threat 
from the NP. Although the Torch was able to boast the support of over 600 000 members, the 
organisation was organised in various strata, allowing it to optimise its members social capital. At 
the national level senior military officers and prominent people, such as the “retired generals, 
 
1063  Wits Historical Papers A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 21;  
Kane-Berman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Torch Commando’.  
1064  Kane-Berman, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Torch Commando’. 
1065  Wits Historical Papers A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 21. 
1066  Wits Historical Papers A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 22. 
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brigadiers, judges, lawyers and sportsmen [who had] answered the roll-call”,1067 assumed figurehead 
positions which gave the Torch gravitas and access to extensive social capital. At the executive 
leadership level more politically experienced and men of lower ranks ran the operations of the 
Torch.1068 These included Sailor Malan as the National President and Kane-Berman as the National 
Chairman, on the National Executive Committee. An Action Committee, which ran the daily business 
of the Torch comprised Accutt, Conradie, Etheredge (as Publicist, a role he had fulfilled in the 
Legion), Kowarsky (as National Treasurer), Guy Nicholson, Wilson, Parrott (as National Director) 
and Charles Bekker (as National Organiser).1069 The Torch also leant on the professional and 
occupational knowledge of its members, such as when the Torch had to prepare a legal opinion on 
the constitution, there were sound legal minds at hand.1070 Of the group under consideration, about 
a sixth were legal practitioners. These included inter alia Wilson, Schwarz, Gordon, Ford, Kane-
Berman, John Lang, Leslie Rubin, Robert Hughes-Mason, Denis Fannin, and Michael Corbett. Thus, 
the Torch entwined its members into the political fabric of the period. 
Furthermore, Erasmus’ military reforms had provided the Torch with a steady stream of fresh 
supporters and organisers, as a growing number of aggrieved officers, who had found themselves 
unwelcome in the Permanent Force and ACF found a new home in the Torch. Erasmus had so 
alienated the men of the UDF that in his first four and a half years as Defence Minister (between 1 
June 1948 and 31 December 1952), 184 officers and 2 752 men from the PF and 469 officers from 
the ACF left the UDF as indicated in Table 4.5:1071 
 
Table 4.5: Resignations from the UDF from 1 June 1948 until 31 December 19521072 
  Army Airforce Navy Total 
Permanent Force Officers 93 (include 30 
women) 
82 (include 2 
women) 
9 186 (32) 
NCO 901 781 1070 2752 
ACF Officers 399 13 57 469 
 
Between June 1950 and April 1951, the ACF lost on average 22 officers a month from 
resignations.1073 The government also treated retiring senior ACF officers poorly, perceiving their 
wartime experience as evidence of loyalty to Smuts and the UP. Erasmus found flimsy reasons not 
 
1067  Walker, Sailor Malan. A Biography, 164. Wits Historical Papers, A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch 
Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 7. 
1068  Wits Historical Papers, A2521 aa, David Everatt Papers; ‘Memoirs Len Lee-Warden’, 44. 
1069  Wits Historical Papers, A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 5. 
1070  Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power, 47. 
1071  Kommandant-Generaal/ Group 5/ 204, Questions in Parliament, ‘Answer to Parliamentary Question by 
Mr PA Moore dated 6 February 1953’. 
1072  Kommandant-Generaal/ Group 5/ 204, Questions in Parliament, ‘Answer to Parliamentary Question by 
Mr PA Moore dated 6 February 1953’. 
1073  Boulter, ‘FC Erasmus and the Politics of South African Defence 1948-1959’, 65. 
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to promote them often, which was contrary to the practice at the time. The most controversial were 
Lieutenant Colonel Eric Thompson (Transvaal Scottish) and Lieutenant Colonel Noël McMillian 
(Natal Mounted Rifles). Thompson, on his transfer to the Reserve, became involved in the Torch, 
accepting the Chairmanship of the Southern Transvaal District. It was unfortunate that he did this 
before the gazetting of his promotion, as Erasmus cancelled the promotion. However, the Transvaal 
Scottish ignored Erasmus’s reversal, and in June 1977 Thompson was appointed Honorary Colonel 
2 Transvaal Scottish.1074 In the case of McMillan, enquiries regarding his ‘step-up’ in rank, led to the 
Acting Adjutant General informing the staff officer working on the matter that “We do NOT want to 
promote him, but he is pressing and I want a reason to turn him down”.1075 McMillan also joined the 
Torch.1076 Brigadier James Durrant left the SAAF in March 1952, in protest of being side-lined, and 
became a leading spokesman for the Torch. Major-General George Brink soon joined him in the 
Torch. Both men criticised Erasmus for destroying the prestige that the UDF had won in the war.1077 
Thus Erasmus had through his reforms inadvertently strengthened both the leadership cadre and 
credibility of the Torch.  
Despite the commitment of the Torch to fighting the NP, all of the leaders held down full-time jobs, 
with only Parrott being a full-time employee of the Torch. Table 4.6 illustrates the difference between 
the occupational class of the Torch’s leadership cadres and that of the ‘ordinary soldiers’ as identified 
by Jonathan Fennell in Chapter 2. The preponderance of the intermediate and professional ex-
servicemen in the direction and operations of the Torch indicates that although the Torch had mass 
appeal, the leadership remained the realm of the political elite. Although elite and middle-class 
occupations had provided the means for these men to engage in the political struggle, they would 
have preferred to have left politics to the politicians.1078 However, the tempo of the Torch’s activities 
came with personal and career costs as Kane-Berman discovered. On the dissolution of the Torch, 
he found himself in financial ruin and had to disavow politics to secure employment at the law firm 
Hayman, Godfrey and Sanderson once he had disavowed politics.1079 
 
1074  Mitchell, Tartan on the Veld, 48–49. 
1075  DOD Archive, PA, Personnel Service File, P1/40004/1 and P1/2535/1, 97. 
1076  UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65.1.5 (Part 2), General Elections 1953 ‘Biography of 
United Party Candidate for General Elections 1953: Noel Douglas McMillian’.  
1077  Boulter, ‘FC Erasmus and the Politics of South African Defence 1948-1959’, 239. 
1078  Walker, Sailor Malan. A Biography, 180. 
1079  J Kane Berman, Between Two Fires: Holding the Liberal Centre in South African Politics (Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2017), 24. 
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Table 4.6: Occupational class of UDF soldiers in the sample group and Torch Commando 
leadership (n=153)1080 





Professional doctors, dentists, engineers, 
writers 
3,1% 28% 31% 
Intermediate pharmacists, chemists, 
teachers, editorial staff 
8% 41% 44% 
Skilled  shop assistances, clerks, 
lorry drivers (SA only 
Farmers) 
74,6% 20% 19% 
Semi-Skilled caretakers, railway porters, 
land workers 
9,6% 0% 0% 
Non skilled labourers, factory workers, 
cleaners 
4,8% 0% 0% 
Unknown  0% 10% 6% 
 
However, the end of the Torch in 1953 did not mark an end to the political aspirations of all the 
Torchmen. According to Historian and Torchman, Rodney Davenport, the Torch provided an entry 
into politics for ex-servicemen who would continue to shape the White political debate, as many 
members joined the Liberal Party(LPSA) and the Union Federal Party(UFP),1084 which is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In post-war South Africa, the UP, LP and the CPSA provided political homes for returning ex-
servicemen, to continue their fight against the NP’s crude nationalism. All three parties had 
representation in parliamentary, provincial and local Government, and stood opposed to the NP in 
the 1948 elections. Many of the ex-servicemen under consideration returned to working within the 
 
1080  Table created by Author from: Who is Who in Southern Africa 1948-1977; UNISA-UP Archive, Central 
Head Office File 61 62 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of 
Information file 158 (Part 1) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information 
file 158 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 35, 
Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65 1 5 (part 2), General 
Election 1953 UP Candidates Information; UNISA-UP Archive, Sir De Villiers Graaff Papers, File 1.15.1 
United Party Papers 1958-1977; Wits Historical Papers, Springbok Legion, A617; DOD Archive, PA; 
Lovell, Love of Justice; Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 186-87, 189–90 
1081  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 186–87. 
1082  Fennell, 189–90. 
1083  Commissioned Permanent Force Officers, students and scholars are included in the intermediate 
occupations. Farmers are included in skilled occupations to be consistent with Fennell’s methodology. 
Other agricultural occupations are included in the intermediate occupations. Where occupations were 
left blank on service cards, occupational classes were derived from UP Curriculum Vita, Biographies 
and Obituaries. 
1084  Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 331. TRH Davenport was an ex-servicemen, Torchman and 
members of the Liberal Party. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
framework of political parties after the war, either achieving senior positions in the parties or 
representing their consistencies in Parliament or provincial council.  
Outside of formal politics, the SL initially commanded the support of the ‘ordinary’ soldiers. As 
soldiers demobilised and reintegrated into society, the ordinary soldier initially slowly withdrew their 
support from the SL. However, rising NP harassment and oppression led to ex-servicemen 
establishing anti-nationalist committees at the local level. The UP and SL worked together to 
consolidate the growing anti-nationalist sentiment among the ex-servicemen into the WVAC-Torch. 
The Torch provided a politically non-aligned mass movement, which aimed to remove the taint of 
communism from veteran politics, and to provide a voting bloc in the 1953 elections for the UP. The 
veteran appeal drew ex-servicemen from a broad spectrum of political beliefs. The Torch provided 
a common political platform for ex-servicemen. For many, it was their first formal experience at 
political work. 
The inability of both the SL and the Torch to substantially influence the behaviour of the dominant 
White opposition groupings created irreconcilable tensions within the veteran movements. The SL, 
although willing to support both the UP and the LP in the 1948 elections, became an early casualty 
of NP oppression. The passing of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 left the leadership 
cadre ostracised from White politics. Despite the SL’s early participation in the forming of the Torch, 
the sceptre of the communist label saw them driven into the political wilderness. There they found 
allies within Black and multi-racial politics. The remnants of the SL were able to present themselves 
within the Congress Movement as an organisation that was representative of a White constituency. 
In this way, the radical ex-servicemen were able to insert themselves at the heart of the liberation 
movement. 
Within parliamentary politics, ex-servicemen were able to use their positions to harangue the NP, 
especially on matters of national defence. The Ex-servicemen identity among the 1948 parliamentary 
caucus drew them together. Within the UP there was often a common purpose with the Torch, with 
some dual membership of its members. The Torch provided politically disinterested ex-servicemen 
with a soft entry into politics.  
The Torch’s reliance on the mass appeal of the ex-serviceman identity led to divergent political 
agendas within the movement. Beyond the wartime rhetoric of anti-fascism, there was little 
agreement on the fundamental issues at stake. Although the primary purpose of the Torch was to 
protect the constitution, the dominant narrative was the Coloured Franchise, which the Natal Torch 
saw as only the initial skirmish. The Natalians believed that the NP would use the Coloured Franchise 
as a steppingstone to consolidate control over the country before launching an attack on the status 
of English and finally push for a Republic. The resulting tussle for control of the Torch fragmented 
the veteran community. The UP strenuously opposed both the SL, and at times Kane-Berman 
attempted to plunge the Torch with the growing multi-racial discourse. The UP depended on Sailor 
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Malan and other members of the national leadership and Oppenheimer’s discrete financial support 
to strong-arm the Torch.  
However, the demise of the Torch showed that the ex-serviceman identity and the accompanying 
anti-fascist rhetoric had a powerful mass appeal but failed to provide a sufficiently coherent political 
programme to sustain unified political action. The differences in cultural backgrounds, military 
experience and political views that emerged under continual nationalist political pressure soon made 
a unified ex-serviceman platform untenable. The collapse of the Torch thus marked an end to the 
ex-serviceman identity as a coherent political identity. The next chapter deals with how the ex-
servicemen repositioned themselves in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics in response 





EX-SERVICEMEN IN POLITICS 1953-1961 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As argued in the previous chapter, the United Party (UP), the Springbok Legion (SL) and the Torch 
Commando (the Torch) had mobilised ex-servicemen, as well as an ex-serviceman’s identity, in the 
hope that the wartime idealism and the anti-fascist rhetoric of the war would animate an ‘ex-
servicemen’s electoral bloc’ against the National Party (NP) in the 1953 elections. However, the 
mass appeal of the ex-serviceman identity had attracted a constituency with divergent political 
agendas. The UP’s machinations to control the ex-serviceman’s political voice hindered the 
coordination of opposition to the NP. First, the SL and then the Torch fell afoul of the UP’s 
unwillingness to formulate a coherent progressive response to the NP’s racial and Republican 
ambitions. The UP’s angst at engaging with extra-parliamentary movements, or taking part in extra-
parliamentary activities, meant that whenever their ex-serviceman allies, in the form of the SL or 
Torch, advocated engagement with multi-racial partners, the UP was swift to suppress the idea. 
First, the UP engineered the ejection of the SL from the Torch, and then twice the UP censured Louis 
Kane-Berman for suggesting that the ex-servicemen would support a national stay-away in solidarity 
with the Defiance campaign in 1952 and again in protest against the Criminal Laws Amendment Bill 
and the Public Safety Bill in 1953. The Torch in Natal was also distrustful of Douglas Mitchell, the 
UP’s provincial leader in Natal. For them, the UP’s inability to protect the Coloured franchise heralded 
the UP’s ineffectiveness and ultimate failure in the face of the NP’s drive towards a Republic. These 
divisions indicate that the war had not consistently liberalised the ex-servicemen.  
The UP’s inability to win the 1953 elections, despite the herculean effort of ex-servicemen, meant 
that the ex-servicemen perceived the UP as a meddling and ungrateful partner. The Torch, as an 
extra-parliamentary mass movement, had initially navigated the shoals of public opinion by appealing 
to the ideals and sacrifices of the war. However, by sustaining an ambiguous political agenda, the 
Republican issue and the Coloured franchise became entangled. British Loyalists soon presented 
their case in the language of non-racial liberalism. Chapter 4 showed how the Torch’s leadership 
battled to sway the UP away from contesting politics on the terms of the NP, towards a more 
principled approach. By the time the Torch leadership realised that the UP was both unable and 
unwilling to capitalise on the mass movement that had developed, the Torch had become overly 
dependent on UP-aligned, financial sponsors to navigate an independent course. Even if the Torch 
had been financially self-sustaining, the UP remained the only viable parliamentary opposition party. 
Thus, the liberal leadership cadre’s inability to influence the UP towards a more progressive stance 
meant that their brief foray into politics had failed.  
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As noted in the previous chapter, from 1948 to 1953, veteran political organisations played a large 
part in swaying political parties away from authoritarianism. However, the appeal of the ex-
serviceman identity as a coherent political force faded after the SL disbanded and the Torch 
collapsed in 1953. Since ex-servicemen politicians lacked access to such organisations they faced 
the arduous task of constructing new support bases through other means. With few alternatives, the 
select ex-servicemen had to trade their social capital of personal loyalties and principles that they 
had accumulated since before the war to the present.  
This chapter tracks the transition from the politics of mass ex-serviceman identity to the role of 
individual veterans in politics. The chapter covers the period from 1953 until 1961. Within the period, 
two parliamentary elections took place: in 1953 and 1958. The discussion covers the ex-
servicemen’s participation in each election and then discusses how each election influenced 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics.  
5.2 ELECTION DEFEAT AND THE SPLIT IN THE WHITE OPPOSITION  
5.2.1 The 1953 general election  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the UP and Labour Party (LP) partnered with the Torch to fight 
the general elections on 15 April 1953 as a United Democratic Front (the Front). The Front provided 
an injection of new members and parliamentary candidates for the UP and LP. The overlap of 
purpose between the Torch and the parliamentary opposition parties, meant that Torchmen soon 
became directly involved in party politics. For Colin Eglin there was a natural synergy between the 
liberal faction of the UP and the Torch:  
I belonged to a group of younger supporters of the UP, most of whom had been active in the 
Torch Commando, who acted as a pressure group in an attempt to make the party organisation 
more effective and to persuade the Cape Peninsula wing to take a liberal view on local issues.1085  
The Torch had energised younger ex-servicemen to join the UP. Raw recalls that “Fifty-three was 
the first time that we got a real injection of – on any scale, of younger people coming in. …[I]t was 
fifty-three that you really got the intake of younger people.”1086  
The number of ex-servicemen in the sample group that stood in the 1953 parliamentary elections, 
with an indication of their previous military experience, is shown in Table 5.1. Thirty-seven ex-
servicemen contested parliamentary seats, 17 of whom won in their constituencies. Despite the 
views of Kane-Berman, that Torch leaders should not stand in the election, several prominent 
 
1085  Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power, 54. 
1086  Wits Historical Papers, A2242 Hackland, ‘Interview with Vause Raw by B Hackland’, 3. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
140 
Torchmen did so.1087 Of the sample group, ten Torchmen stood for election. However, only Noël 
McMillan kept his seat. 
Table 5.1: Background of ex-servicemen in the 1953 general elections and 11th Parliament 
1953-1958 (n=153) 1088 











Successful MP 17 1 8 3 2 3 
Candidates 20 10 8 5 1 2 
By-elections and native 
representatives  
2 1 2 1   
Total 39 12 18 9 3 5 
Of the 17 Members of Parliament (MP), four were new to Parliament, namely Jan Steytler (UP), Prof 
Sakkies Fourie (UP), Christopher Starke (UP), and Brian Bunting (Independent/communist). The 
appointment of the so-called ‘Native Representatives’, and the by-election results, brought the total 
of ex-servicemen in the 11th Parliament (1953 to 1958) to 19. In this regard, Walter Stanford (Liberal 
Party (LPSA) and Len Lee-Warden (Independent) entered Parliament in 1955 as ‘Native 
Representatives’. Stanford had been a fighter pilot in the war and was the grandson of Sir Walter 
Stanford. Bunting was expelled from Parliament in 1954 for being a communist, and Bernard 
Friedman resigned from Parliament in 1954.1089 In terms of the military experience of the MPs, there 
were ten Africa Star and four Italy Star recipients, two former POWs and three who had served in 
the Army Education Scheme (AES). When including the 20 unsuccessful candidates, the military 
experience of the 39, predominantly remained in the African theatre, with 18 recipients of the Africa 
Star and nine of the Italy Star. Three were former prisoners of war, and five had served in the AES. 
The predominance of veterans from the African campaign suggests that the younger soldiers who 
had volunteered to fight in Italy had not yet emerged in parliamentary politics. 
Table 5.2 compares the military ranks held by the members of the 10th and the 11th Parliaments. In 
both parliamentary sittings, demobilised junior officers accounted for the majority of ex-servicemen 
in Parliament. This trend remained consistent for unsuccessful candidates, suggesting that the 
parliamentarians had an understanding of the military based primarily on combat experience and not 
necessarily in the military administration. 
  
 
1087  Wits Historical Papers, A2077, Kane-Berman, ‘The Torch Commando. Its Beginning and End’, 22. 
1088  Table Compiled by Author from DOD Archive, PA; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, Subject 
File 158 (Part 1), War Veterans Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, Subject 
File 158 (Part 2), War Veterans Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Central Head Office, File 61 62 
(part 2); Subject File 158 (Part 1), War Veterans Torch Commando. 
1089  Graaff, Div Looks Back, 144; Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power, 55. 
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Table 5.2: Military ranks of ex-Servicemen in the 10th and 11th Parliaments (n=153) 1090 
 10th Parliament  
1948-1952 





Lieutenant General  - - 1 
Colonel 2 2 1 
Lieutenant Colonel 1 1 - 
Major 2 2 4 
Captain 5 6 2 
Lieutenant 3 3 10 
Unknown 1 1 - 
Warrant Officer - - 1 
Sergeant 1 1 - 
Corporal - 2 1 
Total 15 19 21 
In terms of language, a fascinating tendency occurred during the 1953 elections. The UP, appealing 
to its Afrikaner constituency, fielded an almost equal number of English and Afrikaans-speaking ex-
servicemen as candidates, as indicated in Table 5.3. However, this barely made a difference in the 
language representation among ex-servicemen in Parliament which remained dominantly English-
speaking. Clearly, the military service of the bloed-sappe did not impress the Afrikaner voter in the 
1953 elections. The UP’s attempt to win back the platteland did not succeed. 
Table 5.3: Language of ex-servicemen in the 10th and 11th Parliament (n=153) 1091 
 
10th Parliament  
1948-1952 
11th Parliament  
1953-1958 
Unsuccessful 
candidates in the 1953 
Elections 
Afrikaans-speaking 1 3 12 
English-speaking 10 13 8 
Jewish 4 3 1 
Total 15 19 21 
The Torchmen’s inability to translate political populism into election victory, even at the personal 
level, as indicated in Table 5.1, left the Torch’s election efforts discredited and the Front with the UP 
and LP in tatters. On the back of disappointing election results, the Front partners had to face difficult 
recriminations and chart a path as a weakened opposition in Parliament. 
5.2.2 Effect of the 1953 elections on veteran political organisations 
The increase of ex-servicemen in the parliamentary caucus was marginal. The Front’s efforts had 
failed to provide the UP with victory, or even strengthen the UPs position in Parliament. Even before 
the 1953 elections, when the Torch argued that the invigorated UP electoral machine would deliver 
victory, Sir de Villiers Graaff had remained doubtful. When the Torch raised the possibility of Torch 
 
1090  Table compiled by Author from South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA.  
1091  Table compiled by Author from South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA. 
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representation in a post-election cabinet, Graaff dismissed the idea as entirely academic as he 
believed that the UP and the Front had no chance of winning the elections.1092 The UP fixation on 
the Afrikaans vote, and a non-committal approach to the race issue, provided the electorate with 
very little reason to support them. Julius Lewin, a prominent South African academic, argued before 
the elections: 
If the UP can win the major share of the thirty marginal seats, nearly all in urban and peri-urban 
areas, it can win its way back into office. To do this it must stop stealing the Nationalists’ clothes 
in order to dress itself up to look like a mealie farmer.1093 
Gillie Ford captured the UP’s dilemma when he accused the party of being little more than “apartheid 
enunciated with honey in the voice”.1094 The UP’s lack of viable, unambiguous, policy alternatives 
left it helpless against the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the appeal of apartheid. 1095 
Disillusioned with the UPs election performance, Kane-Berman, who maintained close links with 
liberal groups and the federalists, lucidly described the options open to those wanting to oppose the 
Nationalists: “We [have] two instruments, 1. Natal and 2. The Non-European”.1096 As the Torch 
imploded after the Front’s failure at the polls, factions in the Torch pursued both options. The Torch 
in Natal opted to emphasise the dangers of the NP declaring Republic, and the liberals in the Torch 
faced the choice between courting non-racial politics and remaining a ginger group within the UP.  
Table 5.4 highlights the overlap between the Torch and the three political parties that profited from 
the end of the Torch. Interestingly, the LPSA  attracted a higher proportion of the NCOs in the group, 
with the majority of the officers remaining in the UP. The table shows that although the Torch 
aminated ex-servicemen politically, the majority remained wedded to the politically established UP, 
even after the Torch had disbanded.  
Table 5.4: Torchmen’s membership of political parties after the dissolution of the Torch 
(n=153)1097  
 
Officer NCO Total 
LPSA 2 5 7 
UFP 8 3 11 
UP 22 1 23 
 
1092  White, ‘The United Party and the 1953 General Election’, 76. 
1093  Walker, Sailor Malan. A Biography, 176. 
1094  Roos, Ordinary Springboks, 126. 
1095  Eglin, Crossing the Borders of Power, 51. 
1096  Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, 143. 
1097  Table created by Author from: Who is Who in Southern Africa 1948-1977; UNISA-UP Archive, Central 
Head Office File 61 62 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of 
Information file 158 (Part 1) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information 
file 158 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; DOD Archive, PA; Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid , 
233-235; Reid, 'The Federal Party, 1953-1962'. 
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Thus, with the end of the Torch in September 1953, Torchmen emerged in various political parties, 
as discussed next. 
5.2.2.1 The Torch in Natal and the Union Federal Party  
The UP’s election defeat brought the animosity between the Torch’s Natal regions and the UP to the 
fore. Directly after the election, most senior Torch leaders from Natal were disillusioned and 
suspicious of the UP. This included Torch leaders like Ford, James Chutter, Roger Brickhill, Robert 
Hughes-Mason, Arthur Selby, James Durrant and William Hamilton.1098 As Brian Reid stated, “with 
the end of the election campaign, the member organisations of the United Democratic Front resumed 
their liberty of action” from before the build up to the elections.1099  
The Torch in Natal used the Torch National Executive Committee (NEC) Meeting on 8 May 1953 to 
successfully argue that if the Torch was to remain until “sane, democratic government was once 
more restored”, then the Torch should continue. Flushed with the success of the NEC meeting, Ford 
announced the imminent launching of the UFP and called for sponsors.1100 The surprise move split 
the national executive roughly in half with 19 of the 32 members sponsoring the new party. An 
additional three non-executive members agreed to be sponsors, bringing the number of sponsors to 
22, of which 12 were from the Transvaal, two from the Cape and the remainder from Natal. Ironically, 
most of the sponsors had not committed themselves to future actions or positions and played no 
further role in the party. John Wilson later conceded that he “… never really had anything to do with 
the UFP”.1101 CS Keary claimed that he signed the statement out of wartime loyalty to Ford.1102 Bill 
Conradie sponsored and joined the party, since at the time he perceived it as the only party that was 
willing to oppose the Nationalists’ totalitarian tendencies.1103  
The Union Federal Party’s (UFP) formal formation on 10 May 1953 further precipitated the end of 
the Torch. This was partially due to the tension between UP sympathisers and UFP supporters which 
led to the resignation of prominent members of the Torch. At the 2nd National Congress of the Torch 
between 12 and 13 June 1953, a narrow vote (423 to 399 votes) defeated an immediate call to fold 
up the Torch. The 3rd National Congress of the Torch in East London later that year between 25 and 
26 September 1953 placed the Torch under “care and maintenance”. After that the Torch finally 
faded from the political arena, despite John Lang’s attempts two years later in 1955 to bring life back 
to the Torch.1104  
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The UFP, born out of the Torch, emulated the Torch’s position regarding the South African 
constitution and race relations. The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) traces the 
legacy of the UFP position back to the constitutional issues that the Torch had raised previously: 
[The UFP’s] concern over the preservation of the constitution and the entrenched clause dealing 
with equal language rights for English and Afrikaans led the Party to consider the other 
entrenched clause dealing with non-European voting rights, and to formulate a policy to promote 
racial harmony.1105  
However, the UFP found reconciling White interests with universal franchise problematic. As a 
compromise, the party supported the concept of a qualified franchise for all races, but, in order to 
protect the White minority, this would occur only “over a considerable period of years…[and] … 
subject to safeguards”.1106  
The UFP’s policies failed to attract White support at the polls, even in their perceived stronghold of 
Natal. In the party’s first election experience, Arthur Martin stood in the Berea constituency in the 
1953 by-elections and lost.1107 Further blows followed. Their defeat in the 1954 provincial election 
came as a shattering blow. Not only did they secure just 20.4 per cent of the vote, but the UFP also 
failed to secure a single seat. Brickhill proved to be the most successful of their candidates, securing 
38.5 per cent of the vote in the Berea constituency.1108 The UFP thus failed even in their stronghold 
Province. 
The UFP failed in its appeal to ex-servicemen. Moreover, the UFP’s drift from a liberal racial position 
to sympathising with rising British ‘Jingoism’, in response to the NP plans to form a Republic, 
alienated the liberal ex-servicemen that were instrumental in forming the party.1109 Ford and Brickhill, 
disillusioned by their inability to stem NP Republicanism and unable to shoulder the financial cost of 
politics, emigrated to Rhodesia.1110 Conradie resigned, claiming that it had become clear to him that 
the party was more concerned about English-speaking interests than attempting to halt the 
Nationalists.1111 In the subsequent by-elections in East London in 1957, the provincial by-election in 
Hospital Constituency in Johannesburg, in 1958 and the 1958 provincial elections, the UFP failed to 
secure any success. Their swan song was a campaign headed by Hughes-Mason and Martin against 
the Republican referendum of 5 October 1960 in Natal. By 1962, the party ceased to function.1112  
 
1105  SAIRR, South African Institute of Race Relations Survey 1953-1954 (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1954), 6. 
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5.2.2.2 Liberal Party 
The second party to emerge from the UP’s election defeat in 1948 was the LPSA. As indicated in 
Table 5.4, several Torchmen played a prominent part in the LPSA’s formation, which this section 
discusses. The UP, in the post-war years, gave liberally-minded ex-servicemen access to White 
politics. Many believed that a robust liberal representation within the UP would edge the UP towards 
more progressive policymaking. Loyalty to Jan Hofmeyr kept many liberals from forming a new party, 
and ensured that they worked within UP structures.1113 When Hofmeyr died in 1948, these liberals 
formed the ‘Hofmeyr Society’ as a pressure group within the UP.1114 In 1950, Rupert Pilkington-
Jordan, in order to organise the liberal influence in the UP,1115 drew up a manifesto calling for the 
abolition of the colour bar and the implementation of ‘civilised rights to civilised men’. Sir Ernest 
Oppenheimer attempted to quash the manifesto, which he believed could damage the UP and 
ironically, held a meeting which brought the liberal group closer together.1116  
Canvassing for the establishment of a liberal group also occurred in Johannesburg. Piet Beyleveld 
recalls how Jock Isacowitz canvassed the left for support:  
[b]efore the formation of the Liberal Party (LP[SA]) there was what they I think called the Liberal 
League or Liberal Association- it was very much Jock Isacowitz’s idea, and he phoned me on one 
occasion and he told me his idea of a Liberal Association and asked me whether I would be 
prepared to discuss it, and I said yes I would.1117 
In January 1952, a small group of liberals met in Cape Town to work on a programme of 
principles.1118 In January 1953, this group formalised itself as the South African Liberal Association 
(SALA) which later evolved into the LPSA.1119 Among its initial members, were committed liberals 
like Eglin.1120 The formation of SALA was partially in response to the Darragh Hall meeting in 
November 1952 as well as the formation of the more radical Congress of Democrats (COD) in 
Johannesburg in January 1953.1121 The defeat of the UP, and the imminent formation of the UFP, 
pressured liberals to form a new party. Leslie Rubin, a prominent member of the Torch, had 
foreknowledge of the forming of the UFP and pushed for an early launch of the LPSA to pre-empt 
this.1122 Since the UFP and LPSA appealed to the same sector of the population, there would be an 
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inevitable entanglement of interests and a contest to draw members from the same interest group. 
Both Liberal and Federalist factions in Johannesburg met at the Lewin’s home on 9 May 1953, where 
Lewin later noted that the UFP “came to birth in our lounge the night our own liberal [Ballinger] group 
broke up”.1123 
Furthermore, the UP’s Cape leader, Graaff, had become antagonistic towards the liberals in the 
party and gave the impression that he would “prefer that his UP was not perceived to be on the left 
of the South African political spectrum”.1124 Within the UP the liberals were divided on the need for a 
new party. Between 8 and 9 May 1953, the SALA met in Cape Town to discuss the formation of a 
new party. The Transvaal delegation, led by Isacowitz, was eager to form a new party.1125 The Natal 
delegation, however, was not convinced and Geoffrey Durrant eventually chose to join the UFP.1126 
Eglin was one of the UP liberals that maintained that reform could liberalise the UP from within and 
thus he made the decision not to join the new party.1127 Despite reservations from Margret Ballinger 
and others, Rubin, the vice-chairperson of the SALA, forced the issue by releasing a statement to 
the media before the meeting, in which he announced the formation of the new party.1128 
Table 5.5 shows the members of the sample group who joined the LPSA. The 17 ex-servicemen had 
a more even spread of war experience than in other political groupings, with 12 Africa Stars and 10 
Italy Stars. Four were members of the AES, and two were former Prisoners of War (POWs).  




Military experience of ex-servicemen  
 
AES POW Africa Star Italy Star Africa and Italy 
Star 
Lieutenant Colonel  2 1 - 2 1 1 
Major 1 - - 1 1 1 
Captain 1 1 - 1 - - 
Lieutenant 3 2 - 2 1 1 
Warrant Officers 1 - - 1 - - 
Staff Sergeant  1 - - - - - 
Corporal 1 - 1 1 1 1 
Private 7 - 1 4 6 3 
Unknown - - - - - - 
Total 17 4 2 12 10 7 
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The almost parity in experience between African and Italian war experience suggests that the Italian 
campaign had had a liberalising effect on the ex-servicemen that served there and that a younger 
group of ex-servicemen had entered into politics who were attracted to the policies of the LPSA. 
Table 5.6 reflects the age distribution of ex-servicemen in the LPSA. The age distribution also 
coincides with the membership of the AES and rank. The four oldest, Leo Marquard (1897), Gerald 
Gordon (1909), Leo Kuper (1908) and Rubin (1909) were not only AES officers but also the only 
commissioned officers who had established careers before joining up in 1939/40. Their involvement 
within the AES provided the LPSA with a lineage stretching back to an earlier liberal tradition. The 
presence of both AES officers and University of Natal academics1130 in the LPSA suggests a 
continuity in South African Liberalism that links Ernst Malherbe, as the founder of the AES and Rector 
of Natal University, to the LPSA. In terms of education and occupation, the majority were involved in 
middle to upper-class professions and academia, which affirms Malherbe’s observation that 
education had a liberalising effect.1131  

















Count  1 - - 3 6 2 5 17 
From the outset, the LPSA was not a homogenous group. They shared the political goal of opposing 
apartheid and kept their divergent political views from splitting the party.1133 The most obvious tension 
was between the older, moderate, Cape Liberals and the younger radical liberals, led by Isacowitz, 
from the Transvaal. In Natal, ex-serviceman Peter Brown’s efforts led to the formation of a liberal 
discussion group around June 1952, which attracted a non-racial membership and several ex-
servicemen1134 who were also staff members at the University of Natal.1135 Thus, the Natal group 
often found themselves in the centre of a more conservative Cape and a radical Transvaal group.1136 
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Where the Cape Liberals argued for a qualified franchise which had to be earned, the Transvaal 
group argued that voting was a basic right. 1137 
The Transvaal liberals, in closer contact with the radicals of the SL, were aware that the qualified 
franchise limited the party’s appeal to the Black population.1138 Hans Meidner, a former POW and 
student leader from Natal, and Isacowitz from the Transvaal, were two of the more vocal ex-
servicemen in the radical camp.1139 The 1st Liberal Party conference in June 1953, accepted the 
principle of the qualified franchise, a decision that the younger, more radical members resisted. Only 
in 1960 did the principle of universal franchise prevail, which coincided with many of the more 
moderate Cape Liberals who had supported qualified franchise, such as Stanford and Gordon, 
leaving the party.1140  
In 1958, the LPSA’s dismal performance in the parliamentary elections, where all three Liberal 
candidates lost, opened the way for the younger ex-servicemen to gain control over the party. Ex-
servicemen Brown and Kuper were elected as the national chairman and vice-chairman respectively, 
and Meidner assumed chairmanship of the Natal province from Brown. Isacowitz maintained the 
chairmanship of the Transvaal province. In April 1959, Meidner and Isacowitz accepted the post of 
co-vice-chairmen of the party.1141 The more radical liberals thereby secured a stronger hold over the 
policy direction of the party. Under Brown’s leadership, the party realised the futility of parliamentary 
politics and adopted a more active stance towards extra-parliamentary politics.1142 In 1959, Brown 
bluntly stated that he believes that: 
The Parliamentary system in South Africa is dead, and it is dead because the Nationalists have 
killed it. They continue to go through the democratic motions because it gives the stamp of 
respectability to their policies and deludes a diminishing number of their opponents, at home and 
abroad, into thinking that democracy functions here.1143 
The LPSA’s departure from parliamentary politics freed it from being relevant to the White electorate. 
Instead it cooperated with other extra-parliamentary organisations and became directly involved in 
protests and calls for boycotts.1144  
 
1137  Mouton, ‘Only a Liberal of High-Sounding Words?’, 55; Isacowitz, Telling People What They Do Not 
Want to Hear, 337. 
1138  Mouton, ‘Only a Liberal of High-Sounding Words?’, 55; Isacowitz, Telling People What They Do Not 
Want to Hear, 337. 
1139  Du Toit, ‘The National Committee for Liberation (‘ARM’) 1960-1964: Sabotage and the Question of the 
Ideological Subject’, 41. 
1140  Mouton, ‘Only a Liberal of High-Sounding Words?’, 56–58; SAIRR, ‘South African Institute of Race 
Relations Survey 1959-1960’ (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1960), 12. 
1141  Isacowitz, Telling People What They Do Not Want to Hear, 409. 
1142  Moffatt, ‘From ‘Conscience Politics’ to the Battlefields of Political Activism’, 88, 104; Isacowitz, Telling 
People What They Do Not Want to Hear, 335. 
1143  Isacowitz, Telling People What They Do Not Want to Hear, 404. 
1144  Du Toit, ‘The National Committee for Liberation (‘ARM’) 1960-1964’, 43; Moffatt, ‘From ‘Conscience 
Politics’ to the Battlefields of Political Activism’, 110. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
149 
The LPSA, with its non-racial membership, was an anomaly in South African politics at the time.1145 
Their entry into non-racial politics also placed the party in conflict with the radicals who positioned 
themselves as the White representation of the Congress of the People (COP). If the LPSA’s previous 
non-racial positions had not concerned the government, its new position placed it in direct conflict 
with the nationalist government. 
5.3 COUNCIL OF DEMOCRATS AND THE END OF THE SPRINGBOK LEGION 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the expulsion of the SL from the Torch in 1951, coupled with the earlier 
dissolution of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1950 left many White radicals politically 
stranded. These radicals used the remnants of the SL to regroup. Thus, by 1952, the SL had been 
repositioned. No longer simply an ex-servicemen’s interest group, the SL used wartime rhetoric to 
broaden the understanding of fascism to include racism and thereby frame the NP as fascist. Under 
the leadership of Guy Routh, the SL began building bridges with the Black liberation movements and 
supported multi-racial initiatives against the Nationalists.1146 The SL’s open support for the Defiance 
campaign on 6 April 1952, won over the African National Congress (ANC) and allowed the SL to 
position itself within the liberation struggle. 1147 
In November 1952, on the back of inter-racial solidarity built during the Defiance campaign, the ANC 
and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) called a meeting to consolidate White partnership 
within the Congress movement.1148 Two broad groups were in the audience, the SL’s radical group, 
and a loose collection of liberals and progressives.1149 The radicals were eager to participate in order 
to secure an entry point into liberation politics.1150 The still uncoordinated liberals had a more cautious 
approach which laid bare the divisions between the liberal and radical Whites. The radicals used 
their participation in the meeting at the Darragh Hall in November 1952 to strength the radicals’ 
position within the COP and the struggle for Black liberation.1151  
The radicals entered the Darragh Hall meeting with a distinct advantage over other interested White 
groupings. Their control over the SL had created the illusion that they negotiated on behalf of the 
White population.1152 The radicals control over a rudimentary organisation from which to construct a 
White congress partner, provided them with better leverage than that of individual radicals or liberals. 
Cecil Williams and Jack Hodgson entered into discussions with the SAIC and ANC, accepting that 
the White radical’s role in the congress movement would be to mobilise opinion in the White 
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population.1153 Although the radicals had an initial organisational advantage, there were some, such 
as Routh, who believed that the liberals should have been allowed to organise on similar lines.1154 
The liberals, not yet formally organised as a party, failed to attend the meeting in significant numbers. 
Some had boycotted the meeting in protest over the inclusion of “known communists”, based on their 
previous associations, and others harboured policy differences with the radical left.1155 Both radicals 
and liberals preferred an all-in, non-racial organisation and were wary of constructing the movement 
along racial lines.1156 The communists feared that the emphasis on racial consciousness would 
negate the idea of non-racial class unity, whereas the liberals feared the loss of individualism within 
racially-conscious nationalist movements.1157 In the end, the radicals were more willing to 
compromise on their principles. As a former member of the CPSA, Isacowitz had also warned that 
the communists, with their more flexible agenda, would use the meeting to outmanoeuvre the 
liberals. He cautioned the liberal groups against getting too involved.1158 Ernie Wentzel, a liberal and 
friend of Isacowitz, related how Isacowitz identified the communist agenda during the Darragh Hall 
meeting: 
Isacowitz said that when discussions started to take place, he noticed that various colleagues of 
his from the Communist Party and Springbok Legion were not sitting together as one would 
normally imagine friends would do, but were spread out at various places throughout the hall. By 
their interventions in the meeting, it was quite clear to him, as a former member of the Communist 
Party, that they were working according to a preconceived pattern and that people, although not 
sitting together with one another, had got together before the meeting and decide on the tactics 
to be adopted. Isacowitz told me [Wentzel] that the moment he saw this happen, he realised that 
the CD [Congress of Democrats] would be a straight Communist organization, and under their 
control, and there would be no place in the organization for Liberals.1159 
Despite the reservations of the liberals, several meetings occurred between the liberals and the 
radicals to form a single White congress movement, but without success.1160 By January 1953, the 
Johannesburg radicals formed the COD, while the liberals opted to consolidate the various liberal 
discussion groups into the SALA.1161 One of the main points of contention remained the principle of 
the franchise. The COD argued for universal franchise, and the liberals remained committed to a 
non-racial but qualified franchise.1162  
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The Darragh Hall meeting was a watershed in White resistance to apartheid. Those that were not 
willing to work within the framework proposed by the ANC found expression in the non-racial LPSA. 
The SL, which by this stage had been thoroughly infiltrated by named communists, seized the 
opportunity to consolidate various radical White movements into a singular movement, in partnership 
with the Congress movement. For Beyleveld, the SL had been instrumental in the formation of the 
COD in Johannesburg in January 1953 after the Darragh Hall meeting. According to Beyleveld, 
“…the SL was one of the organisations instrumental in the formation of the Congress of Democrats 
(COD) I became the president of COD”.1163 
The SL raised funds in support of the formation of the COD, which quickly established 13 branches 
countrywide and boasted 500 members. By August 1953, the two movements were cooperating on 
numerous issues. However, Bunting saw the COD as simply a continuation of the SL:  
… the people who battled around in the Legion were probably the same people who battled 
around in the Congress of Democrats, and they had the paper and all the connections and they 
just carried on, changed its character a little bit, that’s all.1164  
The government, alarmed by the SL’s involvement in the establishment of the COD as the White 
partner in the liberation struggle, increased pressure on the organisation. On 4 June 1953, the 
Security Police raided the SL’s offices in Johannesburg, confiscating records and documents. 
Banning orders followed; Hodgson was first.1165 Then, on 28 August 1953, the government also 
ordered Williams and Alan Lipman to resign from all organisations and banned them from attending 
any gatherings for two years.1166  
Despite increased government repression, in October 1953, the COD in Johannesburg, the SL, and 
the Democratic League of Cape Town formally amalgamated as the South African Congress of 
Democrats (SACOD).1167 The role of ex-servicemen, especially legionnaires, in the SACOD, was 
extensive. At the inaugural conference on 10 and 11 October 1953, Rusty Bernstein, both a 
legionnaire and a communist, gave the keynote address. Bernstein and Hodgson set the tone of the 
conference by presenting papers on the situation in the country.1168 In the election of the committee, 
ex-servicemen dominated central positions, with Beyleveld as president, Hodgson as secretary, and 
Lee-Warden as vice-president.1169 Other ex-servicemen and servicewomen on the national 
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executive included Joe Slovo, Michael Hathorn, and Helen Joseph.1170 The election of Lee-Warden 
to the SACOD committee led to the Cape Democratic League, which Lee-Warden led, finally merging 
with SACOD in November 1953.1171  
The aims and objectives of the SACOD were formulated in a restricted manner to appeal to Whites 
who felt politically stranded after the implosion of the Torch the previous month.1172 The sectional 
nature of SACOD worried the founders, with Hodgson and Bernstein arguing torturously that the 
SACOD was non-racial in membership its purpose was to mobilise the White population against 
apartheid.1173 Lee-Warden, was more forthright as he stated, he “… for one, was against joining up 
with an organisation that was for Whites only, even if the ANC had wanted it that way”.1174 Harold 
Strachan described the position of the White SACOD within the Congress movement as being akin 
to being “…like carnivores in a vegetarian restaurant”.1175 Thus, although the White radicals had 
embraced multi-racial engagement, there were some that still harboured feelings of otherness and 
saw multi-racialism as a stepsister of apartheid. 
With prominent legionnaires in control of the SACOD, the SL quietly dissolved into SACOD and 
handed over its mouthpiece Fighting Talk to SACOD. The SL thus provided continuity between the 
radical ideals forged in the war and the emerging ideals of national liberation.1176 However, the 
presence of ‘known communists’ on the committees allowed the government to label SACOD as a 
communist front in the press.1177 As a result, SACOD suffered intense government oppression. For 
example, in response to a parliamentary question by Lee-Warden on 2 June 1959, the Justice 
Minister revealed the banning per year from 1954 until 1959 to Parliament, as shown in Table 5.71178  
Table 5.7: Banning of South Africans between 1954 until 19591179  
Year of banning 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Number of banned persons 82 32 15 15 4 9 
 
By 1954 the government had banned a total of 40 of the estimated 250 SACOD members with many 
SACOD members driven into exile.1180 Such government suppression hindered the SACOD’s ability 
to find direction. 
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In 1954, Professor Zachariah (ZK) Matthews, sensing a lack of policy direction in the Congress 
movement suggested the convening of a ‘Congress of the People’ to propose a Freedom Charter as 
a blueprint for the future South African constitution.1181 After consideration, all constituents of the 
Congress movement approved of the idea. The Congress movement established a national working 
committee to pursue the idea, with Beyleveld and Bernstein representing the SACOD.1182 
The task of collating the thousands of inputs and distilling them into a coherent whole fell on 
Bernstein since he was the only professional writer on the national working committee.1183 The 
collection of demands and inputs from the entire country provoked people to think and discuss the 
political situation. The process of consultation and collection became almost more important than 
the Congress itself. Slovo and others “… considered that process of collecting the demands even 
more important than the actual congress itself, because it was a sort of catalyst for getting people 
moving, organising, discussing and thinking …”1184 On 25 June 1955, the COP revealed Bernstein’s 
final draft of the Freedom Charter at Kliptown. Bernstein and Slovo, both serving banning orders, 
were unable to attend officially but observed from adjoining sites.1185  
The government’s reaction to the Freedom Charter was slow. Only in December 1955 did the 
government react by arresting many of the COP protagonists and indicted them for treason. The 
indictment included ex-servicemen such as Bernstein, Beyleveld, Hodgson, Joseph, Slovo and Fred 
Carneson. Schedule B of the indictment cited Lee-warden and Routh.1186 Although the Treason Trial 
removed many of the Congress movements’ key office bearers, it did not immobilise the movement, 
but instead concentrated them in one place, thereby facilitating deliberations on structures, tactics 
and strategy. Bernstein later recounted that the “… Treason Trail arrests could have made matters 
worse by immobilising key personnel from all levels of the organisation and decimating the ranks of 
local leadership. Instead they made things better by bringing many leaders together.”1187 
The ejection of the SL from the Torch had freed them to engage in multi-racial politics. The inclusion 
of the remnants of the SL in the COP movement, in the form of former legionnaires, injected 
substantial ideological and organisational skills into COP. The legionnaires used the rhetoric of anti-
fascism to juxtapose wartime fascism onto increased government oppression, thereby creating a 
sense of continuity between the war and the anti-apartheid struggle. Furthermore, the government’s 
banning and arrests only served to further strengthen the Legionnaires’ equivalence of fascism with 
the Nationalist regime. 
 
1181  Bernstein, Memory Against Fo  rgetting, 126. 
1182  Bernstein, 128. 
1183  Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 10; Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism, 220–21. 
1184  SAHA, AL2460, ‘Interview with Joe Slovo by J Fredrickse’, 12. 
1185  Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 139; SAHA, AL2460, ‘Interview with Joe Slovo by J Fredrickse.’ 
1186  Wits Historical Papers, AD1812, A2. Vol 42 , 1956 Treason Trail, 'Regina vs Adams and Others’.  
1187  Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 159. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
5.4 EFFECT OF THE 1953 ELECTIONS ON THE UP 
5.4.1 The resignation of Strauss 
The election defeat and the peeling off of two progressive parties from the UP placed the leadership 
of Kosie Strauss into doubt. Bitter political infighting debilitated the UP. Fault lines between 
progressives and conservatives surfaced.1188 Jan Steytler, a new MP and ex-serviceman, in his first 
parliamentary caucus meeting on 21 May 1953, rebutted the conservative Blaar Coetzee’s proposal 
for a rapprochement with the NP over the Coloured franchise. His rebuttal accentuated the fault line 
between the conservatives and progressives:  
I said “I have just fought an election that cost me very many thousands of pounds then, on the 
principle of retaining the Coloureds on the Common Voters’ Roll”…” I’ll be frank, I’d like to get 
every non-European qualified, on the Common Voters’ Roll”. Then I was quite surprised at the 
number of people that supported me, people that I hadn’t met before. And they became very close 
friends of mine, in Parliament, so actually the Progressive Party idea started there at the first 
caucus meeting.1189  
During the same meeting, Bailey Bekker, supported by Arthur Barlow, Frank Waring, Abraham 
Jonker, and Coetzee, openly criticised Strauss for both his management of the election and his 
position on the Coloured franchise. Straus attempted to smooth these frictions between him and the 
Bekker group, but to little avail.1190 By September 1953, the conservatives’ attempts to reach a 
compromise with the NP on the Coloured franchise had become such an embarrassment to Strauss 
that he purged the UP of Bekker and his conservative supporters.1191 However, this expulsion did 
not assuage the rest of the UP, in-fighting between conservatives and liberals within his party 
increased and intensified.1192 Waring joined Reverend Cecil Miles-Cadman as the rare ex-
servicemen with Nationalist sympathies, and he eventually became a cabinet minister in 1961. 
In 1955, an argument erupted in the UP over whether the party would restore the Coloureds to a 
Common Voters’ roll if they returned to power. A dissenting group of progressive MPs threatened to 
resign over the issue. This group included Ray Swart, Owen Townley Williams, Ronald Butcher, 
John Cope and Helen Suzman, Jan Steytler, Sakkies Fourie, and Friedman. An intervention by Harry 
Oppenheimer and Harry Lawrence persuaded the group to remain in the UP as a liberal pressure 
group.1193 However, afterwards, Strauss issued a bland compromise statement, which only further 
antagonised Friedman, who resigned from the party and Parliament.1194 By 1956, an ill Strauss, first 
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suffering from a glandular infection then hepatitis was worn down from fighting the Coloured 
franchise issue while simultaneously holding an increasingly fractious party together.1195 He was 
finally removed from the head of the UP by its provincial leaders. Graaff reluctantly accepted the 
leadership position in the UP.1196 Strauss had little choice but to make way for the charismatic and 
popular ex-servicemen, despite harbouring serious reservations about Graaff’s ability to lead.1197 
After August 1959, Strauss disappeared from public life and retired to the quieter countryside where 
he became a successful cattle farmer in the vicinity of Klerksdorp.1198 
5.4.2 Graaff’s turn to the right 
The charismatic and likeable Graaff was immediately popular within the party and with the press. His 
presence and lineage appealed to the bloed-sappe, the conservative Afrikaans-speaking supporters 
of the UP.1199 He believed that his war record and farming credentials would help reinvigorate the 
UP’s Afrikaner support base and win over the platteland, “…[b]ecause of a whole variety of reasons, 
my background, army service, all that sort of thing, I brought with me the conservative platteland 
people.”1200  
Thus, Graaff aimed to use some of his accrued social, symbolic and cultural capital in various fields 
to advance his political goals and career as he had done prior to assuming the UP leadership 
position. The transference of such capital took various forms. For instance, Colonel Jan Pretorius 
entered politics after leaving the SAAF and was part of the campaign to ‘sell’ Graaff to the platteland 
support base.1201 Pretorius had been court-martialled in-camera in 1953 on 20 offences under the 
military disciplinary code.1202 Ironically, a year before the court-martial, Marais Viljoen (later state 
president) had written to FC Erasmus suggesting Pretorius for advancement.1203 
However, despite Graaff’s charm and the loyalty he commanded, he was labelled by both friend and 
foe as a pleasant man with no political acumen.1204 He adopted the belief that a politician should only 
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articulate the opinion of the electorate, and he advocated policies he thought would be popular with 
the public.1205 As Graaff noted: 
Members of Parliament are in large measure mouthpieces of the people. They may seek to guide 
and to educate, but ultimately their task is to render articulate and effective the views of the 
ordinary citizen.1206 
On assuming the party’s leadership, Graaff formed the opinion that pandering to the progressive 
faction had weakened the UP and that he “… was still stuck with a number of Labour people who 
were making such liberal noises, that they were frightening away any sort of hope of getting 
platteland people.”1207  
He immediately set about distancing the party from liberalism, repositioning the UP as a ‘middle of 
the road’ party that avoided the race issue.1208 He felt that “the party had gone as far to the left as 
was possible without losing the hard core of Party support and the good old Bloed-sappe but they 
were getting fed up.”1209 
Although Graaff was still willing to give the progressives a fair hearing, he was far from willing to 
accept their views.1210 For example, he was surprised by the leftward tendencies of his Cape 
Province leader, Jan Steytler and brother Willem Steytler: 
I was surprised when his brother proposed at the Cape Congress that the Party’s policy should 
be one man, one vote on the common role, but I was even more surprised when Jan supported 
it.1211 
According to Suzman, Graaff quickly came under the influence of the conservative wing of the 
party.1212 He developed a close friendship with Mitchell, who was prominent in the conservative 
faction, which included ex-servicemen Vause Raw, Robert Badenhorst-Durrant, Aaron Berman, 
“Jack” Basson and Radcliffe Cadman.1213  
Graaff was a member of the Cape Afrikaner gentry and remained naïve in terms of the stranglehold 
the Nationalists had on the platteland. As a politician, he believed that the UP should reflect, rather 
than direct, its members and the electorate at large. He was endowed with privilege from a young 
age and often valued loyalty more than principle among his followers. The 1958 elections would 
further test the cohesion of the UP. 
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5.4.3 1958 elections  
The 1958 general elections marked a decisive point in South African history. In this election, the NP 
was able to consolidate undisputed control over the South African White electorate. The Nationalists 
romped home with 97 seats and the six additional seats for South West Africa, knocking the LP out 
of Parliament and reducing the UP’s seats by four to 53. After the election, the NP had secured a 
majority of 43 seats in Parliament.1214 Even more telling for the UP, was that Graaff’s lack of 
ruthlessness had become evident when he contested and lost his traditional seat in the Hottentots-
Holland constituency. This political defeat was made all the more bitter since he had been warned 
that the NP had severely gerrymandered the constituency boundaries in their favour. 1215 Arguably, 
Graaff overestimated the value of his accrued capital, or that of his opponent. 
In the 1958 elections, the number of ex-servicemen, in the sample group, who contested the 
elections increased from 36 to 45, as indicated in Table 5.8.1216 The three LPSA candidates that 
contested Sea Point, Orange Grove and Pietermaritzburg were ex-servicemen. Leo Lovell stood for 
Labour in Benoni against fellow ex-serviceman Douglas Ross. Lee-Warden (SACOD) and Stanford 
(LPSA) returned as ‘Native Representatives’. The remainder stood as UP candidates.1217 The UP 
had thus remained a broad umbrella under which a majority of ex-servicemen sheltered.  
Table 5.8 shows the UP’s careful balance of the two dominant linguistic groups. However, the UPs 
courting of the Afrikaans-speaking electorate was as unsuccessful as in previous years. The English-
speaking candidates successfully contested urban constituencies and in the rural areas the mostly 
Afrikaans-speaking UP candidates faced an even harder battle against Nationalist candidates. The 
NP had adopted a strategy that included the loading of rural constituencies, aggressive 
gerrymandering and the extensive use of identity politics, all of which prevented the UP from 
penetrating the platteland constituencies.  
Table 5.8: Ex-servicemen contesting the 1958 general elections (n=153)1218 
 
Afrikaans-speaking English-speaking Jewish Total 
Successful MPs 5 12 3 20 
Unsuccessful candidates 17 6 2 25 
Total 22 18 5 45 
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Table 5.9: Military experience of ex-servicemen in the 1958 general elections and 12th 
Parliament 1958-1961 (n=153)1219 




War experience Membership of ex-





AES POW SL Torch 
MPs (elected in 1958) 20 5 12 3 2 - 4 
Unsuccessful candidates 24 8 15 2 2 2 6 
MPs (by elections and 
uncontested seats) 
3 - 3 - 1 - - 
 
Table 5.9 shows the wartime and veteran organisation experiences of the 1958 parliamentary 
opposition in the 12th Parliament. Similar to the 11th Parliament, the ex-servicemen with African 
campaign experience outnumbered those who had later fought in Italy. However, the increase in 
MPs with Italian campaign experience announced the arrival of a younger cohort of ex-servicemen 
on the political scene and suggested a broadening of both past military experience as well as political 
views among the ex-servicemen parliamentarians. The lingering political influence of the former 
politicised veteran organisations is evident by the ten Torchmen and two former legionnaires 
contesting the elections. The failure of Lovell and Beyleveld to secure their seats marked not only 
the end of the LP but also the end of the influence of the SL in parliamentary politics. The Torchmen, 
however, were more successful in securing parliamentary representation: Lee-Warden 
(Independent), Eglin (UP), Raw (UP) and Leo Kowarsky (UP) all secured seats in Parliament. 1220 
Although 20 ex-servicemen had won seats in the elections, minor political shuffling and by-election 
victories in 1960 and 1961, left the final tally, within the sample, at 23 ex-servicemen in the 12th 
Parliamentary sitting (1959-1961). Pilkington-Jordan resigned his seat (Rondebosch) in favour of 
fellow ex-servicemen and UP leader Graaff. Kowarsky vacated his seat (Yeoville) in favour of Marais 
Steyn. James Durrant (UP) won a by-election in 1960 and used his maiden speech to berate 
Erasmus for destroying the proud record of the UDF, taking the outcry over the Sharpeville Massacre 
to overshadow the subsequent political fracas. Ex-servicemen now constituted over a third of the UP 
parliamentary caucus. At least 20 of the 53 UP MPs were ex-servicemen. 1221  
With so many ex-servicemen now in Parliament, the unintended personal fallout that many of 
Erasmus’ military reforms had caused came back to haunt him in parliamentary debates. Erasmus’ 
running of the UDF had aggrieved many of the ex-servicemen on the election list. Durrant, the chair 
of the UP in the Transvaal, had resigned from the UDF under pressure in 1952.1222 Pretorius, who 
had been court-martialled in August 1953 and dismissed from the UDF, contested the Boksburg seat 
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for the UP.1223 McMillan, who was denied a ‘step-up’ rank on retirement on the most insubstantial 
grounds, fought the Durban Central seat.1224 Two victims of the infamous 1953 mass dismissal of 
officers later known as the ‘Midnight Ride’, were also candidates on the UP list.1225 Brigadier Hendrick 
Bronkhorst, a UP organiser, contested the Roodepoort constituency and Colonel JA de Vos at 
Vanderbylpark.1226 Wally Kingwill, who led his officers in a mass resignation over the renaming of 
the Die Middellandse Regiment to the Regiment Gideon Scheepers in 1953 now stood in Graaff-
Reinet. 1227 Ross, who as chairman of the BESL had clashed with Erasmus over the creation of a 
defence council, stood in Benoni against fellow ex-serviceman Lovell. In 1961 Gideon Jacobs, whose 
appointment as Dean of the Military Academy was refused by Erasmus because Jacobs’ “politics 
were not right”, entered into politics as a UP organiser. Jacobs was subsequently elected as MP for 
Hillbrow in the 1966 general election.1228 After the 1959 elections, the new Prime Minister, Hendrik 
Verwoerd, who succeeded Hans Strydom, replaced Erasmus. Erasmus was succeeded as the 
Minister of Defence by Jim Fouché. Fouché’s appointment placated some ex-servicemen in the UP. 
For instance, Pilkington-Jordan described Fouché as “a real improvement over his predecessor.”1229 
By 1958, Graaff commanded the absolute loyalty of many ex-servicemen in the UP. Men who now 
represented a fair amount of his parliamentary caucus and party structures.1230 One such individual 
was Kingwill, who was a typical Graaff devotee, had served in Die Middellandse Regiment and 
shared Graaff’s POW status. Kingwill would not even allow his wife to criticise Graaff.1231 As 
previously discussed, Graaff depended on the loyalty of a network of ex-servicemen, or his social 
capital, to control the party and quash opposition: 
In fact, in many small villages our committees consisted almost entirely of old comrades who had 
decided to come in and give a hand.1232 
What he [Steytler] didn’t know, and should have known, was that forty of the chaps on his 
divisional committee, well counting that’s husbands and wives [sic.], were people who’d served 
with me in my regiment. And there was just no argument.1233 
Furthermore, personal loyalties extended beyond the immediate boundaries of party politics. The 
personal relationships that had developed within the veteran community during the early 1950s 
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meant that the UP was still able to call on former Torch members and veterans for support and 
assistance.1234  
5.4.4 The split in the UP and formation of the Progressive Party 
The poor performance in the elections only worsened the already difficult relationship between the 
progressive and liberal, and the conservative wings of the party.1235 His loss in 1958 of the 
Hottentots-Holland seat had made Graaff even less tolerant of the progressive left-wing of the 
party.1236 He informed Eglin, during a discussion over the election results, that he would no longer 
allow the progressives to influence him to his detriment.1237  
When a new MP, ex-serviceman and business financier, Andrew Brown, queried Graaff regarding 
the election defeat of 1958, Graaff appointed a committee to investigate the reasons for the defeat. 
Three of the six members on the committee were ex-servicemen, namely Gray-Hughes, James 
Hamilton-Russel and Raw. Following the investigation, the committee agreed on two points. Firstly, 
that the UP lacked a clear policy. Secondly, that since South Africa was a multi-racial country the 
UP required a forward-looking policy. Graaff used the minority opinion of the conservative Raw, who 
refused to agree to the extension of the Coloured franchise, to sink the committee’s findings in 
January 1959.1238 Graaff’s commitment to the conservative position was thus made clear through 
these actions. 
In August 1959, the UP Congress in Bloemfontein marked the showdown between the conservatives 
and the liberal and progressive factions. The ensuing split saw the progressive faction form the 
Progressive Party (PP) that same year.1239 The charged atmosphere in the UP before the Congress, 
suggested that the party was at a breaking point. Even Graaff had hinted to the media that the UP 
Congress would result in some MPs quitting the party.1240  
The progressives were not unaware of conservative machinations. Raw claimed that the 
conservatives had “organised it overtly, and that was our intention, and we chose the issues”.1241 
Conservatives, such as Mitchell, Raw, Badenhorst-Durrant and Basson marshalled the conservative 
faction in preparation for the showdown.1242 Basson had even forewarned Mrs Jacqueline Beck (née 
de Villiers), a progressive, that he was going to use the Congress to get at Jan Steytler.1243 
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Badenhorst-Durrant even boasted after the conference, “I travelled all over the country, covering 
thousands of miles, visiting party members in the platteland and organising to get rid of you liberals 
at the congress – and see how well it worked!”1244 The progressives had foreknowledge that Raw 
had instructed party organisers to send delegates to the Congress who would “drive the liberals out 
of the party”.1245 For the progressives, it was evident that the conservatives had planned the purge 
in minutiae.1246 “This bore every sign of having been organised in advance, and it soon became 
evident to us that a concerted attempt was being made to drive us out of the party.”1247  
Eglin believed the tensions in the party had made it easy for the conservatives to predict the outcome 
of their purge “… drive the knife in there we’ll get rid of those three, if we drive it in there we’ll get rid 
of six, and if we drive it in there we’ll get rid of nine”.1248 Despite Graaff’s denial of having any 
knowledge of the plot, Oppenheimer had forewarned him against supporting the conservatives.1249 
Oppenheimer, although no longer active in politics due to his business responsibilities, still took a 
close interest in the UP.  
At the Bloemfontein Congress in August 1959, the conservatives relentlessly beleaguered the 
progressive speakers, hoping to push some of the progressives to leave the party.1250 Their 
haranguing soon became personal and provocative. Instead of cooling tempers, Graaff allowed the 
conservatives to vent their frustration and anger at the progressives. Through this, Graaff hoped that 
it would clear the air between the two camps and possibly drive home his point that the liberals had 
exceeded the bounds of the electorate. 1251 
Mitchell, however, was not content with the rapprochement envisaged by Graaff, since it would have 
kept all but the most resolute progressive towing the party line. Instead, he decided to make the 
progressive camp’s position untenable. He used a motion that the UP opposed, the purchasing of 
more land by the government, to create quasi-sovereign Black Homelands to increase pressure on 
the progressives.1252 When an overwhelming majority passed his resolution, the discredited and 
battered progressives had little left but to withdraw from the party. Graaff was surprised at the extent 
of the purge, which took around 25 per cent of his parliamentary caucus. He was able to stem some 
of the flow by convincing Sydney Waterson, and Hamilton-Russell to remain in the UP. Hamilton-
Russell later left the UP for the PP in 1963.1253 
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Graaff eventually reconciled himself that the split was voluntary and a final confirmation that the 
progressives had strayed too far from the mandate of the UP. Therefore “[t]hey could no longer 
associate themselves with the conservative South African approach of the United Party …”1254 He 
was relieved to have restored calm to his party by ejecting the fractious progressives. Ex-servicemen 
now accounted for about half of the UP parliamentary caucus. The high concentration of 
conservative ex-servicemen among the remaining MPs resulted in a more congenial atmosphere in 
the UP.1255 However, it would not bode well in the long term. 
On 13 November 1959, eleven MPs, of whom three were ex-servicemen, resigned from the UP to 
form the PP.1256 The eleven were Suzman, Cope, Owen Williams, Butcher, Swart, Zach de Beer, 
Clive van Ryneveld, Lawrence, Boris Wilson and ex-servicemen Eglin, Fourie, and Jan Steytler. A 
further five MPCs, including ex-servicepersons Kowarsky and Beck, joined them. Furthermore, four 
candidates who had contested seats in the general election, including two ex-servicemen Ralph 
Parrott and Willem Steytler, also left the UP to join the PP.1257 This loss “was a tragedy for the UP 
as the party lost … [their] brightest minds and most capable MPs”.1258 However, simultaneously the 
loss was subdued since it restored homogeneity to the UP since most of the remaining MPs were 
ex-servicemen loyal to Graaff. 1259 
At the PP’s inaugural Congress in November 1959, the executive of the new party included five ex-
servicemen, namely Jan Steytler, Eglin, Friedman, Kowarsky, and Parrott.1260 In total, the prominent 
ex-servicemen/woman that resigned immediately from the UP to form the PP numbered seven, with 
another three, Stanford, Hamilton-Russell and Friedman joining the PP later. Table 5.10 shows the 
war experience of these ex-servicemen. Although the African campaigns still accounted for most of 
their war experience, there was a relative increase in those with Italian campaign experience. The 
increase in Italian campaign veterans suggested two trends. Not only was a younger cohort of 
politicians emerging, but the Italian campaign had seemingly affected soldiers differently. The 
presence of four former prominent Torchmen (Parrott, the former National Organiser, Kowarsky, the 
former National Treasurer, Eglin, the Chairman for the Pinelands Torch and Willem Steytler, the 
chairman of the Burgersdorp Torch) confirms that the progressive and liberal ex-servicemen had 
exerted substantial influence within the PP, despite their numbers being small. However, the near-
equal language split seen in Table 5.10 confirms that at least some Afrikaans-speaking politicians 
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were able to evade the corralling of Afrikaners by the NP into a single, homogeneous, Afrikaner 
Nationalist bloc.  
Table 5.10: Language and military experience of ex-servicemen in the Progressive Party 
(n=153)1261 
Language Ex-servicemen in sample Africa Star Italy Star AES 
Afrikaans-speaking 4 1 - 2 
English-speaking 4 3 3 - 
Jewish 2 1 - - 
Total 10 5 3 2 
 
The progressives in principle were willing to embrace a degree of non-racialism and the “protection 
of fundamental human rights and the safeguard of the dignity and worth of the human person, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed”1262 and that “no citizen of the Union of South Africa shall be 
debarred on grounds of race, religion, language or sex, from making a contribution to our national 
life …”1263 However, when it came to the universal franchise, they ran against the same issue that 
the LPSA and UFP had grappled with before them, the qualified franchise. The need to protect ‘the 
values of Western Civilisation’ and group identities (i.e. White minority rights) made them wary of 
advocating universal suffrage. Their solution was:  
To enable suitably qualified citizens of a defined degree of civilisation belonging to any population 
group to participate in the government of the country in accordance to their ability to assume 
responsibility, through the holding of public office and through registration on a common electoral 
roll for election of members of the House of Assembly, with special provision for the representation 
of persons not so qualified. 1264  
Thus the PP rather aimed for the creation of a non-racial qualified franchise rather than universal 
suffrage. Secondly, for a non-racial Bill of Rights and lastly, to end all racial discrimination in South 
Africa. However, these aims might have been too ‘progressive’ for the time considering the frequency 
and intensity of violence both domestically and in other parts of the continent. Despite its attempts 
to assuage the minority while simultaneously advancing its non-racial policies, the PP still alienated 
the White electorate.1265 
 
1261  Table compiled by Author from South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA.  
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In almost tragic irony, in 1970 Malherbe showed that even years later, the PP’s qualified franchise 
proposal did not weaken the White population’s political control over South Africa. Malherbe 
estimated that the combination of the education proposed (grade 8) and income required (R1000 
pm) would result in an electorate still dominated by Whites (82.8 per cent), with Blacks (10.3 per 
cent), Coloureds (4.7 per cent) and Indian/Asiatics (2.2 per cent) having little influence relative to 
their population size.1266 The progressives hoped that such a gradual response would placate the 
growing demands for universal representation. However, events in the broader South African political 
landscape soon over-shadowed the PP’s political programme.  
5.5 THE IMPACT OF 1960 ON EX-SERVICEMEN IN EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS  
Although the 1958 elections had confirmed the NP’s dominance of White politics, their suppression 
of growing Black discord had faltered. However, by March 1960, the dam of pent up Black frustration 
burst without warning. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) attempted to pre-empt the ANC’s anti-
pass campaign by launching a similar campaign in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. An unprepared 
police reaction resulted in the death of 69 Black South Africans and hundreds of others injured.1267 
The government responded to the violence of Sharpeville in an almost knee-jerk reaction by arresting 
11 279 Africans, 90 Asians, 36 Coloureds and 98 Whites, of whom 35 were women.1268  
Those detained since the government decreed a state of emergency on 30 March 1960 believed 
that the government had used an out-of-date list of “known communists”, drawn from membership 
lists of the former CPSA, to determine who to arrest.1269 This deduction was largely based on the 
fact that not all of them were actually communists in the strictest sense. Bernstein describes the 
confusion of the detainees: 
In the white male cell, there are around fifteen others, many of them my political colleagues. Some 
are, like Archie, former communists who have long since dropped out of politics. Some have even 
changed their political orientation entirely. They are all, understandably, disorientated and 
shocked to find themselves summarily jailed.1270 
Meidner sarcastically commented that he had “been imprisoned twice, once by the Communists, and 
once for being a Communist”.1271 The haphazard, blanket approach of the state’s detentions is also 
disbelievingly expressed by Isacowitz when he commented to Bernstein who was with him in 
detention that, “If anyone had told me that I would find myself singing hymns alongside Rusty 
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Bernstein, I’d have told him to get his head read!”1272 The debateable accuracy of the list’s contents 
rested on the fact that the White detainees consisted of leading members of the LPSA, as well as 
the then secret underground SACP, among others. 1273 
The SACP, founded in 1953, was then only a clandestine party albeit that some have argued that its 
existence was known by some in left-wing politics. It was only in 1960 that the SACP’s existence 
was announced. Unfortunately, the state was less discerning about correctly identifying an 
individual’s political affiliations or orientation. They rather lumped everyone with liberal or radical 
views into one category, namely ‘communists’. Thus the government label communist applied to 
non-communists as much as former members of the CPSA, individuals who saw themselves as 
communists, even if they were averse to the former CPSA or other self-professed communists.1274  
Almost two months after the Sharpville massacre, on 10 May 1960, the Department of Justice 
circulated, arguably the same outdated list, within the civil service of “known communist” office 
bearers, officials and active communists which included 15 of the ex-servicemen in this study. They 
were Hodgson, Bunting, Carneson, Williams, Slovo, Routh, Lipman, Bernstein, Hathorn, Isacowitz, 
Rowley Arenstein, Wolfie Kodesh, Joseph Podbrey, John O’Meara and John Morley-Turner.1275  
The extent of the violence and the subsequent draconian reaction of the Nationalist government 
convinced communist revolutionaries and liberals alike that change was afoot and that a national 
revolution was both inevitable and even imminent.1276 Ironically, the arrest of so many White 
dissidents allowed them to reassess their positions on the state of the country and renew old 
relationships.1277 The members detained together in Johannesburg and Natal were a venerable 
collection of ex-servicemen who knew each other through their involvement in the African and Italian 
campaigns during the war and had forged deep bonds in the SL. The White ex-servicemen detained 
from 30 March 1960 were Hathorn (Natal - SACOD), Arenstein (Natal - former member of the CPSA), 
Peter Brown (Natal - National Chairman LPSA ), Meidner (Natal - Natal Provincial Chairman LPSA), 
Slovo (Johannesburg - SACOD), Isacowitz (Johannesburg - LPSA), John Lang (Johannesburg - 
LPSA), Monty Berman (Johannesburg - former members of the CPSA), Williams (Johannesburg - 
SACOD), and Bernstein.1278 On 31 March 1960, the Nationalist regime published a Government 
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Gazette officially declaring a state of emergency to retrospectively cover the arrests made in the pre-
dawn hours of the previous day.1279  
Kodesh, acting on a tip-off from Braam Fischer,1280 remained at large, disguised as a chauffeur for 
Moses Kotane, fulfilling an essential role as a driver, runner and courier.1281 Carneson, also acting 
on a tip-off, went into hiding. His wife, however, was detained by the police.1282 Strachan and 
Hodgson escaped separately to Swaziland, joining Beyleveld who was already there. However, Rica 
Hodgson did not escape detention.1283 After the Sharpeville Massacre, liberal and radical alike were 
subjected to wholesale arrest, detention and banning by the government as indicated in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11: Suppression of ex-servicemen in opposition formations (n=153)1284 
 
Communist SL LP LPSA SACOD 
Members banned, arrested or detained1285 16 17 2 10 13 
Not suppressed  2 15 2 7 1 
Total 18 32 4 17 14 
5.5.1 National Committee of Liberation/African Resistance Movement  
In prison, Monty Berman became the catalyst for discussions around the contingencies of an armed 
struggle.1286 Berman had been expelled from the underground South African Communist Party 
(SACP) but was allowed by his previous cell leader, Slovo, to continue to work within the Congress 
movement. In prison, he abandoned his previous conviction that an armed struggle was premature 
and began canvassing support for the idea.1287 Berman also drew on his knowledge of the Maquis 
in Second World War France, his first-hand observations of the Italian partisans, and the actions of 
the Jewish Brigade in the new state of Israel for his planning of the campaign. He proposed a 
sabotage organisation that would spark a broader revolution among the Africans.1288 He engaged 
both communists and non-communists, selling the idea of a broad umbrella front under which all 
interest parties could participate. 1289 
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He immediately struck up a friendship with fellow ex-servicemen Lang.1290 Lang had come to the 
LPSA through the Torch. He had already developed a reputation as a maverick and had attempted 
to resurrect the Torch in 1955.1291 His involvement in Freedom Radio in Natal, had established his 
underground credentials. This was especially after he had been arrested and charged for 
contravening the Radio Act in May 1956.1292 Freedom Radio made its first debut on 15 April 1956 
and quickly became a prominent voice of a secret Natalian group that opposed the government. Its 
‘cousin’, known as the Horticulturalists, was a highly secretive, paramilitary organisation formed in 
1959.1293 The Horticulturalists had also considered launching a sabotage campaign, and Lang’s 
close involvement with the group made him receptive to Berman’s plan.1294 When Lang was released 
in June 1960, following his arrest after Sharpville, he concocted grandiose plans for the National 
Committee of Liberation (NCL). He was able to secure funding for the movement from the Ghanaian 
government, via his connection with Rubin, who was lecturing law in Ghana. Lang and Rubin had a 
long history together, both were lawyers at LP Rubin, both had been members of the Torch, and 
both were members of the LPSA.1295  
The newly-formed NCL in 1960 attracted a mixed bag of revolutionaries. They included radical 
liberals, ex-communists, members of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), and 
Trotskyists.1296 All loathed apartheid and felt that the Nationalist government had denied them a legal 
outlet to their frustrations. Almost naively, they were firmly committed to avoiding injuring people, 
opting for sabotage over violent agitation of the population. Furthermore, most were mavericks or 
ostracised by their organisations. Their previous experience with the former CPSA cadre led to a 
deep suspicion of the newly announced SACP, which stood accused of using Trojan Horse tactics 
like its predecessor to subvert other movements. Membership of the NCL at this stage was estimated 
to be four Blacks and seven Whites. 1297 
The movement initially centred on assisting people to flee into exile. In this regard, Lang and Berman 
were able to involve another ex-serviceman and ex-communist, Lipman, in several daring 
operations. These included an attempt to destroy the Bantu Administration Tax Office in 
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Johannesburg and sabotage electric pylons in Edenvale. Lipman joined the NCL out of a desperate 
desire ‘to do something.’1298 By the time Umkhonto we Sizwe had been formed, the NCL had already 
destroyed two powerlines and had severely damaged a pass office.1299 In December 1961, the NCL, 
through Bernstein, discussed the idea of launching joint operations with MK.1300 However, by mid-
December 1961, relations between the two organisations had soured, and MK refused further 
cooperation with the NCL.1301 The NCL faced a setback after Lang fled the country in June 1961 
under a cloud of suspicion for fraud and Monty and Myrtle Berman left South Africa around the same 
time after a tip-off that they were to be arrested by the security police.1302  
5.5.2 Umkhonto we Sizwe  
When the government banned the CPSA in 1950, ex-servicemen in the banned CPSA toyed with 
the idea of insurrection. When the CPSA was reconstituted as the SACP in 1953, the ex-servicemen 
in the party decided to move towards violent action. However, nothing came of the decision.1303 The 
most militant of the ex-servicemen was Hodgson, who had a politicising effect on everyone. Stella 
Beyleveld could not “see any organisation not becoming political with Jack Hodgson in it”.1304 His 
mining background gave him experience with explosives, and his service in the ‘elite’ Desert Rats 
made a lasting impression on his colleagues.1305  
He’d been a miner, he was a mine captain. So he knew about explosives. And he had been with 
the Desert Rats in the Army, so he was quite an authority…And so Jack started to make the first 
bombs for MK.1306 
By the late 1950s, both the underground ANC and SACP were moving independently towards the 
violent option to bring political change.1307 Both considered violence to be the inevitable option and 
that it was essential to gain control of the already volatile situation.1308 By August 1960, radical youth 
in the ANC had begun organising in ad hoc sabotage groups.1309 By the middle of 1961, the SACP 
had established several groups in Johannesburg, with Ahmed Kathrada and Hodgson already cutting 
telephone lines in Johannesburg.1310 Where the SACP focused on creating specialist units, Mandela 
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preferred quantity, and soon the number of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) units outstripped the SACP 
units. The SACP soon augmented the skills within the growing number of MK units by transferring 
members to MK.1311 For instance, Hodgson and Arthur Goldreich, due to their military experience, 
were seconded to MK.1312 Such close interaction led to discussions to merge the two initiatives. The 
discussions led to the dissolution of the communist specialist units, and their organic transfer to MK 
around July 1961. 1313 The SACP appointed Slovo as the SACP liaison to MK and Mandela 
represented the ANC as the overall commander.1314 In the Western Cape, Carneson accepted the 
appointment of MK regional coordinator, thus placing ex-servicemen central to the creation and 
command of the emerging MK.1315 
On 16 December 1961, MK launched its first symbolic attack on the state. Predictably the ex-
servicemen were key protagonists in these attacks. The preparation for the first actions of the armed 
struggle relied on ex-servicemen who had at least a rudimentary understanding of home-made 
explosives,1316 with Hodgson in Johannesburg, and Strachan in Port Elizabeth.1317 In Johannesburg, 
Bernstein, Hodgson and Ben Turok were responsible for delivering the bombs to various cell groups. 
Slovo attempted to bomb the Johannesburg Drill Hall.1318 He later met up with Bernstein and 
Hodgson where they attempted to blow up the main telephone lines between Pretoria and 
Johannesburg.1319 Kodesh, with Reggie Vandeyar, Laloo Chiba and Paul Joseph, was able to bomb 
two targets that night.1320 These ex-servicemen formed the kernel of the ANC’s initial armed struggle. 
Many of them were in the SL during the war, and fought in Africa and Italy together. Thus, there was 
a thread of continuity between the ideals that these men forged during the war and the broader 
struggle against authoritarian oppression. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter traced the eclipse of ex-servicemen organisations within South African politics after 
1953. The failure of the Torch and the Front to capitalise on the ex-serviceman identity to stem the 
NP’s electoral successes in 1953, undermined the political influence of the ex-serviceman 
community as a political constituency. As a result, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
politics reflected the dissipation of the ex-serviceman identity during this time. Out of the Torch, two 
political parties, the LPSA and the UFP emerged and neither attempted to make the ex-serviceman 
identity an election platform. Even the SL, with its virulent, anti-fascist rhetoric, shed its wartime 
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association as it merged into the SACOD within the Congress Movement. Thus, despite an increase 
of ex-servicemen in Parliament and an ever more insular ex-serviceman grouping within the radical 
left, the appeal of wartime associations and values as a political constituency receded.  
However, wartime loyalties and obligations still persisted. These associations between ex-
servicemen, when layered with other shared experiences, such as similar schooling, education and 
occupations, created overlapping networks of interaction and understanding. The radical left, already 
politicised before the war, grew more insular from the broader political community as government 
oppression increased, which ironically forced them into a closer, albeit begrudged interaction with 
the liberal community. In parliamentary politics, often unquestioning ex-serviceman loyalty to 
charismatic leadership worsened tensions between the conservative, liberal and progressive ex-
servicemen in the UP. In 1959, the formation of the PP exposed the contradictions between the 
social capital derived from wartime loyalty to Graaff and the progressive ideals that war had 
inculcated in the habitus of the ex-servicemen. The resultant parting of ways of the ex-servicemen 
in the two factions meant that by 1959 the memory of war-service no longer united ex-servicemen 
as a coherent political identity. The war may have triggered their entry into politics, but did not have 
a uniform or persistent influence on the ex-serviceman’s political disposition. The concluding chapter 
highlights the influence that the war had on the ex-servicemen who participated in post-war politics 









This study set out to explore the nexus between the war experience and subsequent political 
involvement of prominent White South African veterans in opposition politics from 1948 until 1961. 
There were three primary objectives. Firstly, how did the wartime experiences of these ex-
servicemen shape their political disposition? How did the war act as a catalyst in directing them 
towards a career in politics? Secondly, did a sense of solidarity, created by shared combat, 
contribute toward their decision to become involved in post-war politics? Lastly, how did ex-
servicemen influence the wider political discourse during this period? 
Bourdieu’s capital theory was used as a theoretical framework to map the differing types of influence 
that wartime participation might have had on the ex-servicemen. Using Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, the study explored the war’s impact on the political views of the ex-servicemen. His concept 
of forms of capital, and specifically social capital, brought the resilience and utility of the ex-
servicemen’s wartime loyalties into focus. Memoirs, autobiographies, biographies, and interviews 
were used extensively to give substance (geist) to the drier statistics emanating from the 
prosopography of the 153 ex-servicemen identified for this study.  
Chapter One contextualised the period from the declaration of war in September 1939 through to 
the declaration of the Republic in May 1961. Chapter Two, focused on the early life dispositions of 
the sample group, highlighted their ethnolinguistic, educational occupational, and generational 
profiles. Chapter Three covered their war experiences with a specific focus on their combat service, 
their individual military ranks, and prisoner-of-war (POW) status. The politicisation of the soldier by 
the Army Education Scheme (AES) and Springbok Legion (SL) was also discussed. Chapter Four 
dealt with the ex-servicemen’s return to South Africa from the war front and their entry into politics 
during the immediate post-war years up to the general elections in 1953. Chapter 5 dealt with the 
period from the disbandment of the SL and the collapse of the Torch Commando (the Torch) in 1953 
through to 1961, tracing the shift from mass ex-servicemen’s organisations and identity to the role 
of individual veterans in politics. These chapters – Chapters 4 and 5 – elaborated on their influence 
in politics and the interaction of habitus, social capital and political involvement within their ex-
servicemen’s community. Both chapters covered the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics 
of the time, and juxtaposed the ex-servicemen’s war experience against their subsequent political 
careers. Quite strikingly, how and to what extent, their decision to enter politics had separated them 
from the ‘ordinary’ soldiers, who had returned to a quiet, more settled post-war life, was revealed. 
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6.2 TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF EX-SERVICEMEN IN POLITICS 
The study traced the lives of 153 ex-servicemen, from their early lives through to the end of the Union 
of South Africa in 1961. The 153 ex-servicemen were selected because they entered politics after 
the war. Previous studies have suggested a general disinterest in politics among returned ex-
servicemen. This study, however, by focusing on those that became entangled in politics after 1945, 
reveals a unique sub-set of ex-servicemen. The intersection between post-war political formations 
and the factors that formed political habitus – such as cultural background, military experience and 
class (including education and occupation) – reveals the possible formation of numerous political ex-
serviceman typologies or clusters within a broader ex-servicemen’s identity. 
The emergence of three broad, partially overlapping political groupings between 1948 and 1961, 
were identified, namely the ex-servicemen involved in extra-parliamentary activities, who were 
predominantly liberal and radical in view; the ex-servicemen involved in parliamentary politics, who 
were dominated by servicemen in the United Party (UP); and finally, the ex-servicemen involved in 
the Torch. The Torch, for a brief period, brought the broad political spectrum of ex-servicemen 
together into one organisation by appealing to the ex-servicemen’s identity.  
6.2.1 Pre-war cultural habitus formation 
The men who volunteered for wartime service in the Union Defence Force (UDF) were drawn from 
across the White community and reflected the political dispositions of the dominant cultural groups. 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the sample group of 153 servicemen in each political formation 
according to the dominant cultural group discussed in Chapter Two. White South African involvement 
in post-war politics, and particularly in opposition to the Nationalists, seems to reflect the 
demographics of Jan Smuts’s support base before the war. In the selected group, over half were 
English-speaking, with Jews and Afrikaners accounting approximately equally for the remainder of 
the 153. This trend is most evident in the leadership of the Torch where, despite its appeal to the 
shared ex-serviceman identity, the English-speaking ex-servicemen dominated the leadership 
cadre, and pushed the Torch further left than the UP found acceptable. The UP, as the custodian of 
Smuts’s ‘South Africanism’, had made every effort to continue with a policy of language parity, even 
in the face of declining Afrikaner support in the rural areas. Despite the waning of Afrikaner support 
for the party, the UP maintained a loyal Afrikaner constituency, which the splinter parties could not 
dilute. The need to appeal to the Afrikaans-speaking constituency persisted in parliamentary politics, 
with the leadership of the two more successful parliamentary parties remaining in the hands of 




Table 6.1: Ex-servicemen by political formation and cultural group (n=153)1321 
Political formation Afrikaans English Jewish Total 
Percentage of sample 22% 52% 24% 100% 
Torch Commando 12 40 12 64 
SL 2 14 16 32 
CPSA/SACP 1 9 8 18 
SACOD 1 8 5 14 
LP 1 2 1 4 
LPSA 1 11 5 17 
UFP 1 10 1 12 
PP 4 4 2 10 
UP 31 36 12 79 
 
The PP, which split off from the UP in 1959, and the Labour Party (LP) reflected a similar ethno-
linguistic distribution to that of the UP. Predictably, ex-servicemen in the Union Federal Party (UFP), 
a party promising protection for English-speaking interests, were predominantly English-speaking. 
The Liberal Party (LPSA), although predominantly English, had a strong representation of Jewish 
ex-servicemen, who accounted for almost a third of the group. Jewish representation was even more 
pronounced in the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD), in the Communist Party 
(CPSA/SACP) and in the SL. The number and distribution of Jewish ex-servicemen across the 
political spectrum highlights the strength and diversity of the political activism within the Jewish 
community. 
The Jewish community’s contribution to the war effort and post-war politics far exceeded its size. 
Jewish representation in parliamentary politics ranged between 10 and 20 per cent of the ex-
servicemen. In the left-wing and extra-parliamentary movements, between a third and a half of the 
ex-servicemen involved were Jewish. In contrast, in 1946 the Jewish population had reached 
104,156 and constituted approximately 4.4 per cent of the white population of South Africa.1322 
Jewish prevalence in the left-leaning parties, especially in the radical movements, can be attributed 
to the strong socialist and working-class ethos that came with the Jews who had fled Eastern Europe 
at the start of the twentieth century. The Jewish influence manifested clearly in the SL, in the 
CPSA/SACP and later in Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). 
The preponderance of English-speakers in the sample does not suggest homogeneity of political 
opinions, but rather the opposite. Although in aggregate the English-speaking ex-servicemen were 
more liberal than their Afrikaans-speaking counterparts, this does not mean that individual English-
 
1321  Table developed by Author from DOD Archive, PA; using religion as proxy. Where no religion was stated 
language was determined by consulting UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 35, Biographies 
1951-1976, and UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65 1 5 (part 2), General Election 1953 
UP Candidates Information. 
1322  Shimoni, Community and Conscience, 2. 
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speaking ex-servicemen were not conservative. Certainly within the UP, language was not an 
accurate indicator of political leaning. Furthermore, to the left of the UP, the subtle differences of 
ideology between the various liberal and radical camps often meant that English-speaking ex-
servicemen found themselves in different camps simultaneously. Small changes in policy positions 
would cause repeated ‘defections’ from one camp to one of the several others until government 
suppression lumped them all together. 
Thus, although the exclusive identity politics of the NP may have contributed to the activism of 
English-speaking and Jewish ex-servicemen, the Afrikaans-speaking ex-servicemen in the sample 
indicate that the NP did not enjoy a political hegemony over the Afrikaans community or identity 
during the 1950s. The cultural diversity of ex-servicemen on the political scene suggests a strand of 
a ‘South Africanist’ identity within the ex-serviceman identity. This strand runs through the shared 
schooling and military service of the ex-servicemen. 
6.2.2 The influence of socio-economic class on ex-servicemen 
Schooling, education and occupation are strong sources of social capital. Class affiliation may have 
contributed to the formation among ex-servicemen of a political typology that reinforced consistent 
class behaviour among the ex-servicemen in opposition politics. The influence of the ‘old school tie’ 
among ex-servicemen in politics indicates both the role of class privilege within South African society 
at the time, as well as the school system’s ability to inculcate a sense of comradery, duty, and service 
in the pupils. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 intersect the ex-servicemen’s socio-economic class markers of 
schooling, education and occupation with the membership of a political party.  
Table 6.2 compares the attendance of the schools identified in Chapter Two, with the membership 
of post-war political parties. Although the majority of the ex-servicemen who had attended the listed 
schools were members of the UP, there seems to be sufficient consistency in schooling across all 
parties to suggest that the prevalence of the dominant pre-war social hegemony based on duty and 
activism, that the schools reinforced, in all political formations. Thus, the influence of education on 
political affiliation suggests that schooling had the dual function of providing social capital and, in the 
case of liberal education, engendering a liberal disposition. Despite the radical left’s working-class 
agenda and their strong association with the ‘ordinary soldier’, the radical left’s leadership had a 





Table 6.2: Ex-servicemen’s schooling and political formation (n=153)1323 
School CPSA/ 
SACP 
SACOD LP LPSA UFP PP UP 
Durban High School - - - 1 1 - 4 
Diocesan (Bishops) 1 - - 1 1 1 3 
KES - - - - - 1 4 
SACS - - - - - - 5 
PBHS - - - 2 - 1 3 
Dale College - - - - - - 4 
Ficksburg High School - - - 1 - 1 3 
Paarl Boys High School  - - - - - 2 4 
Grey High School - - 1 1 - - 2 
Maritzburg College 1 1 1 1 2 - - 
Michealhouse - - - 2 1 - 2 
St John’s College - - - - 1 - 2 
Jeppe BHS 1 - - - - 1 2 
Hilton College 1 1 - - - - 2 
Grey’s College - - - - - 1 2 
De Villers Graaff HS 1 1 - - - 1 1 
Parktown Boys High 1 1 - - - - - 
Rondebosch Boys High School - - - - - - 1 
 
This middle-class status is also reflected in the post-war occupations of the ex-servicemen.  
Table 6.3 compares their post-war occupations to political party membership. Furthermore, post-
matric qualifications, such as degrees, diplomas and military staff training, are listed by political party. 
The preponderance of middle-class occupations can be attributed to their access to education, 
afforded them by their pre-war social class, as well as the study opportunities they received on their 
return from the battlefronts. As a result, the majority of ex-servicemen in the selected group had had 
some tertiary education, which provided well-paying employment and the financial independence to 
pursue careers in politics. The extra-parliamentary radical movements, possibly due to their solidary 
with the workers, had the lowest ratio of tertiary qualifications. The formal political parties, which 
appealed to the socially affluent (and the better-qualified sectors of the population) had enjoyed 
higher qualification levels. The LPSA members were the most qualified in academic terms. However, 
despite these subtle differences in education and occupation, Table 6.3 reveals that ex-servicemen 
involved in post-war politics were undoubtedly not working-class or ‘ordinary’, but that they had rather 
maintained well-paying occupations and had access to middle-class lifestyles.  
 
1323  Table developed by Author from DOD Archive, PA; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 35, 
Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65 1 5 (part 2),General Election 
1953 UP Candidates Information; South African Who’s Who 1948-1976; ‘Bishops War Record’, 70–99; 
UNISA-UP Archives, UP Private Papers Sir de Villiers Graaff Papers (United Party Papers 1958-1977), 
File 1.15.11, ‘United Party Personalities’; Illsely, Pretoria Boys High; Barret, ‘A History of Michaelhouse, 
1896-1952’; Armstrong, ‘Strenue – Class Reunions November 2014’. 
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Occupational class Education 
Professional Intermediate Skilled unknown Post-Matric 
Qualification 
Unknown 
Torch  64 20 28 12 4 41 (64%) 12 
SL 32 8 12 11 1 16 (50%) 5 
CPSA/ 
SACP 
18 4 9 5 - 11 (61%) 2 
SACOD 14 4 7 3 - 13 (93%) 1 
LP 4 2 1 1 - 3 (75%) 1 
LPSA 17 13 4 - - 17 (100%) - 
UFP 12 6 5 1 - 10 (83%) 1 
PP 10 7 2 1 - 10 (100%) - 
UP 79 38 27 13 1 65 (82%) 4 
 
The majority of servicemen involved in post-war politics had grown up in an environment that 
embraced ‘South Africanism’ and a collective White identity. Their similar schooling and university 
experiences formed their disposition towards civic duty. By the end of demobilisation, they had firmly 
established themselves as part of the White South African middle-class. These experiences may 
have already provided them with a general foundation from which to launch a career in politics. 
However, the war had provided the catalyst for many to do so. The juxtaposition of their war 
experience with a rising Afrikaner nationalism may have created the context for their political action. 
6.2.3 Influence of war experience on habitus and social capital in the political field 
The involvement of ex-servicemen in the full spectrum of post-war opposition politics suggests a 
nexus between war experience and later political participation. Table 6.4 shows that the older officers 
among the ex-servicemen, with predominantly African campaign experience, clustered in the 
established and centralist UP. However, the different distribution of the veterans of the Italian 
campaign seems to indicate a relationship between the campaign in Italy and more liberal and radical 
political views. Participation in the Italian campaign had exposed servicemen to the potential of 
radical societal change, which may also have contributed to the increased numbers of veterans of 
this campaign in the liberal and radical left formations, especially those that came to the fore after 
1953. Furthermore, in the Italian campaign, the soldier’s age may have amplified the campaign’s 
 
1324  Table compiled by Author from Table compiled by author from; DOD Archive, PA; Wits Historical Papers, 
Springbok Legion, A617; UNISA-UP Archive, UP Transvaal Province File 31.5.3; Who is Who in 
Southern Africa 1948-1964; UNISA-UP Archive, Central Head Office File 61 62 (Part 2) War Veteran 
Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information file 158 (Part 1) War Veteran Torch 
Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information file 158 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; 
UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 35, Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Sir De 
Villiers Graaff Papers, File 1.15.1 United Party Papers 1958-1977; Slovo, Unfinished autobiography; 
Kirkaldy, ‘Very Ordinary Communists’; Carneson, Red in the Rainbow; Bernstein, Memory Against 
Forgetting; Lazerson, Against the Tide; Vigne, Liberals Against Apartheid ; Lovell, Love of Justice. 
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influence on the serviceman’s political disposition. Soldiers fighting in Italy were on average younger 
than their African campaign counterparts, and thus possibly more politically impressionable, which 
also suggests the possibility of a generational leftward shift among the ex-servicemen. In contrast, 
POW status stands out as a unique influence on the captured ex-servicemen. The intensity of the 
experience and the deep personal bonds formed in captivity is evident in Table 6.4.  






Africa Star Italy Star POW AES 
Torch  64 43 23 12 6 
SL 32 19 13 2 5 
CPSA/SACP 18 10 9 - 3 
SACOD 14 4 4 - 2 
LP 4 3 - 1 1 
LPSA 17 12 10 2 4 
UFP 12 11 2 6 1 
PP 10 5 3 1 2 
UP 79 44 26 10 8 
 
Prisoners of War (POW) accounted for over a tenth of the group, which suggests that despite being 
wary of involvement in party politics, they still opposed the NP government. After the collapse of the 
Torch in 1953, the former POWs among the sample found political homes in the UP and UFP. The 
POWs seem to have clustered around the leaders of these parties, suggesting personal loyalties. 
Former POWs tended to cluster around the leadership of a fellow former POW in the UP (Graaff) or 
the UFP (Gilllie Ford). Thus, personal loyalties that developed during captivity may have motivated 
their political activism, in addition to the politicising effect of the war. In this regard, the POW 
experience provided the politically astute ex-servicemen with strong social linkages that could be 
used, even manipulated, later in their careers. 
Table 6.4 also highlights the politicising influence the Army Education Scheme (AES) had on 
information officers. A clear overlap existed between the AES and the SL/CPSA. Furthermore, the 
AES, as a unifying liberal ‘South Africanist’ initiative, is evident in both the presence of former 
information officers in all opposition political formations and their particularly high concentration in 
 
1325  Table compiled by author from; DOD Archive, PA; Wits Historical Papers, Springbok Legion, A617; 
UNISA-UP Archive, UP Transvaal Province File 31.5.3; Who is Who in Southern Africa 1948-1964; 
UNISA-UP Archive, Central Head Office File 61 62 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UP Archive, 
Division of Information file 158 (Part 1) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of 
Information file 158 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, 
File 35, Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Sir De Villiers Graaff Papers, File 1.15.1 United 
Party Papers 1958-1977.  
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the LPSA. The AES may not have successfully politicised the ‘ordinary soldier’, but it did politically 
awaken the information officers involved. 
Finally, Table 6.5 indicates the rank groupings of the ex-servicemen by political party and confirms 
that the social capital and stratification inherent in the military hierarchy translated into the post-war 
political choices of the ex-servicemen.  
Table 6.5: Membership of political formations by rank (n=153)1326 












Torch  6 14 28 1 2 11 2 
SL - - 12 2 3 12 3 
CPSA/SACP - - 5 1 1 9 2 
SACOD - - 5 - - 7 2 
LP - - 2 - - 2 - 
LPSA - 3 4 1 1 8 - 
UFP 1 2 6 - 1 2 - 
PP - - 5 - - 7 2 
UP 4 21 43 1 2 5 3 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the leftist parties and organisations tended to attract a higher proportion of 
junior officers and NCOs, which suggests that the disruption of civilian class and status that they had 
experienced in the military (which exposed them to robust cross-class interaction) had had a 
liberalising effect on the servicemen. The broadening of their political perspectives may have 
politicised them and may account for their willingness to question the established political structures 
after the war. By contrast, the stability and respectability of parliamentary politics, and the more 
centralist position of the UP, attracted the officers, and especially senior and general officers, who 
were part of the socio-political hegemony. They account for three-quarters of the ex-servicemen in 
the UP, the UFP and the PP. These ex-servicemen constituted the rump of opposition to the NP in 
Parliament in the post-war years.  
6.2.4 Long term influence of the war on parliamentarians 
The presence of ex-servicemen in Parliament best illustrates the enduring influence of the war on 
the established political structures of White South Africa. Table 6.6 shows the military experience of 
ex-servicemen parliamentarians for the 10th, 11th and 12th Parliaments. The involvement and 
prominence of ex-servicemen in parliamentary politics clearly shows that the ex-servicemen did not 
 
1326  Table compiled by author from; DOD Archive, PA; Wits Historical Papers, Springbok Legion, A617; 
UNISA-UP Archive, UP Transvaal Province File 31.5.3; Who is Who in Southern Africa 1948-1964; 
UNISA-UP Archive, Central Head Office File 61 62 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UP Archive, 
Division of Information file 158 (Part 1) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of 
Information file 158 (Part 2) War Veteran Torch Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, 
File 35, Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Sir De Villiers Graaff Papers, File 1.15.1 United 
Party Papers 1958-1977.  
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retreat from politics after the war, but rather gained traction. Furthermore, it confirms again that ex-
servicemen transferred their social capital accrued during the war, from the military field to the 
political field.  
Table 6.6: Ex-serviceman parliamentarians by rank (n=153)1327 
Rank 10th Parliament  
1948-1952 




General1328 - - 1 
Colonel 2 2 1 
Lieutenant Colonel 1 1 1 
Major 2 2 3 
Captain 5 6 6 
Lieutenant 3 3 6 
Unknown 1 1 2 
Sergeant 1 1 1 
Corporal - 2 1 
LCpl - - 1 
Total 15 19 23 
 
Table 6.7 shows the military experience of the parliamentarians from 1948 until 1961. The figures 
confirm the previous observations regarding the relationship between campaign experience and 
participation in post-war parliamentary politics. Furthermore, the emergence of the veterans of the 
Italian campaign in politics in later years is evident, despite the involvement of former POWs in 
political parties and veteran movements as indicated in Table 6.4 above. The former POWs seem to 
have been unsuccessful in reaching Parliament, which creates the impression that they had 
withdrawn from politics as a group, except for Graaff and Gray-Hughes.  
Table 6.7: War experience of ex-serviceman parliamentarians (n=153)1329 
War experience 10th Parliament  
1948-1952 




Africa Star 8 8 15 
Italy Star 1 3 8 
POW 2 2 3 
AES - 3 3 
 
Table 6.8 shows the cultural background of the ex-serviceman parliamentarians. Despite the UP’s 
careful placing of the two dominant language groups within the party, Table 6.8 would seem to 
indicate the low esteem the Afrikaans-speaking voter generally held for wartime military service, by 
the low numbers of Afrikaans-speaking ex-serviceman parliamentarians. Graaff’s belief that his 
 
1327  South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA. 
1328  Brigadier James Durrant attained the rank of Major General during the war and had been reduced to 
the peacetime rank of Brigadier. 
1329  South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA. 
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social and military background could secure him the Afrikaans-speaker votes was thus seemingly 
misplaced. 
Table 6.8: Ethno-linguistic groups of ex-serviceman parliamentarians (n=153)1330 
Ethno-linguistic group 10th Parliament  
1948-1952 




Afrikaans-speaking 1 3 8 
English-speaking 10 13 12 
Jewish 4 3 3 
Total 15 19 23 
 
Interestingly, Table 6.8 reveals that although English-speaking ex-servicemen accounted for the 
majority of ex-serviceman parliamentarians during the 1950s, there was a relative decrease in both 
English-speaking and Jewish parliamentarians as opposed to their Afrikaans-speaking colleagues. 
Although only slight, it does suggest that significant changes occurred in South Africa’s socio-political 
demographics during the 1950s, a precursor to the English-speaking and Jewish communities’ 
gradual detachment from parliamentary politics in the following decades. 
6.3 FINDINGS 
A generic typology of the ex-servicemen in politics, being ex-servicemen who were well-educated 
and held predominantly professional and intermediate level occupations, is proposed. Although war 
service may have politicised and, to an extent perhaps, liberalised the soldier, these ex-servicemen 
had already come from home and educational environments that had made them disposed to liberal 
ideals. Despite the radical-left, extra-parliamentary groupings having had slightly less affluent 
occupations than their liberal, progressive and moderate parliamentarian counterparts, there 
remains a consistency of class within the broader sample. 
Apart from creating a sense of solidarity around the ex-serviceman identity, war service allowed 
soldiers to question the dominant political discourse in South Africa. Where war experiences 
disrupted and dislocated the dominant racial and class structures, similar dislocation occurred in the 
ex-serviceman’s pre-war habitus, making them prone to adopt more liberal and even radical views. 
Where middle-class volunteers had accepted enlisted ranks, new perspectives on class and privilege 
had confronted them, which dislodged their pre-war political perspectives. Exposure to the 
destructive powers of warfare and the excesses of authoritarian regimes, especially in the Italian 
campaign, reinforced their loathing for fascism in any form. Participation in the Italian campaign, 
more than the African campaigns, seems to have nudged ex-servicemen towards leftist beliefs. The 
juxtaposition of the liberal opinions formed by the ex-servicemen with the fascist perspectives that 
festered at home, especially after the 1948 elections, acted as a catalyst to mobilise ex-servicemen 
 
1330  South African Who’s Who 1948-1977; DOD Archive, PA. 
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to action. Thus, where societal disruption was acute, ex-servicemen experienced political awakening 
or, in some cases, reawakening. 
The two explicit attempts to politicise soldiers during the war (through the SL and the AES) seem to 
have had only a fleeting impact on the ‘ordinary’ soldier, who quickly returned to civil society after 
the war. However, these two organisations did have a persistent and permanent impact on the 
servicemen actively involved in these structures. A tightly-knit core of legionnaires remained in the 
Legion after the war and sustained it for almost a decade before continuing together in radical politics 
and armed struggle. The AES officers were also over-represented in politics in terms of numbers. 
Their greater involvement in the liberal and progressive politics stands testimony to the enduring 
impact this initiative had had on them. 
Thus, war experience had prompted these ex-servicemen’s political careers. It gave them a sense 
of agency and enriched them with social capital. However, the evidence suggests that the war had 
varied success in liberalising the ex-servicemen and, in many cases, strengthened pre-war ‘South 
Africanist’ perspectives. Within the typology of the politically-exposed ex-servicemen there existed 
various clusters or strata derived from the differences in political views (habitus) of these one-time, 
volunteer soldiers. Thus, the typology is based rather on the sense of agency and obligation 
awakened by military service, the social capital derived from being identified as an ex-serviceman 
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  KC Acutt 1909 1940   Air 
Force 
X X   
 
     Torch       




 1947 Pte SL CPSA, 
SACOD 
    
  R Badenhorst 
Durrant 




 1944     UP 1951-
1961 
  




 1943 Capt   UP 1958-
1961 
  
V583213 TVR Beard 1926 1944 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Pte   LPSA     





 1945 Lt Torch UP     







 1945 Lt Navy Torch       
240330 AZ Berman 1893 1940 Lt Army X X   
 
 1945 Maj   UP     
V316117 DEM Berman 1921 1943 Pte Army X X   X  1946 LCpl SL CPSA   




Maj   UP     
  L Bernstein 1920 1943 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Pte SL CPSA, SACP, 
SACOD 
  Bernstein, L. Memory 
against Forgetting; 
‘Interview by Terri Barnes’  
V226959 PAB Beyleveld 1916 1941 Pte Army X 
 
  X  1946 Pte SL,Torch LP    'Interview with Piet 
Beyleveld by David Everatt' 




 1946 Capt Torch       






 1945 Col Torch UP     




 1944 Lt Torch UFP     






Cpl Torch LP, UFP     
639617/ 
PF240281 






 1948 Lt Gen Torch UP   Birkby, C. Uncle George. 
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Brig   UP 1960-
1961 
  






 1946 Lt   UP 1958-
1959 
  




X 1945 Lt SL, 
Torch 
      
V232524 PB Brown  1924 1942 Pte Army X X   X  1946 Pte   LPSA   Cardo, M. Opening Men’s 
Eyes; ‘Interview with Dr 
Peter Brown conducted by 
Prof Norman Bromberger’ 
 580073 BP Bunting 1920 1943 Cpl Air 
Force 
 
X   X  1945 Lt SL CPSA, SACP  1953 ‘Interview with Brian 
Bunting by Don Pinnock’ 




 1945 SLt   UP   Mouton FA. Iron in the Soul 




 1942 Sgt SL       
V117392 F Carneson 1920 1940 Pte Army X X   
 
 1945 Pte SL CPSA, SACP   Carneson, L. Red in the 
Rainbow; ‘Interview with F 
Carneson by J Fredrikse’; 
‘Interview with Fred 
Carneson by David Everatt’ 




X 1945 Cpln Torch UFP   Chutter, JB. Captivity 
Captive 
V14826 VJ Clapham 1913 1940 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Lt SL, 
Torch 
UP    




 1946 Capt SL CPSA, 
SACOD 
    
V14476 WS Conradie 1917 1940 Cpl Army X X   
 
 1946 Sgt Torch UFP     
V230389 MM Corbett 1923 1942 2Lt Army 
 
X   X  1945 Lt Torch       
V558751 H Couzyn 1896 1942 2Lt Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Maj   UP     
V42821 AH Coy 1902 1939 Capt Army X 
 
Burma X  1945 Brig Torch       




X 1945 Lt   UP     
V242551 T Cross 1920 1941 Pte Army 
  
  X  1946 Pte SL       
V179949 RC Dagge 1898 1939 Capt Army X X   X  1946 Lt Col Torch       
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V612108 TRH Davenport 1926 1945 Sgt Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Pte Torch LPSA     




 1943 Lt   UP     
V611604 WH 
dE 
Deacon 1926 1944 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Pte   UP     
  J Dormehl 1922 1939   Army X X   
 
       UP     




 1947 Lt   UP     






 1943 Lt Col Torch       






 1945 Capt Torch UFP     






   Maj Gen Torch UP, UFP     
V159803 CW Eglin 1925 1943 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1943 LCpl Torch UP,PP 1958-
1961 
Eglin, C. Crossing the 
Borders of Power; Mouton 
FA. Iron in the Soul, 
‘Interview with Colin Eglin 
by B Hackland’ 
V327821  DA Etheredge 1921 1942 SSgt Air 
Force 
X X   X  1946 Capt SL, 
Torch 
      




 1943 Lt   UP     




X 1945 Capt Torch UP     
V6320 RM Fenhalls 1914 1940 Pte Air 
Force 
X X   
 
 1945 2Lt Torch UP     




 1945     UP 1958-
1961 
  






X 1945 2Lt Torch UFP     




 1941 Capt   UP,PP 1953-
1961 
  




   Maj   UP,PP 1946-
1955 
  
  HG Gericke 1920 1941 2Lt Air 
Force 
 
X   
 
 1945 Lt   UP     
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   Col   UP 1939-
1957 
Gluckman, H. Abiding 
Values 




     SL, 
Torch 
      




 1945 Capt Torch LPSA     








Graaff, D. Div Looks Back; 
Mouton FA. Iron in the 
Soul; ‘Interview with Sir De 
Villiers Graaff by B 
Hackland’ 
V205996 WH Greeff 1918 1941 2Lt Air 
Force 
X X   
 
 1945 Lt Torch UP     
V26080 HH Greenwood 1912 1939 Capt Army X X   
 
X 1946 Lt Col Torch       
V582286 WV Hain 1924 1943 Pte Army X X   
 
 1946 Pte   LPSA   Hain, P. Ad and Wal 




   2Lt Torch UFP     
V203491 J Hamilton 
Russel 






 1943 Lt   UP,PP 1946-
1961 
  
f268744 JEG Hasting Beck 
(ne de Villiers) 





 1945 Lt   UP,PP     




 1946 Pte SL SACOD     




 1943 Lt Torch UP     
V2033214 BH Henwood 1899 1940 Capt Air 
Force 
 
X   
 
 1945 Capt   UP 1949-
1961 
  




 1945 SSgt   LPSA     










V123846 JL Horak 1917 1941 Lt Army X X   
 
 1945 Capt   UP 1958-
1961 
  




X 1945 Sgt   UP 1949-
1961 
  




  X  1945 WO II SL       




 1943 maj   UP     
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 1945 WO SL, 
Torch 
LPSA,CPSA   Isacowitz, R. Telling 
People What They Do Not 
Want to Hear 





X    Maj   UP    Jacobs, G. Beckoning 
Horizons 
V179837 EA Joseph 1909 1940 Lt Air 
Force 
X X   
 
 1945 Capt SL, 
Torch 
      





 1946 Lt   LP,SACOD   Joseph, H. Side by side: 
The autobiography of 
Helen Joseph 
V251556 MM Kagan 1909 1942 Cpl Army X X   X  1946 Sgt SL       
28477 L Kane-Berman 1905 1939 Lt Army X X   X  1945 Maj Torch UFP   Kane-Berman, J. Between 
Two Fires 




X 1945 Pte SL, 
Torch 
      




X 1945 Capt   UP     
V34408 W Kodesh 1918 1940 Pte Army X X   X  1945 Cpl SL CPSA, SACP, 
SACOD 
  ‘Interview with Wolfie 
Kodesh by J Fredrikse’ 




X 1946 maj Torch UP,PP 1958   




 1946 Lt   LPSA     
V123895 DE Lang  1915 1940 CO Army X X France 
and 
Germany 
X  1945 maj   LPSA     
V152845 JGF Lang  1922 1941 Pte NAvy X X   
 
 1945 Pte Torch LPSA     
V143423 EWC Lardner-Burke 1916 1940 Pte Air 
Force 
X X   X  1946 Lt Torch       




 1945 Lt   UP 1958-
1961 
  
V180190 LB Lee-Warden 1913 1940 Pte Army X 
 
  X  1945 Cpl Torch SACOD 1955-
1960 
‘Memoirs Len Lee-Warden’ 
85774/ 
V203528 
I Lehr 1903 1940 Cpl Air 
Force 
 
X   
 
 1947 Capt   UP     




X 1945 Lt   UP     
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V102719 JE Lindsay 1918 1939 2Lt Air 
Force 
X X   
 
X 1952 Capt   UP     





 1945   SL CPSA,SACOD     






 1944 Capt SL LP 1950-
1957 
Lovell, L. For the Love of 
Justice 






   Col Torch     Franks, N. Sky Tiger, 
Walker, O. Sailor Malan 




 1943 Maj Torch UP   Venter, C. ‘Majoor, J.P. 
Marais: Die Skepper van 
Klipdrif Brandewyn’ 




 1945 Lt Col   LPSA     




X 1945 Maj   UFP     




X 1945 Lt Torch UP,UFP     






 1946 Capt   UP     
232856 KHC McIntyre 1917 1943 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
 1946 Pte Torch LPSA     






 1945 Lt Col Torch UP 1949-
1957 
  
V3583 H Meidner 1914 1940 Pte Army X X   X X 1945 Cpl   LPSA     






 1944 Lt   UP 1958-
1961 
  




 1947 Maj Gen Torch UP     
V4609 JC Moll 1920 1940 Pte Army X X   
 
 1945 Sgt   UP     




 1944 Maj   UP 1950-
1961 
  




 1943 Sgt SL CPSA     




 1945 WO II   UP     
V14208 LG Murray 1911 1940 Lt Army X X   
 
 1946 Maj   UP     
62289 G Nicholson 1918 1940 Pte Army X 
 
  X  1945 Pte Torch       
V558775 JP 
dM 
Niehaus 1910 1943 Lt Army X X   X  1945 Lt   UP     
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 1945 Lt Torch UP     
V208957 JJ O'Meara 1914 1941 SSgt Air 
Force 
X X   X  1945 Lt SL CPSA     




 1943 Capt   UP 1949-
1957 
Hocking, A. Oppenheimer 
and Son 
V126339 RS Parrot 1919 1939 Sgt Army X X   X  1945 Maj Torch UP,PP     
  RD Pilkington-
Jordan 




 1944 Col   UP 1950-
1958 
  





 1945 Lt SL, 
Torch 
      






 1945 Pte SL CPSA     




  X  1947 Maj Torch UP     






 1953 Col   UP     
  HJO Prinsloo 1906 1939 Maj Army X X   
 
 1948 Maj Torch UP     




   Col   UP     
V185378 WV Raw 1921 1940 SSgt Army X X   
 
 1945 Lt Torch UP 1958-
1961 
‘Interview with Vause Raw 
by B Hackland’ 
V590563 GH Relly 1926 1944 LCpl Army 
 
X   
 
 1945 LCpl   UP     




 1943 Lt   UP 1949-
1952 
  




 1942 Lt   UP 1958-
1961 
  




 1945 Lt SL CPSA,SACOD     
V3677 LI Rubin 1909 1940 LCpl Army X X   X  1946 Lt Torch LPSA     






X 1945 Lt Torch       
V251285 J Sachs 1915 1940 Sgt Army 
  
  X  1945 Capt SL       
V178793 IF Schermbrucker 1921 1940 Pte Army X X   
 
 1945 Pte SL SACP, CPSA   Kirkaldy, A. ‘Very Ordinary 
Communists: The Life of 
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Ivan and Lesley 
Schermbrucker’ 
V543198 H Schwarz 1924 1943 2Lt Air 
Force 
 
X   X  1945 Lt Torch UP   ‘Interview with Harry 
Schwarz by B Hackland’ 
V107101 RD Sive 1913 1940 Lt Army X X   X  1946 Capt Torch UP     
  YM Slovo 1926 1943 Pte Army 
 
X   
 
     SL CPSA,SACOD   Slovo, J. Slovo: The 
Unfinished Autobiography; 
‘Interview with Joe Slovo 
by J Fredrickse’  
WP Stanford 1916 1940   Air 
Force 
X X   
 
 1945 Lt Col   LPSA,PP 1955-
1961 
  
V592832 CG Starke 1902 1944 Pte Army 
 
X   
 









 1944 Capt   UP,PP 1953-
1961 
‘Interview with Dr Jan 
Steytler by B Hackland’ 
V12010 WJ Steytler 1906 1940 Lt Army 
  
  X  1944 Lt Torch UP,PP     




 1945 Lt Col   UP     





 1945 Lt   LPSA,SACOD   Strachan, H. Make a Skyf, 
Man! 
V110744 JS Stuttaford 1913 1940 2Lt Army 
 
X   
 
 1944 Lt   UP     
V313898 RG Taverner 1924 1941 Pte Army 
  
  X  1946 Sgt Torch       




X 1945 Lt Col Torch       




 1943 Capt   UP 1939-
1952 
  




 1946 Capt   UP     
V262242 A van der Spuy 1913 1941 Capt Army 
 
X   X  1945 Capt   UP     






 1946 Brig Torch     Van der Spuy, KR. 
Chasing the Wind 
14660 HA van 
Hoogstraten 




X 1945 Maj   UP     




 1943 Cpl   UP     
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 1942 Lt   UP 1947-
1957 
  
V563038 CG Williams 1909 1942 SLt Navy 
 
X   
 
 1946 SLt SL, 
Torch 
CPSA,SACOD     




X 1945 Pte Torch UFP,LPSA     




 1947 Maj Gen Torch       
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Deur Die Beredderaar Ingevolge Artikel 4(1) van Die Wet Op Die Onderdrukking van Communisms, 1950 (Wet No.44 van 1950) van Persone Wat 
Ampsdraers, Beamptes, Lede of Aktiewe Ondersteuners Is of Was van Die Kommunistiese Party van Suid-Afrika’; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, 
File 35, Biographies 1951-1976; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, File 65 1 5 (part 2), General Election 1953 UP Candidates’ Information; UNISA-
UP Archives, UP Private Papers Sir De Villiers Graaff Papers (United Party Papers 1958-1977), File 1.15.11, ‘United Party Personalities’; UNISA-UP Archive, 
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Commando; UNISA-UP Archive, Division of Information, Subject File 158 (Part 2) War Veterans Torch Commando; Wits Historical Papers, A617, Springbok 
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